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1. INTRODUCTION 
Having entered the aid sector in 2007 with an optimistic attitude, I was surprised 
to come across a book published in 2009 in which it was stated ‘Aid has helped 
make the poor poorer, and the growth slower’ (Moyo 2009:xix). Two years later 
an audit report was issued with the headline ‘Lack of results orientation in 
Norwegian long-term development aid’  (Office of the Auditor General of 
Norway 2011). In general ‘results and risk management are identified as “weak 
spots” in Norwegian development cooperation management’ (Norad 2008:5). 
Such criticisms made me want to explore why. Quite contrary to what I read, I 
saw my colleagues in the Norwegian Red Cross overloaded with writing reports 
that predominantly showed good results. There had to be a gap somewhere. I 
wanted to find the underlying reasons – and thus began the journey that has 
resulted in this thesis. 
Capacity Building is recognized as important in achieving aid effectiveness and 
sustainability (OECD undated b). Norwegian development aid strategy highlights 
the need to build institutions and organizations that are capable of leading their 
own development based on national and local needs. A substantial share of 
Norwegian aid is directed towards Capacity Building of NGOs (Norad 2010:1). 
For the Red Cross globally, it is an overarching strategy to ‘build strong National 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (IFRC 2010a:22). The objectives are to 
build up expanded, sustainable capacity, with greater participation in community 
affairs and scaled-up services (IFRC 2010a:24).  However, in general, 
‘successful and sustainable capacity development has remained an elusive goal’ 
(Fukuda-Parr 2002:vii). In particular, it has proven difficult to measure the 
results of capacity building (White Paper no. 13 2009:97).  
I have worked with Results Management most of my professional life, 
documenting the results of complex processes. The challenges of Capacity 
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Building caught my interest. I wanted to use the Red Cross as the main object of 
study; moreover, the Red Cross could give me unique access to data.  
I wanted to explore a paradox: although the Red Cross has worked intensively on 
Capacity Building (CB), results seem to be lacking in NGO aid. Exploring the 
intersection between Results Based Management (RBM) and CB could shed light 
on whether the problems are related to the methodology employed. 
1.1 Research question 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore why Capacity Building seem to 
remain an elusive goal despite huge efforts of Results Based Management. 
Despite all the hype surrounding Capacity Building (CB), the concept remains 
elusive, ridden with conceptual and methodological challenges (Fukuda-Parr e.t 
al. 2002). Further, it has been claimed that Results Based Management (RBM) is 
counterproductive (Ebrahim and Rangan 2010:12). This thesis examines how 
RBM contributes, or does not contribute, to better results in CB. 
In recent decades, there has come greater pressure on proving the results of aid. I 
will try to shed light on the reasons for this increase in general, and critically 
discuss the consequences. My business background has led me to appreciate the 
saying ‘if you can’t measure it, it you can’t manage it’. I enjoy measuring, 
numbers, matrixes and reports, and believe they are all worthwhile. On the other 
hand such efforts are worthwhile only if they contribute to better results. 
Drawing on a case study of capacity development projects at the Norwegian Red 
Cross, I will discuss some of those challenges and seek to provide a partial 
explanation for the elusiveness of CB success, despite greater RBM efforts.   
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My analysis is structured around three sub-questions (see Figure 1). First, setting 
realistic goals is a part of RBM. However, the apparent or real lack of results 
might also stem from setting goals and ambitions overly high.  
My assumption was that each and every project and each and every programme 
coordinator has to deal with a plethora of demands, goals and guidelines  
formulated by  the international community, national politicians, as well as the 
ambitions and expectations of the organization in question.  Series of such over-
ambitious goals can explain the lack of results, whether perceived or real. It is 
disputable whether aid has not brought results. I will argue that the impression 
has been crafted that aid has failed in delivering results – an impression I suggest 
is overwhelmingly incorrect. This thesis highlights that results are understood in 
many different ways. Whether or not results are achieved depends on which level 
we are looking at – the organizational or societal level. 
The second question concerns whether RBM contributes in documenting actual 
results, enhancing learning and promoting better results. It is often held that weak 
results in the aid sector can be traced back to the lack of Results Management. I 
will challenge this diagnosis, asking whether the methods and focus of RBM 
Why does Capacity Building (CB) 
seem to remain an elusive goal 
despite huge efforts of Results 
Based Management (RBM)? 
 
What are the main 
challenges of CB and does 
RBM address those?  
Does RBM document actual 
results of CB and 
contribute to improved 
results through e.g. 
learning?   
Do unrealistic ambitions 
and goals set CB up for 
failure?   
Figure 1: The research question with three sub-questions  
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contribute to better results. The literature concerned with RBM in the aid sector 
gives the impression of a methodology that draws an extensive amount of 
resources without contributing to the overall development goal (Policy and 
Operations Evaluation Department 2011, Ebrahim and Rangan 2010, Eggen 
2008, Natsios 2010, Mikkelsen 2005). Ebrahim and Rangan claim that RBM is 
counterproductive (2010:12). Especially criticized has been that RBM focuses on 
quantitative results, short time-periods, planning matrixes and assumptions of 
linear causality. The methodology basis of RBM might be ill-suited for 
documenting results of complex interventions like CB.  
Critics have claimed that some of the best and most sustainable development 
projects get forced off the priority lists, replaced by projects that can document 
impact in quantitative terms within short timespans (Eggen 2008, Fukuda-Parr e.t 
al. 2002, Natsios 2010, Hulme 2007, Ortiz and Taylor 2009:14). For instance, it 
has been claimed that important goals never reached the list of the UN 
Millennium Development Goals ‘for reasons derived from the RBM principles’ 
(Hulme 2007:16).  
The third question is whether RBM sufficiently addresses the main challenges of 
CB. My assumption was that capacity development is linked to good governance, 
which has been largely criticized for basing development approaches on the 
premise that ‘the others’ lack something that ‘we’ have (Taylor 2004, Howell 
2002, Solli 2011), and that RBM does not sufficiently address this paternalism. 
The normative imagination might contradict the locally-based approach as well 
as local identity ownership efforts, leading to weak development results.  
Thus, judging from the academic literature, I expected to find counterproductive 
RBM and distortion of projects, ill-suited methodology, too many goals and 
guidelines, and development projects mirroring our self-image. If confirmed, 
these elements might explain the apparent or actual lack of results from CB 
projects. However, based on my knowledge of the Red Cross, I had a feeling that 
the scholarly criticism did not cover the whole picture. 
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Throughout this thesis, I hope to show that there is no single reason for the 
impression of elusiveness of Capacity Building. Mono-causal reasons are often 
cited to explain the lack of results. For instance, corruption is often held to be a 
main impediment (Banik 2010). I will argue that the reasons for any weak results 
are multifaceted. Further, I will demonstrate that the impression is partly only 
that – an impression. However, partly there are also substantial challenges 
making results less achievable. Drawing on researchers’ criticisms, I investigate 
and discuss whether RBM is a part of the problem in creating and showing 
results.   
1.2 Rationale 
On behalf of taxpayers and intended beneficiaries, it is a commitment for all 
development actors to allocate and use resources in the best possible way.  
Parliaments and the public call for justification for aid expenditures (Klingebil 
2011). Evaluating and documenting achieved results is important for the intended 
beneficiaries as well. Importantly, RBM is practised not only for retrospective 
use and documentation, but also for informing practitioners to make the best 
decisions: to improve the aid practice. That is the overall reason why research on 
this topic is highly relevant 
Because considerable resources are spent on monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting, it is important to make this as useful as possible. How can evaluation 
and RBM help us understand, change behaviour if necessary and perform better? 
Monitoring and evaluations should provide the basis for understanding what 
works and not, and why (Ortiz and Taylor 2009:12). 
‘There is a strong link between institutional development and sustainability’ 
(Kruse et al. 1998:7). Hence, Capacity Building is important. However, as the 
objectives seems to remain out of reach, there is a need to investigate what kind 
of CB works and how we can achieve a better focus and priority on this topic 
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when it comes to funding and in NGO strategies and activities. To discover what 
kind of CB works, we must learn from successes and mistakes in that field. Then 
we need RBM to lead us in a productive direction. As Denmark’s official 
development agency Danida states: 
While capacity development support is an important element (…) it is generally 
recognized that the knowledge about how best to deliver the support and how to 
measure the results of this key type of assistance is limited. (Danida 2005:3).  
By studying the reporting and evaluations practices in the Norwegian Red Cross, 
the aim of this thesis is to contribute to this debate.  
1.3 Definitions 
Capacity is ‘the ability to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve 
objectives’ (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002:8). Capacity Building is done to enhance 
‘the ability of individuals, organizations, or systems to perform their functions 
more efficiently, effectively, and sustainably’ (Bohwasi et al.1998:13).  This may 
take place at three levels: the individual, the organizational and the state level. 
This thesis will concentrate on capacity at the organizational level, more 
precisely: civil society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
The Red Cross uses the term ‘Organizational Development’ to describe the 
strategy and programmes within this area (Norwegian Red Cross 2012c:4) The 
aim of Organizational Development:  
is a major increase or improvement, often requiring a transformation. The result is a 
new quality (from weak to strong NS
1
, from dependent to sustainable), a modification 
of structures, delivery systems or services; or a dramatic increase in key numbers (incl. 
the adaptation of the organization to new situations). (Norwegian Red Cross 2012c:4)  
This definition of Organizational Development is similar to how the academic 
literature defines Capacity Building. Worth noting is that  the Red Cross uses the 
                                              
1
 NS: National Society, a term often used to describe Red Cross organizations that Norwegian Red Cross 
or other actors support 
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term Capacity Building to describe ‘work done within a National Society to 
improve what already exists’ (Norwegian Red Cross 2012c:4). However, as the 
way the Red Cross uses the term Organizational Development is very similar to 
the way that most of the aid sector and academics use Capacity Building, I have 
chosen to use ‘Capacity Building’, or ‘CB’, as the main term in this study. 
Throughout the thesis, I refer to the different actors in the aid chain using various 
terms, which may need some clarification.  
The aid chain: 
Local branch -> National Society -> Partner National Society -> Norad, MFA or another back-donor  
A local branch is a part of a Red Cross National Society (NS). The term NS is 
often used to describe those Red Cross societies that implement development 
activities. Sometimes I also use the term ‘implementing’ or ‘receiving’ NS to be 
explicit about their role. Partner national societies (PNSs) is used to describe 
those Red Cross societies that contribute with funding. For instance, the 
Norwegian Red Cross and the German Red Cross often act as PNSs, while the 
Burundi Red Cross is a receiving and implementing National Society (NS). The 
term ‘back-donors’ refers to development agencies like the Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA). 
All Red Cross Societies are members of the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Sometimes I refer to the IFRC as the 
Federation, and sometimes all Red Cross Societies are referred to as the 
Movement.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 The emergence of Capacity Building  
Institutions re-entered the development agenda after a period of being ignored 
(Bohwasi et al.1998:11). Following the collapse of communism, trade and neo-
liberal thinking dominated the 1980s, with structural adjustment programmes and 
deregulation (Banik 2006, Mosse 2005). In the 1990s, experiences with the Asian 
Tigers and analyses of their states’ features placed both institutions and the 
importance of ‘good governance’ on the agenda (Banik 2006:41, Bohwasi et al. 
1998:11, Howell 2002). Institutionalism became a part of the new aid 
architecture. Strengthening civil society was a part of the effort to overcome the 
failings of regimes (Mosse 2005:3-4). 
The heightened role of civil society came about because the challenges of 
poverty and development could not be solved by the existing theories and 
solutions. The new ethic came to focus on local populations and what 
development meant to them – as with social movements and landless people’s 
movements. In general, ‘civil society’ was the panacea of the 1990s, inspired by 
the idea of ‘social capital’ that encompassed norms, networks, cooperation and 
trust (Banik 2006:46). NGOs were seen as more reliable than states and more 
connected to the grassroots level (Banik 2006:260). Also self-organization, re-
organization of society, partnership and local ownership became the new 
strategies (Mosse 2005:5). 
This led to a greater role for the NGOs in the 1990s (Howell 2002 and Banik 
2010). The number of registered NGOs in OECD countries doubled between 
1980 and1993. Norwegian aid amounted to NOK 28 billion in 2012, of which 3.7 
billion went to NGOs.  
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The three areas dominating the NGO channel in the periode 2000-2012 was good 
governance (28%), emergency assistance (25%), and health and social services 
(18%) (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Aid budget through NGOs split by areas in the periode 2000-
2012 (Norad 2013d) 
The support for good governance increased steadily from 2000 to 2009, 
thereafter levelling out. ‘Good governance’ includes support to civil society. In 
total, good governance through NGOs amounted to NOK 1.2 billion in 2012, 
accounting for 4% of the total budget.  
Development as enhancing skills  
The main tasks of Norwegian development policy are to fight poverty, to 
contribute to the fulfilment of human rights, and to help countries and people 
gain control of their own development and their own lives (White Paper 2009 no 
13:5 and 10). A main impediment to development was understood as weak 
institutions.  Capacity Building (CB) in these institutions, thus, became the new 
and right thing to do (Riddell 2001). 
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2.2 History of the growth of Capacity Building (CB) 
CB emerged as a reaction to technical assistance (TA) that emphasized 
knowledge transfer through experts. ‘There is growing consensus that TA (…) 
has largely been a failure’ (Riddell 2001:203). 
According to Kuramoto and Sagasti:  
The development cooperation experiment in general, and technical assistance 
programmes in particular, were devised and put in practice at a time when the 
productivity-increase approach – embedded within the larger paradigm of 
modernization – dominated development thinking and practice. (...) Traditional ways, 
knowledge and beliefs were generally seen as a hindrance to modernization and 
economic growth. (Kuramoto and Sagasti, in Fukuda-Parr 2002:215)  
Donor countries or agencies thus sent their experts to train their counterparts in 
developing countries, or only to fix problems, like constructing a water-hole, 
building schools, developing various systems, etc. This proved to be expensive 
and yielded limited results. When the experts left the country, the expertise left 
with them. Riddell (2001) argues that sufficient knowledge was not transferred 
and thus sustainability was severely hampered. Moreover, technical assistance 
was often conducted by experts who had either the wrong skills or little 
pedagogical insight. Nor did they see themselves as mentors. Instead of 
sustainable capacity, parallel structures were often built, and those lasted only as 
long as the expatriates’ contracts lasted (Riddell 2001, Bohwasi et al.1998:16). 
Due to the critique of TA, the new role for donors was envisioned: they should 
contribute to development of local skills, via CB based on a long-term and 
involving process (Riddell 2001).  
Also in Norwegian development policy, institutional development and CB gained 
importance throughout the 1990s (Kruse et al. 1998: 8–9). Civil society and CB 
become key areas: 
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Measures to strengthen important social institutions and organizations will be key areas 
of long-term cooperation (…) Cooperation will not be limited to strengthening public 
institutions, but will also include institutions in business and civil society. (White Paper 
No. 19, 1995–96:42–43, in Kruse et al. 1998:9) 
Subsequent White Papers have followed this new strategy. The White Paper on 
Climate, Capital and Conflicts (no 13, 2009) focuses on  civil society as 
important for voicing the interests of marginalized people, securing a free press, 
and enabling organizations to supplement the public services, which often are 
below a minimum standard (White Paper 2009, no 13:25–26). According to the 
Norwegian government: ‘Organizations have become a significant channel for 
Norwegian public aid’(my translation, White Paper no 13, 2009:96). Both the 
White Paper on Global Health (No 11, 2011–2012), and  White Paper no 14 
(2010–2011), ‘Towards a greener development’, emphasize the role of civil 
society. 
CB is on the one hand seen as both important and a major step forward from 
Technical Assistance (TA). On the other hand, it is also perceived as yet another 
‘buzzword’ which hides more than it reveals (Banik 2010:23). CB and good 
governance have many similarities: both are about management and efficiency. 
Good governance also has (or had) the same positive aura as CB enjoys today, 
for as George and Sabelli put it: ‘[B]eing against good governance is like being 
against motherhood and apple-pie’ (George and Sabelli in Taylor 2004:134).  
2.3 History of Result Based Management (RBM) 
In recent decades, there has been tremendous pressure to show results (Ortiz and 
Taylor 2009, Klingebil 2011, Hulme 2007). RBM became popular within the 
government sector, the civil service and the aid sector. Business schools educated 
their students in the concepts, which, with their common-sense nature and 
linearity, proved attractive (Hulme 2007:18). 
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RBM became influential also in Norway (Hulme 2007:6). The idea of RBM and 
setting targets resonated with Norad, as well as with the development agencies of 
the USA, the UK and Germany (Hulme 2007:18). As a response to criticisms of 
RBM as a weak spot, Norad developed ‘Results Management in Norwegian 
Development Cooperation: A practical guide’ (Norad 2008) for NGOs and other 
development agencies.  From being an underperforming sector, the aid sector 
was now expected to achieve better results with this new toolbox (Hulme 
2007:18).  
Earlier it was enough to document that resources had been transferred and 
activities carried out according to plan. Today one is expected to show what 
change those activities have led to at a higher societal level (Eggen 2011:68). 
Donors want to know if X leads to Y, where Y often is at a national and overall 
development level. This implies or assumes that there is a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship, and that it is possible to isolate this relationship so as to attribute 
impact to programme activities.  
In 2006, a committee headed by Rattsø conducted an appraisal. The conclusion 
was quite pessimistic regarding the possibility of positive results from Northern 
support to strengthening civil society in the South. Also, the report stated that 
evaluations of CB were mainly impression-based rather than based on systematic 
collection of empirical data (Rattsø 2006:96). The report led to more thorough 
evaluations of the development activities of Norwegian NGOs (Norad 2011b:36). 
2.4 Recent assessments of development results in civil 
society sector and use of RBM 
‘Did the strengthening of civil society organizations in East Africa lead to 
poverty reduction among women and children in the areas where the 
organizations operate, according to the objectives set?’, Norad asks (2012a). This 
Norad report, like several others, states that not enough is known about the 
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results of Norwegian development interventions. For the year 2011, Norad 
concludes, regarding evaluations in general, that data or systems are lacking and 
that the outcomes or impacts could not be satisfactorily assessed (Norad 2011b). 
In the next annual report, Norad asks if Capacity Building is about to become the 
new ‘white elephant’: huge, costly and ineffectual (Norad 2013a:9–10). Does CB 
require too many resources, and is it inefficient? The same report also concludes 
that insufficient attention has been paid to learning from evaluations within the 
organizations (Norad 2013a:23).  
2.5 Case presentation: Organizational Development in 
the Red Cross 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement consists of 189 
national societies (NSs) – the world's largest humanitarian network. Each NS 
provides a range of services, from disaster relief to first aid training, based on the 
needs of the country. NSs are independent units and set their own priorities. All 
NSs are made up of volunteers and staff, and all NSs are members of the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).   
2.5.1 Organizational and financial development 
The Norwegian Red Cross is associated with emergency relief operations. In fact, 
however, disaster preparedness and long-term development have long been 
important the Red Cross. Just as there is a tendency for most people to react to 
sudden crises instead of chronic situations, there was a tendency within the Red 
Cross for long-term development work to be overshadowed by work with relief 
operations (Nord/Sør konsulentene 2011:1).  
The Norwegian Red Cross strategy is to contribute to strengthening other 
national societies (NSs) – because they are closest to the needs and solutions on 
the ground, and because strong national societies can reduce the risks of severe 
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consequences of acute and silent crises alike. The strategy of the  Norwegian Red 
Cross for the period 2009–2014 highlights Organizational Development, or 
Capacity Building, as one out of six main objectives: 
National societies that are priority cooperation partners for the Norwegian Red Cross 
are more capable of dealing with humanitarian and long-term development challenges 
using their own resources (Norwegian Red Cross 2009:13).  
Internationally, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Federation has selected 
Organizational Development (OD) as one of three main strategies in its ‘Strategy 
2020’ (IFRC 2010a). The Norwegian Red Cross supports other Red Cross NSs 
bilaterally or through regional or global programmes. Capacity Building, or OD, 
may be organized as separate projects or programme or as part of other 
programmes – like the HIV/AIDS programme. 
Although OD is a part of Strategy 2020 for the IFRC globally, there seem to be 
two different schools of thought. The Norwegian Red Cross represents one 
school with both financial and professional support. Financial support may 
involve covering core costs for administration and management; and professional 
support may concern competence building and system development for volunteer 
recruitment or Financial Development (FD) (Norwegian Red Cross 2012c). 
Members of the other school are reluctant to cover core costs and support 
professionally. As one informant explains:  
[That is]one school that operates unilaterally (…) They build up parallel 
structures, and when the funding period is due, they withdraw and leave 
no capacity enhancement behind  (Red Cross informant 2) 
As we will see later, the disparity in the approaches of these two schools of 
thought is one of the obstacles to achieving better results as it leads to 
uncoordinated management and governance.  
The Norwegian Red Cross concentrates its support to CB efforts on building 
local networks of volunteers, FD, and governance and management (Norwegian 
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Red Cross 2012c:10–11). In this thesis, I will use examples from some of the 
Organizational Development (OD) and Financial Development (FD) 
programmes, mainly from Burundi. 
2.6 Outline of the thesis 
This study consists of eight chapters, including the introduction and background 
chapters. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on conventional and alternative results 
management approaches. I present New Public Management and Results Based 
Management (RBM), as these provide the foundation for today’s Results 
Management. Participatory Approaches (PAs) will also be presented, as an 
alternative. As there is no such thing as a perfect methodology, criticisms of both 
approaches exist, and will be presented. Chapter 4 describes how the study was 
conducted and the rationale underlying the choice of research methods.  
Chapter 5 to 7 form the discussion part of the research question: why Capacity 
Building (CB) seem to remain an elusive goal despite the massive RBM efforts. 
The structure follows the three initial questions.  
In Chapter 5, I discuss whether unrealistic ambitions and goals may set CB up for 
failure. The distance between politicians’ goals and NGO project goals will be 
presented, and it will be asked if there is a gap in levels here that sets aid projects 
up for failure. Aggregation challenges will be discussed, as will the interpretation 
and consequences of the impression that results are lacking. By taking a closer 
look at ambitions and goals, what might appear as lack of efficiency in the aid 
sector might actually prove to be lack of capacity. I will argue that there is a huge 
gap between the ambitions of Norwegian development policy and the Norwegian 
Red Cross and what can actually be achieved at the project level. I will also 
examine various interpretations of the term ‘results’.  
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In Chapter 6, I present the main theme of this thesis, – the issue of 
methodological choices. The assumption is that the RBM approach is 
inappropriate for the field under study due to the shortcomings outlined in 
Chapter 3 – such as control focus, the accountability structure, use of indicators, 
assumptions of causality and so forth. Inappropriate methodology might lead to 
insufficient learning or insufficient documentation of results. It might also be that 
RBM is appropriate, but has been poorly or wrongly applied. I will argue there 
are challenges in both categories. In part, RBM does not create necessary 
learning and does not allow CB results to be shown, while more might have been 
learned and showed through more correct use – for instance by including 
beneficiaries and heeding local voices. Evaluation and reports are used to show 
how results are documented. Interviews are used to show shortcomings and 
challenges that the Red Cross encounters. I also present some positive 
experiences with RBM as highlighted by the informants themselves, in order to 
provide a more nuanced picture than the most critical voices. 
We then turn to the alternative – the Participatory Approach (PA), asking if it is 
used and what experiences the Red Cross has with using it. I will demonstrate 
that on the one hand, PA contributes to learning and motivation. On the other 
hand, it does not sufficiently address the root causes of the challenges to CB – 
such as lack of coordination and local ownership.   
Central here is the content of CB projects. If the most appropriate methods for 
monitoring and evaluation are in use and are used correctly, and there still is a 
lack of results, then the content of CB might be at fault. Lack of results might of 
course be due to weak projects. In Chapter 7, I will take a look at the challenges, 
how they are perceived by different actors, and whether RBM can help to reveal 
the causes of the elusiveness of CB results. The scope of this master thesis does 
not allow for a thorough analysis of the CB concept in general. I seek to provide 
some insights into the challenges and results as perceived by the Red Cross. 
Drawing on the literature as well as interviews, the dilemmas of local ownership, 
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equality, resources and coordination will be debated. Finally, Chapter 8 
summarizes the thesis and discusses some implications. 
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3. CONVENTIONAL AND PARTICIPATORY 
APPROACHES 
The aim of this thesis is to examine how evaluations and Results Based 
Management (RBM) of Capacity Building (CB) projects are conducted and how 
the Results Management actually affects CB. On the one hand, there is a need for 
autonomy and local ownership to achieve results. On the other hand, there is a 
need for control, short-term results and visible results. This is a dilemma.  
In this section, I present the ideas behind New Public Management (NPM), 
which has dominated the public management systems of recent decades. Today, 
NPM is seen as the conventional approach, and RBM is a part of NPM. 
Alternative methodological approaches have also emerged that are critical of the 
NPM and RBM technologies. One dominant voice is that of Robert Chambers, 
who argues for a Participatory Approach (PA).  However, also PA has been 
subjected to criticism.  
My intention here is not to repeat old criticisms of the ‘audit culture’. Rather my 
aim is to take a closer empirical look at how RBM is used in the Red Cross, 
analysing how this approach influences CB projects as well as the consequences 
its use might have for long-term development goals; and finally, whether the 
criticisms that have been expressed are relevant. 
3.1 NPM and RBM – Conventional approaches: 
SMART framework? 
In Norwegian public management policy, one of the most central components 
has been goal- and Results Management (Christensen et al. 2007:100). The 
concepts and ideas of New Public Management have been developed for the 
public sector in general, not specifically for the development sector. Therefore, 
the general theory will be referred to here. 
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3.1.1 Theoretical perspectives and operationalization  of NPM 
and RBM 
RBM is defined as a ‘strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way 
government agencies operate with improving performance (achieving better 
results) as the central orientation’ (Binnendijk 2001:3 in Hulme 2007:2).  
The purpose of applying RBM is twofold: management improvement, and 
performance reporting (Ireland 2003, and Binnedjik 2000 in Vähämäki et al. 
2011:8). Management improvement includes planning, decision-making and 
learning. Performance reporting concerns accountability, measuring and 
evidence.  
The IFRC defines RBM as ‘an approach to project/programme management 
based on clearly defined results, and the methodologies and tools to measure and 
achieve them’ (IFRC 2011b:9). This definition is mostly in line with the 
‘performance reporting’ purpose defined above. However, the Federation states 
clearly that learning and reflection are essential parts of evaluations.  
Norad defines RBM as an approach that ‘involves shifting management attention 
away from a focus on inputs, activities and processes to a focus on benefits (…) 
Results Management also focuses on using information on results to improve 
decision making.’ (Norad 2008:9). This definition covers to some extent both 
‘management improvement’ and ‘performance reporting’.   
Both Norad and the IFRC use a project approach which runs from assessment 
and planning to evaluation and learning (see Figure 3). The project management 
model used by the Red Cross and others can be said to be an operational layer of 
NPM thinking. 
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Figure 3: Project cycle (based on Norad 2008:23–28, IFRC 2011b:10 
and Red Cross informant 6) 
 
Measurement of results is shown through logical chains from activities to impact. 
Development problems and solutions are translated into a logframe model. 
 
Figure 4: The result chain/logframe model (based on Norad 2008 and 
IFRC 2011b) 
Norad’s practical guide on Results Management (2008) highlights the importance 
of clear objectives by the use of logical planning models, using indicators, result 
chains and baselines (Norad 2008:1–2). Indicators are used to measure progress 
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towards a predefined goal that should be ‘SMART’– specific, measureable, 
achievable, relevant and time-bound (Norad 2008:15). Aid actors should use 
logical planning models, indicators and baselines, establish monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) plans, and projects should report on outcome level (Norad 
2008:1–2).  
Norad underlined in 2008 that ‘outcomes represent the most important result-
level in results management’ (Norad 2008:10). This summarizes the main point 
of RBM compared to earlier types of reporting. The focus was no longer to be 
solely on activities and output. As we will see later, reporting on outcomes was 
both difficult to report on and not seen as sufficient. Despite this, only one year 
after launching the handbook, Norad removes the requirement of ‘only’ outcome 
levels and expects NGOs to report on impact level (Norad 2009:15–16).   
The underlying assumption of the project cycle, and logframes, is that 
organizations can be changed and used as instruments for achieving societal 
goals (Christensen et al. 2010:23 and 33). But is this management theory or 
concept useable in practice in the aid sector? My own experience from working 
with projects in other sectors is that projects are easier to plan and implement if 
the circumstances are quite stable. Then it is possible to use the resources you 
have planned for throughout the project period, although often with some 
adjustments. In such a stable environment, it is possible to predict the outcome of 
a project fairly well. However, in the settings that have the most pressing need 
for well-functioning humanitarian organizations, there is a very high probability 
of encountering profoundly unstable environments. The planned project outcome 
is not always achievable when context changes dramatically – when a refugee 
situation emerges, or when there is a coup. 
Although the RBM concept often includes objectivity, linearity, measurements 
and SMART criteria, there are different understandings and applications of the 
concept.  There is no such thing as a ‘singular RBM model’ (Vähämäki et al. 
2011:10).  In this thesis, I use the Norad handbook (2008) as a basis, but 
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explicitly draw attention to the various interpretations of the terms ‘results’ and 
RBM.  
3.1.2 NPM and RBM criticism 
In searching for literature on RBM, I was struck by how the literature was 
divided in two categories: either the ‘how to go about’ literature from the project 
management and business segment, or critical literature from the social science 
segment. This chapter is mainly based on negative criticisms of RBM.  
Critics of NPM claim that the approach has resulted in too much bureaucracy, 
too much of a focus on control and too much complexity, and has acted to raise 
costs (Christensen et al. 2007:99–103).  
Criticisms of the conventional approach can be summed up in five main points: 
(1) control, (2) indicators, objectivity and measurements, (3) linearity and 
baselines, (4) the accountability structure and (5) lack of autonomy and local 
ownership.  
1) Control 
The essence of the criticism about control is that it is not really results that are 
measured, but tasks and activities – hence, more control of behaviour than results 
(Christensen et al. 2007:102). The intention was to move from rule-orientation 
towards goal-orientation. ‘It’s the results that count’ (my translation, Christensen 
et al. 2007:78) became the new slogan. In fact, this has led to both goal- and rule-
orientation, which means that more requirements have emerged to be fulfilled. 
With control comes priority accorded to easily measureable activities, and less 
interest in broader frames of reference, such as human rights, participation and 
democracy, that are more difficult to measure, it is claimed (Hulme 2007:2). This 
in turn would lead us to expect distortion of projects as well as distortion within a 
given project: more focus on counting vaccines or workshops, and thus a 
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prioritization of such activities, instead of focusing on and giving priority to trust, 
autonomy and sustainability.  
In fact, in many places Results Management has developed into a system 
dominated by control, attention to details and formalization. It has led to more 
activity and behaviour control than result control – contrary to intentions. In 
general, however, the concept has been adjusted somewhat, and one has realized 
that the RBM system has to be tailored to various organizations in order to be 
relevant (Christensen et al. 2007:100–102). Despite criticism of the dominance of 
control, in what known as the post-NPM period the control aspect has actually 
been reinforced (Christensen and Lægreid 2010:408).  
2) Indicators, objectivity and measurements 
RBM focuses on objectivity and measurements through use of indicators. It is 
important to establish the causal relationships, conduct a baseline study and 
measure progress (Norad 2008). Drawing on Chambers (2008) and the Norad 
handbook (2008), we can derive three questionable preconditions for conducting 
result assessments of this type:  
 the facts have to be specific, standard and verifiable  
 external conditions should be constant (at the time of baseline and 
progress measurement, or for treatment and control group)  
 there should be a verifiable link between cause and effect 
(based on Norad 2008, Chambers 2008:16–17). 
The expectations of verifiable facts, constant context and causality give the 
impression of wishing to emulate the experimentation and tools of the natural 
sciences, with experiments and control of effects. Naturalists, or positivistic 
science, use observation, experiences, logic and reason (Knutsen and Moses 
2007:8) and prefer experiments in controllable environments and statistics.  
Naturalists perceive phenomena as existing objectively, whereas constructivists 
believe that all phenomena are interpreted through the lenses of the observer 
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(Knutsen and Moses 2007). Is there a truth out there to be recorded and analysed 
objectively? Or is all truth subjective? That is one of the main questions and 
differences between two methodological traditions – where the naturalist and the 
constructivist tradition constitute the extreme points of a scale (Knutsen and 
Moses 2007:7). While perhaps not incompatible, the underlying philosophy is the 
main battle in today’s social science (ibid.:3). 
When subsequently analysing evaluation reports, we need to understand such 
foundational theories of science, as what constitutes rigour is not an agreed point. 
Neither is there agreement on what is considered valid knowledge. Power, 
authority and rhetoric play important roles in the debate on what constitutes 
sound knowledge (Knutsen and Moses 2007:2).  
Using a constructivist perspective and methodology makes it difficult, of course, 
to measure the progress of an intervention because we ‘allow’ the method to 
influence the results. The question is whether it is possible for evaluation 
methods not to influence results.  
Feelings of trust, involvement and dignity are influenced both by the way 
questions are framed and by the RBM practice. If the main purpose of Results 
Management is control (or is perceived to be), this is likely to influence feelings 
of mutual trust and of dignity in a negative way. And conversely, if the main 
purpose of RBM is learning and the approach is appreciative, then this will 
influence trust and dignity in a positive way. 
3) Linearity, baselines and causality 
The use of baselines and indicators rests on some tacit assumptions of linearity 
and causality, which also can be said to be a legacy from the natural sciences. 
Baselines are required by back-donors and are seen as a prerequisite for 
documentation of progress. Lack of baselines is one of the main criticisms 
repeated in Norad’s evaluation summary for 2011 (Norad 2011b). However, 
baselines might be less relevant for complex programmes, as the constraints in 
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for instance a CB project are moving targets (Riddell 2001, Ortiz and Taylor 
2009).  When development projects start up, the most relevant obstacles to be to 
overcome during the CB process might be unknown or non-existent. This adds to 
the criticism of treating development from a purely instrumental view, as CB is 
not a linear process (Ortiz and Taylor 2009:9). ‘In brief’, describes McNeill, ‘the 
problem is that LFA is ill-suited to be applied to “soft” sectors, which are, in fact, 
becoming increasingly dominant in aid’ (McNeill 2012). 
4) The accountability structure 
The essence of this criticism is that the dominant control focus in RBM skews  
the direction of accountability. It seems that the RBM system asks the lower 
parts of the system to document, aggregate and visualize results to higher parts in 
the system. By lower parts, I mean those closest to the beneficiaries; and higher 
parts refer to the funding end of the value chain. Responsibility for achieving the 
objectives set is at the lower parts of the system. At the same time, ambitious 
goals are decided at the top of the system – politicians and the public 
management system. There might be large gaps between politicians’ goals and 
what is achievable, especially within time-bound limits and in terms of single 
projects.  This can explain the increased pressure on documenting results and 
control. A repeated criticism of the RBM practice is that the predominant upward 
accountability at the expense of beneficiary accountability and learning is due to 
how NPM is constructed (Ortiz and Taylor 2009:30). ‘Politically formulated 
goals are then to be realized through a process of administrative implementation’ 
(my translation, Christensen et al. 2010:111). The premise is ‘administrative 
implementation’ of politically-set goals, based on a top–down approach which 
goes counter to the sense of local ownership that is so central in CB.  
How goals and indicators are set and the inclination for accuracy might also 
reflect an audit culture with a preference for upward accountability instead of 
trust, complex programmes, learning and accountability towards beneficiaries. 
The use of indicators itself might hinder the flow of more relevant information 
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from the field up to the relevant decision-making boards. As will be shown later, 
a conventional evaluation of a programme in Sudan showed good results, 
whereas a participatory workshop some years later gave both a somewhat 
different and more relevant in-depth understanding of both results and 
challenges. Thus, it might be that learning, and hence necessary adjustment of 
programmes, fails to occur because the most relevant information is not asked 
for, or does not fit into the reporting system, and thus does not become visible.  
As we will see later, CB projects might help building streamlined organizations, 
but it might also be that something gets lost by the NPM influence. It is striking 
that few of the evaluation reports examined in this case study have included 
beneficiaries. Does this mean that public management simply does not ask about 
the impact on beneficiaries?  
Likewise, how are the beneficiaries’ interests and needs heard when the 
objectives of the projects are set? ‘[A]id beneficiaries have limited influence of 
how results are defined in most development programs’ (Vähämäki et al. 
2011:9).  According to NPM, political goals are to be based on the interests of 
the population. Normally politicians’ goals are based on the needs of their 
domestic constituencies. For the aid sector, the needs of vulnerable populations 
in poorer countries are what should be guiding the policies and priorities.  
5) Lack of autonomy and local ownership 
The final point of criticism here is that NPM is a hybrid with various elements, 
often pulling in different directions. One tries to achieve autonomy for the lower 
parts in the system and more control at the same time (Christensen et al. 
2007:99). Management through goals, and not management through detailed 
descriptions of how tasks should be performed, should secure increased 
autonomy. However, RBM has led to increased control, which goes against 
increased autonomy. This is one of the inconsistencies in NPM (Christensen et 
al. 2007:102–103), and it seems to affect how the CB concept is conceptualized 
and practised.   
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As will be apparent in Chapter 7, project coordinators and Organizational 
Development experts in the Red Cross highlight the importance of autonomy and 
local ownership. Implementing NSs are ‘in the driving seat’, and the importance 
of not forcing ‘our’ solutions on implementing NSs is consequently highlighted. 
Without autonomy and local ownership, fundamental sustainability cannot be 
achieved. Sustainability is the key for Organizational Development. At the same 
time control, short-term results and financially sound management are 
preconditions for support and seen as preconditions for confidence among 
funding partners, and thereby for sustainability for the local organization. Hence, 
both autonomy and control are perceived as necessary for success and achieving 
long-term development goals. That is a dilemma. In the ensuing chapters, we will 
see how this dilemma manifests itself in reports as well as in practice.  
To transform development issues into logframe models with a logical chain 
reflects an instrumental view of complex processes (Mosse 2005:2–3). This 
instrumental view can act as an explanation and summary of the challenges. An 
alternative perspective on organizations is the cultural view that problematizes 
rationality and emphasizes the traditions, cultures and informal elements 
(Christensen et al. 2010:23 and 52).  
3.1.3 A need for alternative approaches? 
Critics of the current practice of Results Management recommend greater use of 
Participatory Approaches, emphasizing qualitative approaches, storytelling, 
observation, reflections on ‘whose theory?’, appreciative inquiry and focus on  
learning aspects (see Chambers 2008, Mikkelsen 2005, Ortiz and Taylor 2009). 
Mikkelsen (2005) focuses on flexibility and participation, as opposed to stringent 
logframes and detailed planning. Logframes are, she argues ‘(…) based on the 
assumption that, inadequate planning is a persistent fundamental problem in 
international development aid’ (2005:38). Furthermore ‘[d]etailed planning (…) 
has tended to counteract flexibility and people’s participation’ (ibid.:35). 
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‘Logframes’, Chambers concurs, ‘(…) stifle creativity’ (Chambers 2008:182). As 
we will see later, the two different approaches, conventional RBM and PA, 
influence motivation and energy in different ways. As will be demonstrated, 
logframes tend to drain energy, and harmonization of indicators risks having the 
side effect that motivation is lost. By contrast, an alternative participatory 
workshop, without logframes and with only limited resources spent on written 
reporting, gave new energy and motivation for improvements.   
The linear focus of logical framework models ‘causes organizations to overlook 
the complexity’ (Ortiz and Taylor 2009:30) as well as leading the Results 
Management frameworks to be modelled on the same, false premises (Ortiz and 
Taylor 2009:31). Since organizations are complex and many intangible elements 
influence the processes, Ortiz and Taylor claim that we will never have the full 
overview of the system, or of how cause and effects are related. ‘Small 
“butterfly” actions may have a major impact and big ones may have very little 
impact’ (Eyben, et al. 2008:203–204 in Ortiz and Taylor 2009:27) 
As a result, valuable resources are used for tracking outputs – instead of 
discussions of the complex processes, learning and relevant adjustments. The 
best we can do is constantly try to understand what is happening, which means a 
greater focus on the learning aspect. The more complex the project, the more 
relevant are Participatory Approaches (Chambers 2008). The question is how this 
can be done in practice. 
3.2 Participatory Approaches (PA) 
As a reaction to the ‘technocratic’ approaches and top–down and centre–outward 
approaches, Participatory Approaches (PA) have evolved and spread (Mikkelsen 
2005, Chambers 1995, Chambers 2008, Ortiz and Taylor 2009, White 2009). PA 
tries to address deficits in current accountability structure:  
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Participatory approaches originate from a political perspective which claims to 
empower the excluded and to ensure that the last are put first (...) Participatory 
approaches aim to ensure that the ‘voices of the poor’ are heard across development’s 
organizations. (Green 2009: 407) 
There are three main approaches within the PA family: rapid rural appraisal 
(RRA), participatory learning and action (PLA) and participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) (Chambers 2008:85). I will refer to all three approaches as ‘PA’.  
To get an idea of how this approach can replace or complement the more 
conventional approaches we need to examine the differences between what 
Chambers calls ‘contrasting paradigms’ (Chambers 2008:173): 
Paradigms: Conventional Participatory 
Planning Top–down 
Centralized 
Bottom–up 
Decentralized 
Priority given to Plans 
Procedures  
People 
Processes 
Methods Standardized 
Universal 
Questionnaires 
Randomized control trials 
Logframes 
Flexible 
Contextual 
Participatory 
Causality Linear 
Controllable 
Predictable 
Non-linear 
Uncontrollable 
Unpredictable 
Rigour and quality Precision 
Measurement 
Statistical analysis 
Fitness 
Judgement 
Triangulation 
Table 1: Characteristics of the two paradigms: Conventional and 
Participatory approaches (based on Table 9.1 in Chambers 2008: 
173) 
 
Table 1 shows that the two approaches differ in important ways. The theoretical 
underpinnings of more PA entail a change from ‘things’  like the outputs from  
logframes, reports and infrastructure, to a focus on  ‘people,’ referring to outputs 
such as relationships, processes and capabilities (Chambers 2008:172).  
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3.2.1 PA Operationalization 
PAs explore the unexpected, build on and allow more contact with the people 
involved. The methods are observation, shorter semi-structured interviews, and 
contact with the local population, for instance through small groups who map and 
discuss a project plan. Reflection is a central part of the methodology (Chambers 
2008:94). Data collection and processing occur at the same time through joint 
reflections and intense interaction. In the more conventional approaches, data 
collection is conducted ‘locally’ and in the first phase, whereas the processing 
often occurs at another place – in an office at headquarters and in a distant 
country, even by other people than those who collected the data – and this is 
done in a separate phase. With PA, data gathering and processing are often done 
simultaneously and by the same people (Chambers 2008). 
 
Flexibility and triangulation allows for several perspectives from various sources 
and different angles of approaches to the same topic. Reading of previous reports 
and statistics can be supplemented by interviews and observations. Interviews 
can be done one by one, supplemented by small-group discussions. These 
methods and approaches combine to create greater rigor, it is argued (Chambers 
2008), while validity is ensured by coming closer to true statements from 
participants and stakeholders. Often in quantitative surveys, people may answer a 
question although they do not fully understand the content. This leads to 
‘findings’ that are not valid. Reliability is ensured by joint discussions, 
reflections and also by using several methods.    
In order to emphasize and take into account the fact that perspectives often 
depend on one’s background, position and viewpoint, as well as to question 
underlying assumptions, Chambers asks ‘whose problems?’, ‘whose realities?’ 
and ‘whose logic?’ (Chambers 2008:148). NPM and logframes build on the 
assumption of cause–effect links, and survey content frequently has an academic 
bias (Chambers 2008). Often there is a lack of assessments or explicit uncertainty 
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linked to these underlying assumptions. In order to increase understanding and 
reduce the risk of errors, more attention should be paid to the underlying 
assumptions of the linkages between causes and effects (Mayne 2008, Reeler 
2007, White 2009). 
Asking ‘whose theory?’ might show that there are differing perspectives on how 
things work. Such questioning includes asking how the local people perceive the 
project, understanding context and anticipating heterogeneity, careful selection of 
beneficiaries and definition of target groups, exploration of complementarities, 
use of counterfactuals (control group, or before and after) to verify impact, and 
the use of mixed methods (White 2009). Also, in order to dig deep into the 
‘why’, observations over time are necessary, as well as involving actors who 
represent various viewpoints and hold different positions in a society. It is 
essential to understand the processes that reinforce or obstruct change. Which 
factors in a context contributes to change, and which factors do not? The 
important thing is to understand the internal dynamics of the processes as far as 
is possible.  
3.2.2 PA as both a means and an end 
Apart from being a more cost-efficient method (Chambers 2008:15) and having 
instrumental value, PA also has an immanent value. As its methods are 
democratic, bottom–up and flexible, the methods themselves have the potential 
to contribute to empowerment and local ownership.  
As a bottom–up approach, PA releases people’s creativity and energy, as well as 
enhancing learning (Chambers 2008:176). At the core of Chambers’ theory is 
also the embracing of complexity, diversity, respect and a profound belief in 
local capacities. Participatory methodologies make use of people’s own 
capacities and help to release potential. Participation can also change power 
relations, as with participation follows a new accountability. In this way 
participatory methodology is not only about ways of inquiring, but is also ‘an 
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entry point and means to transform power and relationships (…) [and] seminal 
points of entry for good change’ (Chambers 2008:189) – and positive changes 
are what results are all about. 
According to some scholars (see Mikkelsen 2005, Knutsen and Moses 2007), 
methodological choice can influence the results. Strengths are not necessarily 
taken as ‘something out there’, something static or objective, but can be 
reinforced through inquires. We create our own world by what we anticipate 
(Mikkelsen 2005:245–248). By focusing on strengths, strengths can be created.  
 ‘[C]onstructivists recognize that people may look at the same thing and perceive 
it differently’ (Knutsen and Moses 2007:11). PA and appreciative inquiry 
resonate with this. Constructivists prefer interpretative methods where narratives 
play an important role (Knutsen and Moses 2007:16–17). 
3.2.3 PA challenges and criticisms 
It is also important to examine the PA aim of bringing in the voices of the 
marginalized and the vulnerable. In this way, local needs and priorities are be 
ensured, and their evaluation of any intervention is to be heard. Beneficiary 
participation is expected – but there are reasons for caution here.   
Maia Green (2009) raises an interesting criticism of PA. First, participatory 
knowledge is opposed to expert knowledge, but the former cannot find its way to 
project documents without the facilitation of ‘experts’ (Green 2009:407). 
Secondly, participatory or local knowledge is categorized as more morally valid 
than other knowledge, as beyond criticism. ‘Evaluations of participatory 
knowledge accept this ring fencing of locally produced knowledge, assessing the 
process of knowledge production, not the quality of knowledge produced, which 
in being local is morally unassailable, literally beyond criticism’, states Green 
(2009:408). The process becomes more important than the quality of the 
information. 
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Third, PAs are criticized, both by Mosse (2005) and Green (2009), for being 
empty rhetoric because the poorer are not always represented and hence 
‘participation’ has little practical implications, they claim. Moreover, according 
to Mosse, the approach ‘does not reverse or modify development’s hegemony so 
much as provide more effective instruments with which to extend technocratic 
control or advance external interests and agendas (...)’ (2005:4). Participatory 
methods are embraced by the established system, and the risk is that little is 
changed apart from the rhetoric and packaging/wrapping. If that is the case, it 
could mean achieving the same weak information basis as with the conventional 
methods, while also maintaining basically unequal relationships. According to 
Green, ensuring the voices of the poor is no longer the primary objective of the 
approach: 
Participatory methods and knowledge they generate are no longer the preserve of 
populist movement which claimed to speak with or through the ‘voices of the poor’. 
Participation is institutionalized across the majority of what are perceived to be credible 
non-governmental organizations (…) (Green 2009:404). 
Fourth, and linked to the second point, is that communities can be presented as 
defined entities without wider links, and hence politics becomes insignificant. 
(Green 2009:408). Chambers mentions some challenges related to representation, 
but does not problematize local power structures or the inherent power structure 
in the link between the donor on one side and the receiver and implementer on 
the other side. The funding part of the link still has the power to say no to 
projects, to stop the funding and to impose conditions.  
As a fifth point, I will add that PA also risks being ‘conventional’ and taught in a 
top–down manner, with use of manuals which in reality standardize procedures 
instead of keeping flexibility. The quest for aggregation has a tendency to create 
standardization. Limited time schedules do the same. The reason is obvious: ‘The 
less standardized it is, the harder the outcomes are to analyze’, states Chambers 
(2008:129), but if we fall for the temptation to standardize then we lose the 
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desired empowerment and contact with local realities and priorities (Chambers 
2008:128–129).  
A further point regarding dilemmas and challenges is the issue of costs. 
Facilitating PA, being flexible, using several methods and allowing time for 
reflection might give an impression of a costly and resource-demanding method. 
Although simultaneous data gathering and processing might save time, and 
although immanent empowerment and local ownership might raise the cost-
effectiveness of the development project, it might not be perceived this way by 
donors responsible for allocating budgets. The number of days a project 
coordinator from a donor is spending on a participatory process ‘in field’, being 
away from his or her office at headquarters might be perceived as adding costs, 
not reducing it. If the evaluation makes use of external evaluators, the cost of the 
evaluation will increase by several days ‘in the field’. As we will see later, one of 
the Red Cross evaluations was restricted and sufficient time ‘in the field’ not 
possible due to cost and time restraints, and Norad displays scepticism towards 
using funds for personnel ‘in field’.  
Lastly, it might be that the criticism of NPM and the need for an alternative 
approach is exaggerated. PAs are based on a premise that NPM is a one-way 
management approach. However, as we will see, people do pick and choose, 
interpret and adjust (Mosse 2005). 
3.3 Concluding remarks on theoretical frameworks 
New Public Management, with RBM, and PA can be regarded as two separate 
ideologies with fundamentally different values. The purposes of the 
methodologies are different, and that can create a dilemma. As we will see later, 
some of my respondents consider indicators with ‘objective’ content to be both 
necessary and meaningful. The current RBM system is needed for following up 
projects, documenting history and for reporting progress.  
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One question must be asked: do we grasp the most relevant information by 
recording the ‘objective’ facts? Does use of naturalist methodologies give the 
information that is most valuable for achieving development goals? If we do not 
use objective methods and comparable indicators, if ‘anything counts’ and if 
what is perceived as relevant varies not only from person to person but also from 
one time to another – then is it possible to report anything meaningful regarding 
the progress of a project? 
CB is based on the same ideas and values as PA: empowerment, local ownership, 
local capacities, people, processes and learning. I would even claim that PA is 
quite widely used in the Red Cross partly because it reflects the organization’s 
deeply rooted values. The organization’s perspective is that Capacity 
Development can never be achieved without confidence and autonomy on the 
part of the beneficiaries. At the same time, there is a need for control, which risks 
undermining that confidence. That is a dilemma. PA is an alternative, but might 
have an important weakness in not being able to document progress objectively – 
at least not in a legitimate way, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. In order to be a 
part of the aid system, to be deemed accountable and trustworthy, NGOs need to 
make use of the NPM and RBM systems. NGOs are expected to demonstrate 
progress, to show objective results, to follow a certain reporting standard. And 
so, PA might prove not to be a feasible alternative after all. 
In view of the criticisms of RBM, we may ask: has control of activities become 
the most relevant focus – even more important than actual development practice? 
The need for control, audits and being accountable to Norwegian taxpayers might 
direct the focus away from development praxis. 
The choice of NPM and RBM concepts is based on Norad’s Results Management 
requirements. As to PA, my choice is based on the fact that its ideas have gained 
ground, in general and within the Red Cross. Especially relevant is the use of PA 
as a methodological framework for assessing complex development processes 
such as CB and Organizational Development. The higher the complexity, the less 
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relevant are data accuracy and pre-determined categories, Chambers claims 
(2008:19). ‘[T]he more complex the issues and causality, the harder they are to 
unravel and understand through the crude standardized template of a 
questionnaire and correlations’ (ibid.:21).  
I would hold that both approaches are used to some degree and they are both 
relevant, but for different reasons. Both approaches contribute to a certain extent 
to fulfil expectations and requirements, but both also have their shortcomings.  
Being torn between two such fundamentally opposed logics is part of the daily 
life of development workers, also in the Red Cross. The organization and the 
project coordinators must act as intermediaries between funders and 
implementers, and between two inquiry approaches. They have to negotiate, 
balance and find middle paths, for relying on only one of the approaches will not 
fulfil all expectations and meet all needs. 
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4. METHODOLOGY  
The case chosen for study is Capacity Building (CB) within the Red Cross, with 
a particular focus on Financial Development (FD) and the Burundi Red Cross. 
Burundi is among the poorest countries in the world. After the devastating civil 
war which ended in 2006, the Burundi Red Cross (BRC) set about rebuilding and 
re-establishing itself. This was a National Society with a broken back at that 
time. Both during and after the conflict, there was a huge need to rebuild and to 
support vulnerable people throughout the country. From 2006 onwards, the BRC 
has both taken part in broad CB programmes of the international Red Cross 
Movement and in the FD programme of the Norwegian Red Cross (IFRC 2011A, 
Norwegian Red Cross 2012a, Bensky 2011). This case and four evaluation 
reports concerning the BRC will be a part of the present case study.   
In addition to Burundi, there will be examples from Sudan, Pakistan and 
Madagascar, as my respondents have used their own experiences when 
exemplifying issues. I will also draw on my own experience from monitoring and 
evaluation from Lesotho, Russia and Vietnam.  
4.1 Case study as method 
Case studies are linked to historians’ methods of using reputable sources, 
systematic doubt, referencing and processing data (Knutsen and Moses 
2007:116–125). ‘Case studies are generally strong precisely where statistical 
methods and formal models are weak’ (George and Bennett 2005:19). The case 
study presented here is specific, and cannot be generalized to other cases. 
However, it might create insights of broader value, helping to explain the 
perceived lack of results of aid and how RBM influences CB. 
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4.2 Case selection 
A case does not present itself as a neat entity with clearly defined borders. My 
interest was in RBM and CB. The latter encompasses a range of programmes or 
is often part of other programmes, so for in-depth information, one obvious 
choice was an FD programme that the Norwegian Red Cross has supported in 
several African countries for years. A further criterion for case selection was that 
there should be material available. The BRC became the natural choice, as there 
were several evaluation reports as well as several staff persons with experience 
from the program and BRC.  
Researchers have expressed scepticism towards RBM. From politicians and 
public opinion, however, the apparent impression is that there is too little focus 
on RBM. I was in a position to analyse the situation based on empirical facts 
within my own organization, the Red Cross. I had unique access to data, from 
written reports, meetings and interviews with colleagues. I could also use my 
own experiences to dig deeper from where I stood, develop questions based on 
observations I had made and my own experiences from evaluation and 
monitoring missions. 
4.3 Remarks on case selection and methods 
Validity is also relevant for qualitative studies. It concerns the extent to which 
the study can be backed by other studies (Silverman 2001:225) – if the study 
gives a true reflection of the case. Since the ‘truth’ in a constructivist 
understanding lies in the hearts and mind of the observers, they should be open 
and honest about who they are, their sympathies and antipathies and contextual 
influences (Knutsen and Moses 2007:12). For this reason I have already in the 
introduction mentioned my basic preferences for measuring, statistics and 
reporting. However, from reading the academic literature, discussions with 
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colleagues and my own experience, I gradually became sceptical to a purely 
naturalistic use of method.  
The approach applied here, with in-depth interviews and open-ended questions, 
has some shortcomings. An ethnographic study would probably have given both 
a richer and a truer picture of for instance the case of the FD programme in 
Burundi. A survey among Norwegian NGOs would have given a more 
representative picture of how CB is understood and operationalized today.  
4.4 On doing research in one’s own organization 
There is a risk in doing research in one’s own organization: ‘Handling 
interpretations or outcomes which would be perceived negatively by the 
organization is a particularly sensitive issue’ (Coghlan and Brannick 2001:53). 
The considerations of three possibly differing interests have to be balanced: my 
organization, my career, and contribution to an overall debate on RBM and CB. 
Balancing these interests is a delicate task.  
One advantage of being an insider is the knowledge of people, jargon, taboos, 
and how the organization works, so that one can see beyond the window-
dressing. There are also disadvantages: being close to the data might lead to 
wrong preconceptions because one thinks one knows the answers. Closeness to 
data might also lead to superficial knowledge, through denial of deeper access 
due to crossing ties. Publication is a tricky issue, and the role might be confusing 
both during the data collection process and after publishing, when an insider is 
playing the role of an outsider (Coghlan and Brannick 2001:53). 
Although being situated within the Red Cross has given me unique access to 
data, my own work has been in the Communication Department: it is the 
International Department that runs all aid projects. This means that I have not 
worked with the colleagues interviewed here on a regular basis, and I have not 
myself participated in CB programmes. That also means that I have not been able 
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to do an observational study; moreover, a planned visit to one of the CB projects 
turned out not to be feasible. Thus I have probably missed some relevant 
information and perspectives, but perhaps I have also been able to ask questions 
with fewer initial assumptions than if I had been working closer to the projects. 
The obvious methodological difficulty here is that I may have been too 
sympathetic to my colleagues. During my interviews and analysis, I worried 
about being too critical towards their work, and also being not critical enough. I 
hope that the end result is something in-between. Closeness to data and 
colleagues has also made me want not to bother colleagues by taking up too 
much of their time for interviews. On the other hand, the amount of data material 
from interviews proved to be almost too comprehensive to deal with. 
4.5 Triangulation 
To avoid misinterpretations or skewed perspectives, the researcher may apply 
different methods or theories from different disciplines. This is called 
triangulation. The main methods I employed have been interviews, participation 
in internal meetings and external seminars, and critical reading of documents.  
4.6 Interviews 
It was essential for me to understand how RBM worked, and why RBM was 
productive or counterproductive within the field of CB. I wanted to go in depth 
and understand the on-the-ground implications, choices and prioritizations and 
the reasons behind them. This I found to be much more enlightening than, for 
instance, interviewing a representative sample of NGOs to find out what 
percentage considered RBM to be counterproductive.  I chose to interview Red 
Cross staff, consultants and researchers on aid and RBM, as well as one Norad 
representative, in order to tap into the experience and perceptions as well as the 
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‘experts’ perspectives on the concepts in question (see Appendix 1 for list of 
informants). 
The interviews were based on interview guides. From the very beginning, they 
came to proceed more like conversations with many interesting discussions. I 
used open-ended questions, asking for examples and clarifications along the way. 
My respondents’ interests and perception of challenges often guided the 
conversations, and I let new information from interviews lead to somewhat 
revised questions for ensuing interviews.   
In terms of methodology, my open-ended questions are something in between 
naturalist and constructivist methodology. According to Wilhite, open-ended 
questions can be located in the middle of a continuum, with quantitative surveys 
with structured questions and multiple-choice answers (a naturalist method) at 
one end, and phenomenology and other constructivist methods at the other end.
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I told my informants about the purpose of the interview and their right to remain 
anonymous. Most had no desire for anonymity, but a few from the Red Cross 
did. As it would have been a challenge to hide the identity of only a few, I have 
made all Red Cross informants anonymous, but put most weight on keeping 
anonymous those who requested it. 
It felt rather risky to interview and analyse what my own colleagues had said or 
written. And here I must underline that any misinterpretation or incorrect 
translations are my responsibility. The consent the informants have given me 
does not include my interpretation and the context in which I have placed their 
responses (see Thagaard 2003:128).  
Whatever the method and data material, there are always some aspects that need 
to be addressed and critically reflected upon. One aspect is looking for data that 
confirm the reseacher’s assumptions (Booth et al. 2008:84). Some of my initial 
                                              
2
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assumptions were quite strong – for instance, that CB projects would not find 
their way to the priority list of NGOs and Norad as they are so difficult to 
measure. That led to my assumption of distortion. Another firm assumption was 
that RBM is counterproductive. Already from the first interview, I met resistance 
to those assumptions, especially the one concerning distortion. However, through 
most of the interviews I continued asking the question, and through document 
reviews, looking for signs that could confirm my assumptions. In fact, my 
assumptions were not fully confirmed. It is precisely my initial eagerness to 
prove the assumptions right that makes me quite confident when I later in this 
paper disconfirm some of them.  
I analysed the interviews in three ways. First, I went through all interviews and 
searched for statements that confirmed or disconfirmed the theory or criticism 
thereof. Second, I made lists summarizing the main points on the two subjects: 1) 
CB achievements and challenges, 2) RBM pros and cons. Third, I looked for 
informants’ own explanations for RBM and CB practice.  
One weakness of the interviews is that I spoke mainly with Red Cross staff based 
in Norway. Some had quite short experience from the field, most had not been 
involved in the daily activities and result reporting ‘on the ground’, and some 
expressed limited knowledge of the particular case I was interested in, FD and/or 
CB of the Burundi Red Cross. Staff-members work with different countries, 
different contexts and different thematic areas. All this made it difficult to 
compare their impressions of the same case. Sometimes I have included staff 
experiences although they do not concern Burundi or FD, as with examples from 
Pakistan and Sudan. That, however, means I have only one source for each such 
case. Despite this weakness, I found it relevant to use the staff perspectives and 
input from their own experiences to shed light on the general challenges.   
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4.7 Document analysis and literature review 
Both the content of evaluation reports and how they are written have been of 
interest to me (Thagaard 2003:109). Methodological preferences influence the 
choice of approach and presentation. Therefore it was relevant to analyse how the 
writers have understood their evaluation task and which methodological tradition 
their choices and style reflect (ibid.:110). Some expressions from the evaluation 
reports might indicate the evaluators’ viewpoints. The evaluations and the reports 
used here are listed in Appendix 2. 
I have not validated the interpretations of the texts with the evaluators. That 
might be a weakness. It might also be seen as an ethical violation, as I thereby 
ascribe to the evaluator a viewpoint that person might not actually have 
(Thagaard 2003:128). For most of the documents I use, the writers have not been 
asked to participate through their text, as the reports are Red Cross property and 
were provided by the Red Cross or the reports are publicly available online.  
I have also used studies, evaluations and research from sources not related to Red 
Cross to shed light on challenges and achievements of RBM and CB and the 
relation between the two concepts. Examples of such literature is Riddell (2001) 
on aid project results, Hulme (2007) and Vähämäki et al (2011) on RBM and 
various Norad reports on CB and/or RBM. 
4.8 Seminars and meetings 
I have attended seminars, dissemination of evaluations and Red Cross internal 
meetings in order to get an idea of the most relevant topics and challenges that 
are on the agenda. Seminars and meetings were selected on the basis of their 
relevance for RBM, CB or for evaluation issues related to NGOs. (See Appendix 
3 for list.) 
44 
 
Regarding ethics and attendance at internal meetings, I stated my purpose in 
attending when given the chance to do so. In open external seminars or larger 
internal meetings, I have not done so. For internal meetings, I was invited by Red 
Cross staff. When relevant opinions and discussions from those meetings are 
presented, I have quoted anonymously. 
4.9 Explorative approach 
My main aim has been to analyse how RBM influences CB. While I had some 
assumptions that guided my work, I did not start out with a theory that I wanted 
to test. Instead, I focused on getting an overview of the field and then explored 
some theories. I do not claim to have an adequate overview of the relevant theory 
for the field under study here, and defining the borders of ‘the field under study’ 
is highly challenging when the effort is inter-disciplinarily (McNeill 1999:318).  
This thesis seeks to build on insights from relevant theories in an eclectic way 
rather than testing one particular theory. The analysis was explorative in the 
sense that I started out with reading theories, doing some interviews and reading 
evaluations from the Red Cross and Norad. This guided me along new paths and 
I repeated the process in an iterative way. In the middle phases of the analysis, I 
chose the theories that could best describe what I had found so far. 
In this thesis, theories are used primarily to understand how result reporting and 
evaluations are actually conducted and to assess, based on empirical material, 
how relevant the various academic criticisms of the respective approaches are. 
RBM was an obvious choice, although it is in fact more of a strategy (Hulme 
2007) than a theory. However, it is rooted in New Public Management (NPM) 
theory. NPM and naturalistic philosophy will be used as explanatory factors. 
CB is not only about end results, but also about the process of getting there – 
ownership, participation etc. This is one reason why RBM falls short of being a 
sufficient tool for the Red Cross 
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5. UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS AND 
MULTIPLE REQUIREMENTS  
  
RBM and project planning starts with defining clear objectives. The objectives 
and indicators should be SMART (see Chapter 3) – where the ‘A’ stands for 
‘Achievable’. The question then becomes: are the desired goals achievable?  
The prevailing impression that aid does not deliver results is fuelled by the 
plethora of complex goals and objectives. Development policy and practice is 
packed with good intentions, and international guidelines and all projects are 
expected to follow these guidelines and fulfil the expectations. Also the term 
‘results’ is understood in different ways by different actors. At the global or 
national level, those in charge of setting the overarching goals often opt for goals 
that do not match the level where aid practitioners actually work or have 
reasonable influence. All national societies (NSs) that implement projects, like 
the Burundi Red Cross, have many partners funding their programmes and 
projects, adding to the plethora of goals.  
Expectations set the measure of success. Consequently, the higher the bar is set, 
the higher is the likelihood of failure. As I seek to demonstrate, development 
policy and practice are brimming with overly ambitious goals and multiple 
international requirements. Expectations about aid are often so unrealistic that it 
is hardly surprise that aid does not always work.  In addition, challenges in 
aggregating results make it problematic to display results. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I explore the gap in levels between 
development policy goals and the actual results of CB projects in the Norwegian 
Red Cross. I will compare overarching goals with project goals, and discuss 
whether the impression of a lack of results might depend on which level we are 
looking at and the challenges of aggregation. Then, I discuss how the plethora of 
Do unrealistic 
ambitions and goals set 
Capacity Building up for 
failure? 
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donor requirements to which projects must conform contributes to setting the bar 
even higher.   
I argue that there are gaps related to how the term ‘results’ is understood, gaps 
related to objective levels and gaps created based on too many requirements. 
These gaps, I suggest, can explain the low trust in the ability of aid to deliver and 
the growing demand for results reporting.  The greater focus on results is based 
on the underlying assumption that the aid sector is not efficient.  What is 
perceived as lack of efficiency may instead be the lack of capacity to fulfil the 
overall goals and the numerous accompanying requirements. 
Next, I note that some aid projects are based on what interests Norway as a 
country has regarding foreign relations and not only on achieving development 
goals for those most in need.  
5.1 The level-gap  
The main task of Norwegian development policy is to help countries and people 
to get control of their own development and their own lives and to fight poverty 
(White Paper 2009 no 13). These expectations and desires shaped the main goal 
of CB in the Norwegian Red Cross’ cooperation agreement with Norad for the 
period 2009–2011. ‘The overall goal of the cooperation agreement is to – through 
strengthening the capacity of NSs – respond to humanitarian challenges, and 
increase the resilience of vulnerable communities.’ (Norwegian Red Cross 
2012a:4).  
However, there seems to be a huge gap between the ambitions of the Norwegian 
government, and the results from development projects. For instance, the main 
goal of the FD project funded and managed by the Norwegian Red Cross was to 
establish a financial management system that would enable NSs to get their audit 
reports approved (Bensky 2011:5). Evidently, there are great many steps between 
fighting poverty and improved Finance Management. This helps to illustrate 
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what I call the ‘level-gap’ and indicates that achieving overall development 
policy goals will take time and require many steps.  
The level-gap between policy and project goals becomes also evident in the 
report of the Norwegian Red Cross to Norad for the period 2009–2011. These 
are some of the tangible results reported in Organizational Development 
(Norwegian Red Cross 2012a): 
 South Sudan: ‘a total of 8 state branches manage their monthly financial 
reporting through SAGE’3  
 Somalia: ‘all branches in Puntland (three) and Somaliland (six) now use 
standardized reporting templates’ (Norwegian Red Cross 2012a:12–14) 
 Palestine and Lebanon : significant growth in number of beneficiaries 
The three results above address different levels. An increase in reach (number of 
beneficiaries) in Lebanon and Palestine may be a relevant indicator of positive 
development towards helping people to get control of their own lives. The results 
from South Sudan and Somalia relate to FD projects. If these results are 
compared to overall policy objectives, it is not difficult to understand why 
politicians and the media question the results of Norwegian development policy. 
There is a significant gap in levels, and many steps to go between using 
standardized reporting templates and, for instance, the overall goal of helping 
countries and people to get control of their own development and lives and 
fighting poverty (White Paper 2009 no 13). 
This is not to say that FD is irrelevant in achieving development goals for a 
country. As one of my informants noted: 
[Financial development can] strengthen a National Society’s ability and 
capacity to become an important actor, a more trustworthy actor. 
Receiving funds has to do with trustworthiness. If partners perceive them 
                                              
3
 SAGE is an accounting software system 
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as a trustworthy actor, then they will have more partners, more projects, 
important programmes and perform better. (Red Cross informant 2)  
Despite a plausible link between audits and development goals, audits and 
similar achievements as main results of FD programmes are not easy to 
communicate to the media – avid for pictures, beneficiaries’ stories or impacts on 
a society. 
UNDP (2006) and Fukuda-Parr et al.’s (2002: 9) layered understanding of CB 
can help to explain why there is a gap between policy and project goals. In their 
views, CB takes place at three different levels:  
 individual – enhancing knowledge and skills, and enabling environment 
for learning 
 institutional – supporting, modernizing and encouraging existing 
institutions to grow and develop sound policies, organizational structures, 
effective management and methods for control 
 societal – creating opportunities for the society as a whole, and developing 
accountable public institutions. 
The Red Cross’s CB projects promote change at the institutional level. However, 
Norwegian development policy goals are set at the societal level – hence the gap. 
It will probably take a long time until results can be perceived at the level of 
society (if at all), since many institutions and individuals would have to enhance 
their capacity. Thus, the question becomes: do CB projects have the potential to 
promote change at the societal level? If so, is it possible to show any indications 
of such impact?  
5.1.1 The aggregation problem  
Showing how project results trigger societal level changes is the holy grail of 
Results Management in most NGOs. This is not a coincidence, as more and more 
donors want NGOs to report on the impact level. ‘The ultimate evaluation-
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question is whether programmes contribute to the overarching aims of 
Norwegian development assistance, namely sustainable development and poverty 
reduction’ (Kruse et al. 1998:33). Norad wants more impact evaluations (Norad 
2009). In 2012, Norad’s civil society panel (Norad 2012b) called for aggregated 
impacts at the national level. Politicians seem to look for results at the national 
levels. Aggregation becomes necessary.  
In fact, some 60 to 90% of all NGOs aid projects actually achieve their 
immediate objectives (Riddell 2001:269–270). Looking at CB, Norad concluded 
in 2010, ‘Norwegian aid has succeeded in building important knowledge, 
competence and institutions in various sectors of society’ (my translation, Norad 
2010:1). There are, however, practical challenges in aggregating projects results. 
As one respondent noted: 
 We can report on our mobile health clinics: how many patients, how 
many shelters etc. The hardware is easy to report on. Everything on 
preparedness is very challenging to report on. When it comes to issues like 
reduction of measles and malaria – the large programmes where we 
cooperate with WHO and such organizations – then WHO report on 
reduction in child mortality. They are able to report on an overall level, at 
impact level. Fewer children die. We are unable to do that. Earlier we had 
such overarching goals, like reduction of mortality. That does not make 
sense at all! (Red Cross informant 1).  
After the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) many projects were given 
national-level goals. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to assume that a single project 
will have an impact on national statistics. For instance, the Norwegian Red Cross 
has supported 4,000 to 8,000 highly vulnerable children per month for the past 14 
years in northwest Russia. Given the size of the Russian population, it is unlikely 
that this project alone will reduce child vulnerability at the national level. The 
Norad representative I interviewed, Ivar Evensmo, doubts the possibilities of 
aggregation:  
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If you start at the grassroots level with a million activities, and then 
aggregate to next level – say meso-level – and then a national macro-
level, how can all the project activities influence the national statistics? I 
don’t believe that we can go about in that way. (Ivar Evensmo, Norad 
representative) 
Aggregating project results may also be inconsistent with the requirement for 
projects to be contextualized and based on needs – and this is even more so for 
Capacity Building projects. As the Red Cross puts it in their report to Norad on 
16 programmes conducted between 2009 and 2011:  
To report on achievements in 16 different programmes in four distinct regions as well as 
results achieved in the global programmes is a challenging task. Capturing common 
trends and comparing the achievements across the regions is demanding as each 
National Society has its own strategic plan and priorities, reflecting and responding to 
country-specific contexts and need. NorCross firmly believes that its support to national 
societies has to be based on the priorities and plans set out by the Society themselves. 
Although this makes it difficult to convey a comprehensive picture of results across 
regions, it does ensure the relevance of the programmes. (NorCross Norad report 
2012:4).  
The same applies to the FD Programme. What is relevant intervention depends 
on the situation in each context. Then results will also differ. How to aggregate 
‘satisfactory audit reports’ and ‘increased number of volunteers’ into an overall 
impact on CB?  
The aggregation challenge starts already from the phase of funding application. 
For the period 2013–2016, the Red Cross has built up the application to Norad in 
thematic areas. To merge goals from different NSs, in different context, on 
various developmental level and different priorities proved somewhat 
challenging. Some felt that in lifting context-specific goals to common thematic 
areas, one loses sight of what the real goals are. The thematic areas are followed 
by a thematically-oriented logframe which one of my respondents describes as 
operating at an intermediate level with limited relevance: 
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This intermediary level becomes a lowest common denominator of what 
we carry out abroad, because the programmes are in reality very different 
in the different countries. In order to present an application to Norad 
which presents what we do as something holistic and coherent, in four 
clear thematic areas and similarly independently of country, we have to 
make some adjustments. It is a model of ‘new way of packaging’ more 
than anything else, which some greatly believe in. Others, with field 
experience and focus on what is happening in the field, find it difficult to 
recognize what we do abroad in this intermediate level. (Red Cross 
informant 9)   
If the project starts with an application that the country responsible does not fully 
recognize, it is likely to cause challenges for the follow-up phase and reporting. 
On the other hand, other respondents saw it as necessary to develop common 
goals with common indicators in order to steer the organization in the same 
direction. Thematic indicators and aggregation are considered necessary to 
display the overall results. ‘This will give a more holistic picture, not only 
programme-by-programme results’ (Red Cross informant 11).  
It remains to be seen if the new approach will display aggregated results. Up 
until now, the level-gap between development policy goals and projects 
results, coupled with the aggregation problem, may have contributed to the 
overall perception that aid does not work. By promising more than it can 
deliver, the aid industry has just been setting itself up for failure. NGOs and 
donors are both responsible for setting the bar high.  As one respondent 
noted: 
We are very ambitious on behalf of our partner National societies. It is 
two-sided. We very much want them to become proficient and strong. The 
other issue is that we have to report results back. We are very ambitious 
when we write our applications to back-donors, because we need the 
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funding, and then we add many good arguments. (…) (Red Cross 
informant 1) 
5.1.2 Multiple agendas 
Sometimes MFA wants to define what we shall do, but we cannot impose 
on our local partners what to do. We have to try to match what the MFA 
wants and what the local partner needs. (…) I don’t experience a huge 
contradiction. It is up to us to explain. Our role is to facilitate.  (Red 
Cross informant 4) 
According to former Norad director, Poul Engberg-Pedersen, aid is becoming 
more politicized, which means ‘ there is a willingness from the Norwegian side 
to take politics and Norwegian interests more seriously’ in aid politics (my 
translation, Bistandsaktuelt 2010). The Red Cross has experienced situations 
where the MFA is asking Red Cross to accept funds for a certain country in order 
to contribute to Norway’s relationship with that country.  
A committee was appointed in 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
with the mandate to evaluate the NGOs as a channel in the aid cooperation 
(Rattsø 2006). The report points to relevant challenges when it comes to who and 
what set the development agenda and priorities: ‘Humanitarian aid must be 
prioritized based on needs, not on media potential or foreign policy’ (Rattsø 
2006:38). The report stated that donor countries have a tendency to prioritize 
what is important in their domestic public opinion (ibid.:21). These two motives 
create dilemma and might contribute to both apparent and actual weaker results.  
 
5.2 Numerous and partly inconsistent requirements  
CB projects must satisfy many cross-cutting issues and requirements. First, there 
are the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and 
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sustainability (OECD undated, a). There is the Paris Declaration to consider, 
which focuses on ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual 
accountability (OECD undated, b). In addition, there are cross-cutting issues such 
as gender sensitivity.  
It should come as no surprise that a single programme does not fulfil all these 
expectations and requirements at once. Indeed, if each project must satisfy all of 
them to be considered successful, then no project will ever deliver ‘good enough’ 
results. Evidently, some of these requirements involve different levels and may 
build on each other. However, there are also contradictory criteria. For instance, 
local ownership, self-reliance and contextualization, on one hand: more control, 
common criteria and harmonization, on the other hand.  
It is challenging to evaluate results when the criteria for success are so broad and 
blurred. Which criterion for achievement should be prioritized for assessment? 
As noted by Rattsø (2006:36), a significant problem in carrying out evaluations is 
that development policy has too many goals and too many criteria. 
One dilemma is to choose between prioritizing least-developed countries on one 
hand, and short-term results on the other. To achieve good results in a relatively 
short period, it is reasonable to choose countries and partners that have a 
potential to build on. This implies choosing countries and NSs with a certain 
standard. On another hand, these are not likely to be the most vulnerable and 
needy communities. This is a dilemma to which we return in Chapter 7 when 
discussing the possibilities and challenges of securing local ownership in weak or 
emergency exposed areas. 
NGOs have an obligation to work for the most vulnerable. The MFA and Norad 
expect the organizations to work with the poorest and most vulnerable societies 
(Portela 2012). This creates a dilemma: 
On one hand you’re asked to work in those countries. You’d like to work 
in those areas because that’s where people have the most need, but at the 
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same time they are the most risky. (Save the Children representative in 
Portela 2012:89) 
The perception is that the MFA and Norad are not willing to share the risk with 
the NGO: 
If the MFA asks us to do work in a country that is among the top ten most 
corrupt countries in the world, then, they need to understand that both of 
us have to take that risk (…) We have not yet managed to come to that 
point that the MFA and Norad will share the risk with us.  (Save the 
Children representative, in Portela 2012:89) 
5.3 ‘The buzzword challenge’ 
Development history is crammed with new ideas and good intentions: 
empowerment, good governance and human rights based approaches to name but 
a few. The challenges are often about operationalization: to turn these nice 
concepts - or ‘buzzwords’ - in to hard reality lessening the burdens for vulnerable 
and marginalized people (Banik 2010:23). The same challenge goes for 
‘Capacity Building’ and ‘strengthening civil society’. Are we by those two 
expressions talking about the same things? What do we want to achieve by 
strengthening civil society? (Ivar Evensmo/Norad representative, Banik 2010). 
What do we mean by ‘Capacity Building’ or ‘Organizational Development’?  
Organizational development is a terrible word. We should rather step 
down one level and call it training of volunteers in advocacy, resource 
mobilization or finance development (…) (Red Cross informant 4)  
Red Cross informants see the objectives of strengthening civil societies, both to 
be democratization and improved service delivery. Yet those two goals might not 
be very compatible. Moreover, there are ongoing internal discussions and some 
confusion on how to understand the concept of Capacity Building. If you do not 
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know where you are going, any road will get you there. My point here is that if 
the objectives are unclear, it will be difficult to assess the results. 
5.4 Interpretation of the term ‘results’ differ  
The phrase ‘results in aid’ has various interpretations. Results can be seen at a 
global and aggregate level, or results can be seen at national, organizational or 
project level. I have argued that it is a challenge that both on a national level and 
at project level, the term ‘results’ is used.  
In addition to a gap in levels between what results a project can deliver and 
global results, there is a level-gap between activity and impact level within each 
a project. As presented in Chapter 3, the intention with RBM was to move 
beyond reporting on activity and output level, to report on outcome level. 
However, reporting on this level still leads to stakeholders asking for prove of 
results. Norad are not satisfied with current knowledge of effects of Norwegian 
aid and ask for more impact analysis – long-term and aggregated results (Norad 
2009:15-16).  Norad’s increased focus on impacts reflects a trend generally and 
for Capacity Building in particular: ‘M&E should be able to measure how CD 
contributes to wider development processes (...)’ (Ortiz and Taylor 2009:9). My 
data indicate that the term ‘results’ is used for activity, output, outcome and 
impact level. 
Secondly, the concept ‘aid’ encompasses a range of approaches, channels and 
goals which makes it challenging to conclude results of aid on an overall level. 
The approaches vary from emergency aid to investments. The channels vary 
from NGOs like the Red Cross, the UN, state-to-state aid to Norfund and 
microfinance institutions. The aid objectives vary from increased school 
enrolment to emission reductions. In addition, Norwegian aid covers more than 
120 recipient countries. No wonder it is challenging to sum up in a single 
conclusion whether aid works or not.  
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By now we can, however, sum up that we have two types of level-gaps: one 
related to scale of the ambitions (global versus projects) and one related to stages 
in a project implementation (activity versus impact level). When it comes to 
‘results’, conclusions whether goals are achieved and results are delivered will 
depend on which level one choose to focus on.  
5.5 Consequences of the gaps 
The gaps described above must lead to some consequences. Among these are 
reduced trust in aid and a greater demand for result reporting. The Norwegian 
people’s confidence in aid is diminishing, and the reason is probably that 
development results seem to be weak. 
Slightly under half of the surveyed persons believe that aid gives fairly good or very 
good results. This is a definite decrease from the surveys in 2010 and 2006 (…) The 
respondents are particularly negative towards the long-term development assistance 
(my translation, SSB 2013). 
The gap between politicians’ development goals and the programme goals of 
NGOs is one likely source of the impression of the lack of results in aid. What I 
have showed is that this is a gap in levels and not necessarily an actual absence 
of results. The consequences of this gap and the subsequent impression of lack of 
results might have contributed to the increased call for RBM systems from the 
1990s. It had led not only to increased calls for Results Management, but also to 
a certain type of Results Management. 
Lack of results in the aid sector is often understood as lack of control 
mechanisms or a need for improved ways of using the resources – in other words, 
an efficiency problem. The greater focus on results builds on the underlying 
assumption that the aid sector is not efficient. This might be wrong. What is 
perceived as lack of efficiency might actually be lack of capacity to fulfil overall 
goals and numerous requirements. Concerning the Norwegian health sector, Vike 
makes an interesting point: that challenges are perceived as lack of efficiency, 
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instead of too high ambitions and too many goals (Vike 2004:12). I suggest that 
the same can be said about the aid sector. 
Overwhelmingly, NGO aid projects do achieve their immediate objectives 
(Riddell 2001:269–270), but still this is not necessarily captured by global or 
national indicators. The FD programme for Southern Africa has achieved many 
of its goals – for instance all NSs had financial policies in place, six had audited 
their financial statements and six used the new accounting system (Norwegian 
Red Cross 2009). A global study of Organizational Development where 15 Red 
Cross societies were assessed concludes that: 
At least half of all ICB [Intensive Capacity Building] participants achieved significant 
change in 71 percent (37 of 52) change areas assessed. (...) These findings demonstrate 
that, overall, ICB activities were highly effective. (Bloom and Levinger 2011:29).  
 
Norad’s civil society panel also concludes that projects tend to achieve their 
goals. Health, education, micro-credit and agricultural services are provided to 
‘significant numbers of people’, however, ‘for most projects we are talking of a 
few hundred people (sometimes fewer), not tens of thousands’ (Norad 2012b:5). 
Civil society contributes to poverty reductions, although small, but important 
(Norad 2012b:16-17). Should these limited results be viewed as lack of 
efficiency or lack of capacity? Norad’s civil society panel answer: 
It makes little sense to make civil society accountable for reducing or not being able to 
reduce poverty.(…) due to the limited scale of work, and the final impact depends on a 
number of external factors. (Norad 2012b:17). 
This is not to say that increased capacity within NGOs would be sufficient to 
achieve the development goals. However, greater capacity in the NGO channel 
might contribute. To make aid alone responsible for the failure to achieve 
development goals is misleading. Increased financial investments, improved 
trade regulations, reduction of agriculture subsidies and subsequent job creations 
are obviously some key factors as the White Paper on coherent development 
policy addresses (NOU 2008: no 14). However, often aid is ‘blamed’ because it 
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is so much more challenging and painful for states to alter their trade regulations 
and commitments, for instance. 
5.5.1 Lack of capacity also within the projects 
One way to increase the capacity to carry out development projects is to hire, 
train and retain qualified staff.  
Administration costs are controversial. Donors prefer to fund visible activities 
(Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002:11) and not the core structures that are the fundament 
for carrying out those activities and conduct necessary back office tasks. If 
administration costs are controversial, salaries are probably the most 
controversial part of it. Several reports and interviews show that retention of staff 
is a main impediment for CB.  
Normally NS’s salary scales are not proportionate to the job profiles, that 
is, the responsibilities conferred upon the staff are much higher than the 
remuneration. Subsequently most partners are not willing to contribute 
towards recruitment of well-qualified people and therefore you often see 
more square pegs in round holes running around. Those quality and 
qualified ones, when they come they don’t stay longer that is one of the 
reasons why there is high staff mobility at all levels within the NSs.(...). In 
developing world, salaries are considered as a highly motivating factor. 
Unfortunately the Red Cross doesn’t pay well compared to other 
established NGOs/humanitarian org. PNS
4
 are interested in paying for 
programme activities. (…)  (Red Cross informant 7) 
Already in 1998 retention of staff was an important hindrance for development: 
Northern NGOs and their counterparts must give greater attention to the need for 
southern NGOs to offer adequate incentives to attract and retain capable staff. (Bohwasi 
et al.1998:10) 
                                              
4
 PNS: Partner National Society, used as a term for the funding part in a Red Cross cooperation. 
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So-called ‘brain drain’ is one of the biggest challenges for the Financial 
development programme. As reported through Norad report and stated in 
interview with Red Cross informants, loss of trained financial staff is a main 
impediment for further progress.  
There is immensely high turnover. An important reason is that they reach 
a level where they get recruited to other places where they get a better 
salary. In several national societies, this was the case. (Red Cross 
informant 5) 
Higher salaries could be one way of motivating staff to stay. However, other 
PNSs oppose such a strategy, and the freedom to raise salaries for the Red Cross 
societies that are dependent upon PNSs is restricted: 
Huge informal pressure from PNSs might be a reason why they do not 
raise salaries. This is connected to the unwillingness to pay core costs. 
Many PNSs demand to see the salary payments to the employees! That is 
totally… We would not like it if MFA had asked to see what we earn. But 
some have a totally different approach to partnerships. They want to have 
much more control (...) One has to base partnership on equality, but to my 
view many do not take that into account   (Red Cross informant 2 ) 
Incentives are seen as one of the main challenges for CB (Mkandawire, in 
Fukuda-Parr 2002:152). As Mkandawire describes: 
The most obvious forms of incentives are the material ones, including job security. 
Capacity development requires provision of adequate remuneration. Modern 
bureaucracies are founded on the premise that individuals who work in them will serve 
the public good as opposed to catering to personal or sectional interests. This 
presupposes a basic income or living wages that will allow public servants to carry out 
their duties without succumbing to extraneous pressure (Mkandawire in Fukuda-Parr 
2002:152).  
Evidently, it can be questioned if the Red Cross offers good enough incentives to 
achieve their CB goals.  
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It has been discussed in the Red Cross to make sure the conditions for financial 
managers are competitive (Red Cross informant 5). This might be just as 
effective a measure for achieving the ultimate goals as continuous training and 
supervision. The risk of people leaving will still exist, but would probably be 
reduced. On the other hand, it could be objected that by increasing salaries the 
Red Cross would contribute to an imbalance in the local markets for both NGOs 
and the private sector aiming to create profitable businesses.   
Volunteers are not paid in the same way as staff, but an example from volunteers 
might still be relevant to show the limited resources available. During a visit to 
Lesotho, the project coordinator and I observed that the volunteers had next to 
nothing when it came to material possessions. Sadly, one of the highly-valued 
women volunteers died just before our visit. We visited her mother to offer our 
condolences and show that we appreciated her work. Her home was small, but 
very tidy and neat. The mother was sick herself and remained in bed, but she did 
not ask us for anything. But when we left, the programme coordinator of the 
Lesotho Red Cross asked if we could find a way to pay for a coffin for the 
volunteer who had passed away. Her mother had no money for the coffin and the 
volunteer had left nothing behind, and the Lesotho Red Cross has no budget for 
support to volunteers.  
 
5.6 Summary regarding ambitions and gaps  
Objectives are set on different levels, ambitions are overly high, agendas are 
multiple, capacity is restricted and requirements are many and incompatible. The 
consequence is a prevailing impression of weak results and subsequent 
diminishing trust in aid and increased demand for Results Management. It is 
quite easy to claim that results are not achieved when the objectives are 
numerous and exist on so many levels. Then accusations of ‘lack of results’ will 
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have a high probability of encountering some truth at some level. This might 
explain the call for improved effectiveness and efficiency. In this subchapter I 
have pointed to an alternative explanation of ‘lack of results’ – namely lack of 
capacity.  
It is important to understand the pressure for results and RBM. There are many 
ways that the gap between ambitions and results can be reduced, and it might not 
be that more stringent requirements, more results reporting or greater 
effectiveness are the only relevant strategies. 
In Chapter 6, I will proceed to look at the methods used for assessing and 
documenting results and explore whether or not the methods used contribute to 
improving results. 
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Does RBM document 
actual results of CB and 
contribute to improved 
results through i.e. 
learning?  
 
6. RESULTS MANAGEMENT – 
METHODOLOGY AND DOCUMENTATION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a gap in levels 
between development policy goals and project goals. I argued that this gap 
contributes to the impression that aid does not work and does not show results. In 
this chapter, I discuss whether RBM is a suitable approach for measuring and 
evaluating CB, including making a foundation for better future decisions. What is 
gained by this approach, and what is lost? My discussion will show a nuanced 
picture. RBM is useful for documentation and creates dialogue between partners. 
However, the methodology can also prove useless and at times even destructive. 
First, I examine whether RBM is an appropriate method for monitoring, 
evaluating and documenting CB results. Then I discuss why apparently ill-suited 
approaches are used. And finally, I will look at the use of alternative approaches. 
6.1 The RBM approach for Results Management of 
Capacity Building 
The RBM system introduced in the 1990s has probably contributed to achieving 
better results over time. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
showed an increase in effective projects from 35% to 60% and the Department of 
International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom had an increase in the 
rate of results from 66% to 75% (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002:5).  
After reading the extensive criticisms of RBM, I wondered if the negative aspects 
were exaggerated. Could there be positive sides that were not brought forward to 
the same extent as the negative sides? My Red Cross respondents mentioned 
several positive aspects of RBM: 
 ability to compare between projects, countries and over time 
 documentation and thereby ability to find historical data 
 a contribution to quality assurance  
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 more systematic approach 
 logframes function as a basis for dialogue between partners  
 
According to a recent study of evaluation practice in six Norwegian NGOs, 
evaluations  are ‘associated with positive attributes’(Norad 2013b:xiv). 
Evidently, Red Cross employees do see positive effects of RBM on quality 
assurance and documentation: 
For sure there is a lot we have done in Africa that we cannot 
summarize.(…) We are not able to document what we have done. If you 
dig into the archives, you will probably find many reports, but no 
systematic approach. They are not comparable. There might be good 
reports, but the lack of system makes it difficult to document the totality. 
The advantage of Results Management is system and quality assurance. 
(Red Cross informant 9) 
Red Cross staff-members interviewed for this study held the following to be the 
main negative factors of RBM: 
 time-consuming tracking and reporting 
 less relevant than talking to people directly 
 not able to track the most relevant substantial and qualitative results 
 lacking context 
 expectations of a specific standard, coupled with weak national societies, make local 
ownership of the project plan very challenging 
 assumed linearity 
 bureaucratic  
 
RBM is intended to document results, follow-up and contribute to learning. 
Drawing on data from the Norwegian Red Cross, I will revisit the RBM 
criticisms presented in Chapter 3 to see whether there is support in the data 
material. I will discuss the four aspects: control, indicators, linearity and 
accountability deficit.  
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6.1.1 Control 
Everyone will have more time if they do not have to spend the time on 
reporting. For instance in Lesotho Red Cross – if he [the project 
manager] did not have to spend four to five days a month to ensure a 
proper report he could have spent those days on travelling around 
speaking with them [volunteers and branches] and follow up in a more 
direct and flexible way. Results Management creates a lot of bureaucracy. 
(Red Cross informant 9) 
This quote supports the impression that New Public Management has led to 
significant bureaucratization. The danger is that actual development work 
becomes secondary, and RBM efforts the primary task of the staff. The 
experience of Price Waterhouse Coopers
5
 is, in general, that some 80% of project 
resources are spent on tracking and documenting, leaving only 20% for 
adjustment and implementing necessary follow up activities.  
The control aspect is vividly discussed in the academic literature (see Fukuda-
Parr et al. 2002, Ebrahim and Rangan 2010). The character of NPM is one reason 
for more focus on control. Another is likely to be the policy change from 
Technical Assistance to Capacity Development: fewer ‘experts’ are now being 
send to the field (Riddell 2001). Possible side-effects can be a felt loss of control 
and the need to impose control mechanisms. In other words, decentralization is 
met by an increased focus on control that might undermine true decentralization 
(Kruse et al. 1998:32).  
The intention behind NPM was a greater focus on results. The Norad guide on 
Results Management asks for a shift ‘away from a focus on inputs, activities and 
processes to a focus on benefits – from what you have done to what you have 
achieved’ (Norad 2008:9), which resembles the change from ‘rules’ to ‘goals’ in 
                                              
5 Price Waterhouse Coopers, giving courses on project management to Red Cross, presented these figures 
(December 2012).  
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New Public Management. My informants associate RBM with reporting, 
documentation and control, and not with learning. 
Both this case study and experiences reported by others indicate that is has been 
easier to fulfil the procedural rather than the substantial parts of the new goal- 
and result orientation. As described in Christensen et al.:  
(…) today, the Ministries ask by and large detailed report requirements to their 
subordinate entities (...) [but] (...) reporting on results achieved has been particularly 
problematic (…) (Christensen et al. 2007:102).  
The Norad handbook on RBM (2008) can be said to reflect a procedural 
approach to Results Management. Results reports are to include outcome, 
logframes, baselines and indicators. Stein Erik Kruse, representing an evaluation 
consultancy company, explained: 
A huge part is just simple bureaucratic reporting and little focus on a 
qualitative assessment of what has really happened. Bureaucratic reporting is 
all about economy – what you actually can control – input, activity and 
output. (…) If one should take Results Management seriously one should 
focus broader (…) The idea of goal management was to get further than 
input-output.(...) However, Norad is not consistent either. (Stein Erik Kruse) 
On the other hand, a focus on control was explicitly mentioned by my informants 
as negative aspects of RBM.  
  
6.1.2 Indicators – the question of facts, context and causality  
We cannot let our work be governed by indicators. We have to customize 
RBM to the way we work. (Red Cross informant 2) 
While the focus on control was not mentioned explicitly by my Red Cross 
respondents as a negative aspect of RBM, the indicators were highly 
controversial. Using indicators is one way to ensure objectivity, to control, and to 
66 
 
measure progress along the way from inputs to effects. As outlined in chapter 3, 
measuring should be based on (1) facts, (2) constant external conditions, and (3) 
a verifiable causality chain. 
1) Specific, verifiable facts   
‘We should not burden them with measuring every something under the sun that 
interests us’ (Red Cross informant 1). Although indicators have become an 
essential part of RBM in Red Cross and many see this as a positive development, 
there are worries that this tracking leads to unnecessary extra burdens. 
Red Cross devotes considerable resources to discussing indicators, coming up 
with relevant ones, defining, tracking and reporting on them. There is an ongoing 
debate within the organization on how useful indicators are and how they can or 
may contribute to its main objectives. 
IFRC has made a checklist for Characteristics of a Well-Prepared National 
Society, with 30 characteristics grouped into seven themes
6
 in addition to seven 
proxy indicators
7
 (IFRC 2010b:7).  There are also six sets of ‘Core Capacities 
that are critical for successful and effective functioning of National Society in 
service delivery to beneficiaries’ defined. These Core Capacities are divided into 
91 attributes (Red Cross undated
8
).  This indicates a strong belief in the 
feasibility of indicators.  
In 2013, an indicator-tracking table was developed for the Norwegian Red Cross, 
covering, i.a., Health, Disaster Preparedness and Capacity Building. The table is 
based on a template from Red Cross internationally as well as on a previous 
version of indicator tables. The table forms a part of the reporting system where 
qualitative assessments and narratives are included. Description and analysis of 
                                              
6
 ‘Disaster Preparedness policy and planning’, ‘Structures and organization’, ‘Human resources’, 
‘Financial and material resources’, ‘Relevance’, ‘ Advocacy’ and ‘Effectiveness’.  
7
  These are: 1)# people volunteering time, 2)# paid staff, 3)# people donating blood, 4)# local units (i.e. 
chapters, branches), 5)# people reached, 6)# total income received, and 7)# total expenditure.  
8
 The list of criteria and attributes were provided by Red Cross informant 2  
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progress are to be related to this indicator table. As an optional element, stories 
from beneficiaries may be included in the reporting. The extract below shows the 
indicators for CB (see table 2). 
 
Table 2: Extract of Indicator tracking table on Organizational Development 
(Norwegian Red Cross 2013a) 
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One of my informants see indicator tracking as relevant because it tells 
something about change, but at the same time questions that e.g. an increase in 
number of volunteers necessarily means that the organization is stronger and 
more sustainable (Red Cross informant 6).  
The academic Robert Chambers claims that surveys, purely quantitative 
measurements and indicators have shortcomings, as these rely on predefined 
categories, categories that often have an academic bias, as well as concentrating 
on what is measureable or answerable (Chambers 2008:6). The table above also 
includes more qualitative aspects – such as ‘know their roles’, ‘well qualified 
staff’, ‘management system implemented’ and ‘relevant policies’. On one hand, 
these indicators cannot be said to be easily measured. On the other hand, they 
constitute a potential for different interpretations. What is the definition of ‘well 
qualified staff’? What is the acceptable degree of implementation in order to 
conclude that something has been implemented – 90%? 100%? In order to 
document how the indicators are defined and what they are based on, the 
columns ‘Means of verification’ and ‘Method of collection’ are added. However, 
this does not necessarily help in better defining the indicator as such. 
People interpret indicators very differently, indeed. Even a basic concept like 
who should be counted as a volunteer is debated. A Red Cross workshop on 
indicators held in Nairobi 2013 revealed that ‘share of children’ gave rise to 
different interpretations. When the surveyed population is internally displaced 
and partly on the move, what population do we count and how do we calculate 
the ‘share’ of children that are vaccinated? Confusion regarding such definitions 
led one participant to conclude:  
They will have a huge problem when they are going to merge the indicator 
results from different places and make it into one result. It will be either 
very imprecise or so diluted that it will not say anything meaningful. (Red 
Cross informant 2) 
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Thus, measurability might not be as easy as both supporters and sceptics claim. 
Predefined categories do not necessarily lead to predefined and standard 
interpretations. Some claim that summarizing anything that has a slight 
possibility for divergent interpretation will make the aggregated results useless. 
 
Some are sceptical towards the whole system of logframes and indicators: 
 
The regime introduced recently means that we report at a wrong level, a 
level which is very general. One has to aggregate elements that are very 
different. One loses sight of the real results. (…) Behind an audit, there 
can be various results and important factors. If we analyse at the level of 
the national societies we can say much more about how the financial 
management actually works. It is a danger if we are satisfied when only 
the overall objectives are reached. (Red Cross informant 9) 
 
This also reflects an academic debate where critics argue that indicators reduce 
the social reality to bits and pieces that say very little about what is really going 
on (Eggen 2011:71). When the challenges for each society differ and hence 
project activities differ, then also the possibility of aggregation on impact level 
will be questionable: for as Ivar Evensmo says, ‘the more one moves to a higher 
level or on an aggregated level, the more the questions regarding methods 
appear.’ (Ivar Evensmo, Norad representative).  
On one hand, aggregation of indicators across projects in several countries might 
answer to the quest of documenting overall results that policy-makers, Norad and 
the general public want. On the other hand, to be able to aggregate results, one 
must rely on the lowest common denominator.  
Standardization of indicators across projects might have the unintended effect of 
reducing motivation, as such harmonization may indirectly communicate that 
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only what is tracked is deemed relevant. A recent workshop revealed the 
following:  
[For them, it was]no fun to participate in the workshop and notice that 
none of the main indicators reflected their programs (…) Then there will 
be very limited motivation to report on anything at all. (Red Cross 
informant 10)  
 
After another workshop on logframes, one participant reported that the others 
had found logframes extremely difficult and demanding. The focus on logframes 
created frustration, confusion and felt like a complete draining of energy (Red 
Cross informant 6). 
Do these indicators capture the elements that really work and are leading to the 
development wanted by the Red Cross, Norad and each and every country? Both 
IFRC (2010:8) and those responsible for the reporting system within the 
Norwegian Red Cross make it clear that tracking indicators are possible only at 
output level, and that indicators are only one part of Results Management – albeit 
a meaningful and necessary one.  
If it is possible to develop objectives and attributed indicators only at the activity 
or output level, then the question of the relevance for impact documentation 
arises. Activity-focused reporting will probably add to the impression of lack of  
results. 
According to a review of RBM made by former employees and consultants of the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), ‘the most cited 
challenge related to the method itself is the difficulty in selecting appropriate, 
objective indicators that measure relevant results rather than activities’ 
(Vähämäki 2011:20).  
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An example – alternative method, different result 
Even if indicators are meant to only be a part of results assessments, my 
informants feel they get too much focus. Several studies have recommended a 
greater focus on learning (Kruse et al. 1998:32, Norad 2012b).  
A new approach, focusing on reflection and learning, has been tried in Red 
Cross, with interesting findings. The Norwegian Red Cross has worked for many 
years in Sudan, supporting CB and other specific projects.  Here two 
methodological approaches were tried in order to improve evaluating. The first 
method was a conventional approach with key informant interviews, indicators, 
cost–benefit analysis and focus groups (Khogali and Zewdu 2009). The second 
method was unconventional, using interviews, quotes and reflection through 
workshop dynamics (Farah et al. 2012). This change in method actually altered 
the conclusions of the project. As a member of the evaluation team explains: 
 An evaluation was conducted in Khartoum 2 to 4 years ago. It was a 
large evaluation team with focus on counting and statistics. It showed that 
x number of latrines were built and so on. (...) The evaluation report 
concluded with positive results, but now a new workshop [using another 
method] showed something different – because at that time they counted, 
but never asked and talked to people. (Red Cross informant 6) 
 
The first report concluded: ‘Impacts are being realized in socio-economic, health 
and education terms’, and ‘sustainability had been reached’ (Khogali and Zewdu, 
2009:25). The report mentioned a concern about sustainability, but there are 
indications that this concern drowned in the dissemination of the report. My 
informant’s impression is that the report was extremely academic and ended up 
on a shelf instead of being used to make necessary changes (Red Cross informant 
6).  
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The second evaluation approach was building on the same elements as PA. The 
facilitators of the workshop and the evaluation explain some of the rationale and 
the method: 
It was decided that this evaluation would not take a conventional approach – analyzing 
for effectiveness and efficiency. Instead, it would be designed to encourage collective 
reflection involving all the interested parties (…) The style used in this report is to let 
those who have been interviewed speak for themselves. (Farah et al. 2012) 
Quotes from the people interviewed were hung up on the walls in the workshop 
room before the workshop began, explains one of the facilitators. Participants 
walked around, read the quotes and talked about them. It gave room for 
discussions and reflections. The evaluation process opened the eyes of those 
involved, according to the facilitator (Red Cross informant 6). This time the 
programme was shown not to be sustainable. Latrines collapsed. Income-
generating activities proved unfeasible alongside more needed humanitarian 
activities. Even more important, the workshop approach created new motivation 
to change and implement new measures. Those working on the project started out 
with the renewed energy almost before they left the workshop room (Red Cross 
informant 6). Chambers claims that PA releases energy, creativity and learning 
and that the methodologies are ‘drivers of change’ (Chambers 2008:178). That 
was, according to my informant, what happened in this particular workshop. 
Not only the style of evaluation process differed, so did also the participation.  
What we found out through the workshop was that the participants had 
other recommendations based on their knowledge of the local context and 
experience with the programmes (…) If they had used the same method 
earlier and before the programme exit, it might have had another 
results..? (Red Cross informant 6). 
The two methods differed in several ways: style (report vs joint reflection), who 
participated, and the content of recommendations. The workshop/participatory 
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approach led to more ownership of the recommendations and motivation for 
change (Red Cross informant 6).  
This is an example of how what may be hidden with one methodology becomes 
visible through another, and that the approach might have immediate effect 
through its motivational force.  
The second evaluation in Sudan allowed for more learning and corrective 
actions. However, the second evaluation method did not document results in a 
conventional written report with documented ‘verifiable’ facts. In other words, 
although the workshop approach proved effective for ‘management 
improvements’, it is questionable if it satisfies the ‘performance reporting’ 
requirements.  
2) Constant external conditions and relevance  
Constant conditions are the second prerequisite for indicator use. As the 
following quote indicates, changes in context are likely to happen, and more so in 
vulnerable or unstable environments. Moreover, changes in context make it more 
challenging to read results solely from tracking indicator.: 
To show results (…) one should look at results within their context. One 
should have qualitative assessments, interpreted within the context where 
the data and results are collected. We can have done everything correctly 
according to a programme, then there is suddenly an outbreak of cholera, 
and then every quantitative indicator heads in wrong direction. However, 
it might have been that without the capacity development programme the 
results of the cholera outbreak would have been much worse. (Red Cross 
informant 2) 
The quote shows that indicators can be useless without contextualizing, and to 
assume constant external conditions is very often unrealistic. Deteriorating 
contextual conditions, like coup d’etat or war, might lead to an impression that 
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there is a lack of results. And conversely: how can we know when results can be 
attributed to a particular programme? 
Burundi Red Cross was a very weak national society at the end of the civil war. 
In 2006, the IFRC launched a programme for Intensified Capacity Building 
(ICB) with the following objective: 
[T]o best serve vulnerable people through a tailor-made and holistic approach. It helps 
selected societies build the organizational capabilities needed to scale-up country-wide 
service delivery. (IFRC 2008:2)  
 
After implementation of the programme, and a corresponding increase in 
humanitarian activities, the number of volunteers increased from almost none in 
2007 to 300,000 by 2010. How can we know that the positive changes are due to 
the CB Programme and not the changed context? Apparently, it is rare to use 
control groups –for instance, comparison with other NGOs and their 
development in terms of volunteers, activities or reach. Is it possible to isolate the 
effects of the programme from the changing context in Burundi at the end of the 
civil war? It seems plausible that change of context contributed or was an 
enabler, but it alone cannot account for the change.  
Further, in the transition from increased capacity to increased service delivery, it 
is seen difficult to separate the support from external factors, and to be sure about 
causality. Indicators are not seen as sufficient for assessing causality. 
Organizational Development is supposed to lead to better service delivery. 
This is difficult to measure! Do we reach more people than ten years ago? 
Yes, but it is not sure that the result stems from Organizational 
Development. That is very difficult methodologically. We have to look at 
not only simple indicators, but also use more in-depth analysis. (Red 
Cross informant 2) 
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3) Verifiable causality 
In 2011, the Norwegian Red Cross conducted an evaluation of a Financial 
Development (FD) Programme. The objectives of the FD Programme had been 
to promote accountability, increase financial resources, gain or maintain donor 
confidence and contribute to sustainability of the organization (Bensky 2011). 
This review found the cause-and-effects link difficult to establish, and isolating 
elements was often impossible. The evaluation reported an anecdotal link from 
the FD Programme to improved confidence and competence among finance staff. 
That might also have led to increased donor confidence and funding, but such a 
link could not be documented (ibid.:12).  
The evaluation team had developed an indicator-based interview guide. During 
the dissemination of the review, they reflected on the choice of method. In 
retrospect, it appeared that using indicators instead of narratives and in-depth 
interviews reduced the possibility of reflecting on causality: ‘We focused too 
much on indicators which in the end did not give us much. We should have 
focused more on narratives’(anonymous respondent) 
 
6.1.3 Linearity – relevance of baselines and possibilities for 
causality? 
A danger with indicators is that over time the focus is only on them. There 
are many other relevant factors that we maybe did not think about when 
the project started (Red Cross informant 2).  
Indicators defined at the beginning of a project to act as a baseline for gauging 
progress may prove irrelevant over time. Other studies confirm this risk (Riddell 
2001:285). CB demands in-depth knowledge of an organization. If results are 
measured against irrelevant baseline indicators, then ‘progress’ on these 
indicators may be weak, and that contributes to the impression of weak results.  
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Some academics doubt that the hunt for empirical data will help in verifying 
causal links (Eggen 2011:8–9). It might be both challenging and costly, if not 
impossible, to document causality through observable and objective facts tracked 
as indicators and conventional methods. However, although in a narrative form, 
the causal links between volunteer activities and societal impact are substantiated 
through the following account from Burundi: 
Initial services were agricultural in nature – digging a field, building a house or 
mending a roof for an elderly or disabled person – and based on existing skills and tools 
within the communities. The logic was that lots of people doing simple things once a 
week would lead to very visible impacts. From the start, these groups attracted members 
from both Hutu and Tutsi, men and women, young and old. As the groups got used to 
working together, a level of social cohesion began to return to communities which had 
been destroyed during the civil war, rebuilding links between members of Hutu and 
Tutsi communities. (IFRC 2011a:19) 
 
According to one respondent, it is commonly recognized that it is not possible to 
document results through the linear model of activity-output-outcome-impact 
(Red Cross informant 8). And yet, public opinion and the politicians demand 
such documentation of results. Norad acknowledges that this is more complex.  
A study of Organizational Development of Red Cross societies highlights the 
complexity of demonstrating causality (Bloom and Levinger 2011). This study 
uses a broader set of methods to assess the links between all types of 
Organizational Development initiatives and Capacity Building with the objective 
of building CB knowledge. The study aims to capture all elements that have an 
influence on CB. The evaluation focused on fourteen Red Cross national 
societies, including Burundi Red Cross. The methods used were desk studies, 
interviews, participatory workshop, evidence-based assessment tool, surveys, 
indicators, discussions, correlation analysis, regression analysis and social 
network analysis.  
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The study found that networking, building on existing resources, reflecting local 
needs, commitment and ownership were key success drivers of CB. Table 3 is an 
extract from a table displaying the results. 
Dimension 
Type 
Dimension Type Definition9 Dimensions 
 
‘Strong 
drivers’ 
Performance on these dimensions is highly predictive of an 
NS’s C-BAR composite score (i.e., there are no more than 4 
NS that have composite scores that differ from the score 
received on this dimension). Additionally, scores for these 
dimensions are strongly linked (i.e. correlated) with 
performance on at least 9 (i.e., three-quarters) of all other 
C-BAR dimensions. Good performance on these dimensions 
is crucial. NS that don’t score well on C1 (effective internal 
communication), for example, do not reach the highest 
performance tier. At the other end of the spectrum, an NS 
that scores ‘developing’ on B1 (foundation of sustainability), 
will also have a ‘developing’ composite 
score. Thus, B1 acts as a warning sign while C1 appears to 
be a prerequisite for success. 
B1, foundation of 
sustainability, 
(warning sign for 
a developing 
rating); 
C1, effective 
internal 
communication (a 
prerequisite for 
an exemplary 
rating) 
Table 3: extract from Table 3 in Bloom and Levinger 2011:19 
Thirteen dimensions scored and ranked through a discussion process form the 
foundation of this study. These dimensions cover everything from having a 
culture that fosters progressive thinking, to having the skills necessary for 
developing administration systems and for coalition-building (Bloom and 
Levinger 2011). To score thirteen, broad dimensions can be accused of being 
reductionist. However, while the discussions leading to the scoring probably 
provide insights, learning and value for the participants, it is questionable if the 
form of presentation makes the results accessible enough to provide learning for 
others. Although learning was the main purpose of this evaluation, the 
communication of the results through the written report seems quite inaccessible 
for non-researchers. As one respondent noted: ‘I have been to two meetings 
where the report has been presented, but I find it complicated’ (Red Cross 
informant 1) 
                                              
9 NS: National Society , C-BAR: Capacity-Building Assessment Rubric 
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Red Cross tries out various methods to establish causality. We have seen through 
two very different approaches that proving causality is challenging, although it 
may be assessed. The study referred to above is comprehensive and complex, but 
probably fails to satisfy policy-makers’ quest for simple and clear presentation of 
results.  
Organizational culture 
We have seen that it is challenging to establish causality in CB, and that 
indicators tend to concern measureable activities and not always the most 
relevant aspects. Cultural change is not among the easily verifiable facts in a 
causality chain. Red Cross representatives underline the importance of culture: 
 
The whole idea is that when the management supports its employees, with 
good attitude and dedication they will be able and willing to achieve 
intended results. (…) The bond that holds this process together is the 
values and leaders in the organization. (Red Cross informant 7) 
 
Assessments of governance and leadership are weaker than assessments of other 
factors in NGO evaluations (Norad 2013c:xv). Previous research has shown that 
culture is a common denominator in successful companies, so culture should also 
be one of the most important parts to measure when working with Organizational 
Development (Høidal et al. 2008). Red Cross representatives underline the 
importance of leadership: 
I believe that a motivated workplace is driven by strong leadership and 
management. Creating and sustaining motivation therefore, requires open 
communication, honesty and respect. (Red Cross informant 7) 
Although measuring cultural elements may seem relevant, the linear model from 
cultural change to impact is challenging to display. The indicator table presented 
above does not include explicit indicators for culture. However, culture is a part 
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of some of the evaluations conducted by Red Cross, and is to some extent 
included in the reporting to Norad (see Norwegian Red Cross 2011:14). For 
instance, the IFRC review of Burundi focuses on self-sufficiency versus 
dependency, and the traditional values of helping one another (IFRC 2011a). The 
study used interviews, but apparently there is no measuring of cultural elements 
that can act as documentation of causality and linearity.  
 
Communicating results based on cultural change may prove challenging, and 
there is a long way to go to get results from cultural change. That, too, might add 
to the impression that results are lacking.  
 
6.1.4 Accountability deficit: Beneficiaries’ assessments  
Vulnerable or poor people are the main target group for most aid projects. And 
yet, ‘beneficiary accountability’ is often lacking. As one respondent put it: ‘[We 
should] not only become an organization that is reporting, in addition [we have 
to ensure] beneficiary accountability.’ (Red Cross informant 2)  
In general it is not very common to do beneficiary surveys (Red Cross informant 
2). None of the evaluations or reports presented in this thesis included 
beneficiaries’ assessments of the relevance or quality of the services provided. 
One reason for this absence of the voices of the intended beneficiaries might be 
that the target groups are far from the Norwegian decision-making processes, so 
the accountability link between populations and politicians is disturbed by many 
intermediary levels, and that there is no way that the population directly can hold 
the politicians accountable. To complicate matters further, we are not talking 
about one population with similar needs. Norway provides aid to at least 124
10
 
                                              
10 According to Norad statistics for 2012 – url: http://www.norad.no/no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall. In addition 
come the countries that NGOs support through own funds and through other actors and channels. 
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countries with very different needs. The question then becomes which 
populations’ interests and needs are reflected in the donor aid policy goals. 
Secondly, the links between an FD Programme and beneficiaries’ access to and 
satisfaction with humanitarian activities are long and unclear. Beneficiaries 
might receive more and better service from Red Cross for reasons not stemming 
from a specific FD Programme. 
Thirdly, the number of donors might add to their power and presence, so that 
others (like beneficiaries) are overlooked. Most of the implementing NSs have 
many funding partners and back-donors they have to satisfy. Several of my 
informants at the Norwegian Red Cross observed that NS resources often go to 
satisfying the diverging objectives and interests of back-donors or Red Cross 
funding partners: 
(…)for those national societies with many partners who all want to achieve 
different things, who the national society has to serve – they spend really too 
much of their time and resources on that instead of doing what they really 
need to do and should do – namely serve the people (… ) (Red Cross 
informant 1) 
6.2 The assumed distortion not fully supported 
Above we have seen that conventional methods, including indicators, might 
over-focus on activities and not provide the tools needed to demonstrate 
causality. Further, one of the assumptions was that indicators and the RBM 
regime lead to distortion of priorities (Hulme 2007:8). According to Red Cross 
staff, partners prefer to fund and support the most ‘legible’ or easy-to-explain 
projects: 
It is easier to get funding for a relief operation or building water wells. To be 
able to count something or to take photos of it becomes important.(…) It is 
very difficult to ‘sell’ Organizational Development. (Red Cross informant 4) 
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Most partners are interested only in ‘sexy programmes’ like HIV/AIDS, 
health etc., perhaps those are easy to measure impact, but not FD or OD 
programmes that are sometimes difficult to measure. (Red Cross informant 7)  
The quotes indicate a distortion away from CB towards projects that are easier to 
present to public opinion. This might give short-term results, but less 
sustainability and hence fewer long-term results. 
As it is highly challenging to visualize and document impact for beneficiaries 
from CB Programmes, it is hard to get funding for core costs of the 
organizations. Core costs are necessary for running an organization. They can 
cover, for instance, the salary of the Chief Executive Officer and costs related to 
accounting. It is likely that the organizations will become less sustainable if they 
are used as service providers for funding partners without the necessary 
organizational foundation to do so.  The following quote from a project plan for 
Malagasy Red Cross highlights the challenges of lack of funding for core costs: 
The Malagasy Red Cross [MRC] is financially very dependant to donors and partners. 
MRC is being used as cheap service deliverers by PNS, their back-donors and other 
international aid agencies. Funding would be available for projects but not for the core 
costs of the Society. Independence and growth on this model is unsustainable 
(Norwegian Red Cross 2012b).  
 
There are several plausible reasons for the distortive practice away from CB from 
international donors and Red Cross societies. It might be a consequence of RBM 
and indicator use. Or, it might be that the international donors have little faith in 
either the concept or CB. A third explanation might be lack of confidence in the 
receiving National Society (NS). Not having interviewed international donors, I 
cannot offer conclusions regarding faith in the concept. Lack of trust in receiving 
NS is a challenge. A need for control can be said to underlie all three possible 
explanations. In order to avoid accusations from their home constituencies, 
donors often prefer ‘manageable’ projects and retaining control (Hulme 
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2007:11). The paradoxical consequence is that the poorest and weakest NSs risk 
receiving the least support for CB.  
 
Experiences with Red Cross and governmental back-donor priorities 
internationally show the distortion towards visible and measureable projects.  
However, my initial assumptions of obvious distortion also in Norwegian aid 
priorities are not confirmed. Both Norad and the Norwegian Red Cross give 
priority to CB. As one respondent explained: ‘We don’t have to convince Norad. 
When it comes to ECHO it is harder. To convince the EU system – that is not 
possible!’ (Red Cross informant 4)    
 
6.3 Gap between RBM intentions and practice 
I have shown that extensive resources are spent on tracking indicators. We have 
seen that indicators might lead to distortion, but that forces in Red Cross and in 
Norad can counter that. In addition, we have seen that the focus on indicators and 
conventional approaches might neglect the question of sustainability. Finally, we 
have seen that opportunities for reflection, dialogue and learning are partly lost in 
current RBM practice. In sum: indicators tend not to capture impact, and often 
lack relevance and contextualized results. Moreover, the challenge of aggregating 
meaningful results contributes to the impression that CB efforts fail to produce 
results.  
Indicators make it possible to summarize results from various countries and 
various projects into aggregated results. However, there is a risk that the most 
relevant and important work is made invisible, and that important and qualitative 
changes in social realities are not tracked. An expert and instructor in RBM 
describes this: 
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The problem [with indicators] is that you often get the things that are 
possible to count, and hence output level. You will not get the qualitative 
changes. At outcome level there are different target groups and different 
challenges. (…) For instance, in Save the Children they state that 1 
million children are reached. That is appealing, but it does not say 
anything about what kind of change has happened. We cannot say that 1 
million children have a new and better life. Some have received education, 
others have received something else.(…) The goals are always qualitative, 
or they should be, where you describe the changed situation for the target 
groups. With indicators it might be that you steer towards what can be 
counted instead of steering towards the goal. (Anette Simonsen) 
 
We have seen that some of the criticisms of RBM are relevant, and have noted 
the gap between the intentions of RBM and practice. As presented in Chapter 3, 
the intention of RBM is both ‘management improvement’ and ‘performance 
reporting’. However, my data indicate that the ‘performance reporting’ with a 
procedural approach and focus on activity dominates to some extent at the 
expense of a focus on results, learning and beneficiary accountability. According 
to one informant the focus on logframes means that one never manages to move 
beyond step one to four in the project cycle (see Figure 3). Reflection and 
learning are lost in the logframe fog (Red Cross informant 6). 
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Figure 3: Project cycle (based on Norad 2008:23–28, IFRC 2011b:10 
and Red Cross informant 6) 
 
6.4 Gap between Red Cross needs and RBM 
requirements  
The earlier Results Management system was less formal, but perhaps more to the 
point and hence more relevant, according to one informant: 
Traditionally there has been much more presence in the fields. I do not 
think the Results Management was any weaker, but it was different and 
more informal. The priorities were different earlier, less bureaucratic. 
There was more time to talk with the national societies, to listen to how 
things were going, observe, and spend time operationally in the field. In 
addition, one would achieve results at that time too. (Red Cross informant 
10) 
1: Initial 
assessement 
2: Planning 
3: Imple-
mentation  
4: 
Completion 
and end-
evaluation 
5: Reflection, 
learning  
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Researchers and critics who hold that RBM is counterproductive (Ebrahim and 
Rangan 2010, Vähämäki et al. 2011, and Natsios 2010) might be at least partly 
correct. If information is not relevant, it will not be used. Somehow, information 
is collected despite indications that it is not used. Neither NGOs nor people in 
MFA and Norad have sufficient time to read reports (Norad 2013a, Norad 
2013b).  
The different stakeholders have different needs for information. What is seen as 
relevant for one actor might be less relevant for another. Table 4 summarizes 
what Norad asks for and what Red Cross staff say they need for managing 
projects.  
 
Norad Red Cross  
Methods: 
 Baselines 
 Logical Planning models 
 Outcome 
 Sufficient data collection, but 
preferably based on existing data 
tracking 
 Use of Indicators 
 
 
 
 
Purposes of monitoring and 
evaluations: 
 Accumulated effects 
 Demonstration of progress 
 More knowledge regarding impact 
and wider effects 
 Results for beneficiaries 
Methods: 
 Beneficiary satisfaction assessments 
 True and clear answers 
 Context and culture based evaluations 
 Holistic assessments 
 In-depth understanding, not superficial 
 Minimization of resources spent on data 
tracking and reporting, not overload 
implementing national societies with data 
tracking 
 Acknowledge the process, not just results 
 Practical and economically realistic  
 
Purposes of monitoring and evaluations: 
 Beneficiary accountability 
 Comparison across programmes 
 Contribute to dignity, respect and trust for 
those involved 
 Impact assessments: if CB leads to improved 
service delivery etc. 
 Contribute to learning  
 Usefulness: easy to read and use the evaluations 
Table 4: comparison of Norad and Red Cross Needs for Results 
Management (Based on Norad handbook 2008 + interviews) 
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Both actors want impact, results for beneficiaries and some kind of systematic 
approach. However, there is a gap regarding what is perceived as relevant. Norad 
want to see accumulated effects and demonstrated progress. Red Cross wants in-
depth understanding, contextualized results, learning and to contribute to dignity 
and trust. Norad wants logframe models and use of indicators. Red Cross wants 
holistic assessments and minimization of resources spent on data tracking.  
The table conveys the general impression from interviews and documents, 
especially the differences. However, both Norad and Red Cross have nuanced 
perspectives on this; and of course not all employees agree – viewpoints may 
vary. My impression is that the debate is very much on-going in both places. 
The conventional RBM approach does not always give Red Cross practitioners 
the information they most need for managing projects and programmes. 
Obviously, this must have consequences on results. Conventional methods are 
often used without considerations of strengths and weaknesses or of other 
alternatives (Norad 2013c:xv). Perhaps a different choice of method than the 
conventional one could provide more relevant information. 
 
Whether RBM is relevant or not also depends on which step in the result 
documentation process we are looking at. Although many feel that indicators and 
the overall reports to back donors are too narrow, underlying material produced 
along the way is seen as relevant by some of my respondents. Country-specific 
reports are examples of material underlying the production of overall reports to 
Norad. They are in-depth and based on the specific context, history and 
challenges of the particular country and programme. Such reports give insights 
and understanding that contribute to learning and are thus seen as relevant. 
Those reports are on such a level that you understand what the goals are. 
They are not aggregated: you read them in the context. For instance, what 
did we want to achieve in China, what were the challenges in China? It 
was not written as examples or thematically, but was written as context 
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specific reports. Reading such reports from areas you were not familiar 
with gives good insight into what was really going on. (Red Cross 
informant 2) 
 
6.5 Possible reasons for the gaps   
We can conclude that there is a gap between what Red Cross staff need for 
monitoring and implementing better programmes, and what Norad demands, 
altthough the picture is mixed. There is also a gap between the intentions of 
RBM (results focus) and reality (activity focus). These gaps probably lead to the 
impression of lack of results and actually weaker results. The next step is to 
discuss reasons for these gaps.  
First, scholars point to differences in methodological approaches caused by 
different ideas and ideologies (Knutsen and Moses 2007). Here, I will take a 
closer look at these arguments, and suggest that this analysis does not cover all 
explanatory factors. As an example, and the second point here, I hold that there 
are sheer practicalities and realities that  may also govern choices, but this is not 
often debated in the academic literature. Thirdly, some claim that priority is not 
given, as insufficient resources are spent on Results Management. Fourth, I ask 
whether current RBM practice is only a ritual performed for an external 
audience. Lastly, I discuss the weak acceptance of complexity in aid. 
 
6.5.1 Methodological gap and legitimacy  
Knutsen and Moses (2007) help us to understand preferences in methodology: 
methodologies, they explain, refer to the philosophical ground floor or 
understanding of the world, whereas methods refer to the techniques applied. 
Different disciplines apply different methods and relate to different 
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methodologies, although methodologies and disciplines to not correspond fully. 
Simplifying, we might say that a naturalist understanding corresponds to 
economists’ methods and that constructivism correspond to anthropologists’ 
methods.  
There is a tendency to believe, particularly in policy and economic circles, that 
the more naturalistic way of researching has the highest standing. Evaluation 
credibility depends on international acceptance and that reports are perceived as 
being rigorous (Ortiz and Taylor 2009, Hulme 2007). Natural science methods 
and quantitative methods are seen as most objective and able to give the most 
precise answers:  
For the last years, it is no doubt that the quantitative oriented method 
people that have had the dominance. Those ‘softer’ oriented have been 
more on the on the defensive side. (…) Results are often perceived as 
quantifiable. Journalists do not want any approximate answers. One 
wants precise answers, -so and so percentages etc. (Ivar Evensmo, Norad 
representative) 
The striving for measureable indicators and empirical verification of causality are 
fuelled by media and academic voices based in naturalistic traditions. There are 
also influential researchers in Norway who criticize aid evaluations for not being 
scientific. For example, Anne Welle-Strand and Asle Toje find a Norad report to 
be based on ‘[l]oosely founded guesses’, with a lack of causality and lack of 
quantitative data:  
There is no necessary link between the questions being asked and the answers given – 
there is no causal relationship between dependent and independent variable. (…) The 
parts that are presented are all qualitative within a field where quantitative analysis is 
desirable and possible. (my translation, Welle-Strand 2008) 
With a sigh, one evaluation consultant said: ‘For positivists, things have to be 
quantified in order to exist.’ (Stein Erik Kruse). Learning seems often to be 
sacrificed on the altar of perceived rigour.  
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Perceptions of objectivity and what is scientific can be understood as results of 
dominant discourses (Thagaard 2003:111). Compliance with the criteria upon 
which Red Cross legitimacy rests influences priorities and RBM practice to a 
certain extent. As demonstrating performance is one way of gaining legitimacy 
(Portela 2012:114), doing it in compliance with accepted standards will 
obviously yield the greatest legitimacy. 
One reason why there is not more use of PA and appreciative inquiries may be 
that we still believe the naturalistic methodology to be most objective, giving 
‘uncontaminated’ facts. Appreciative inquiry contradicts the highly valued 
standard of avoiding leading questions during surveys. The ‘gold standard’ is 
objective and verifiable facts: 
There is a general belief that natural science is quantitative and therefore rigorous, 
whereas social science is qualitative and therefore not rigorous. (Norgaard and 
Sharachchandra 2005:971) 
Thus, striving for legitimacy might be one reason for greater focus on indicators 
than on storytelling or appreciative approaches, and for the other gaps noted 
above. But scientific legitimacy is not the only thing that governs evaluation 
methods in Red Cross. In the Sudanese case, two methods were employed – the 
first used tracking and classical report writing, while the second used quotes on a 
wall and active participation in an workshop where participants were paired up to 
discuss the quotes. The latter created active reflection, new perspectives and 
learning. 
The variety of methods used leads me to claim that academics have exaggerated 
the negative sides of RBM, or have at least not taken sufficient notice of other 
approaches in use. In that way they might not see the nuanced ways in which an 
organization like the Red Cross employs various approaches. The evaluations 
cover a broader methodological range than anticipated, but some gaps remain.  
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In any case, giving priority to tracking, focus on control and the requirement of 
upward reporting ‘on demand’ may create an atmosphere less focused on 
learning and results than in-depth analysis and reflection could have done. In 
hunting for indicators, we may lose sight of real people living in real societies – 
and that too can add to the impression that results have not been produced. 
 
6.5.2 Intentions meet realities 
Reporting was a specific area of communication mentioned as problematic.(…) Internet 
access at the national level is generally good (...) but few branches have internet access, 
and some do not have electricity (IFRC 2011a:29) 
Results Management is not only about methodological preferences, but very 
much about resources and practicalities. Evaluations and reporting require data, 
which in turn require resources, competence and sufficient budgets. 
If you are going to say something about empowerment, then you have to 
do a thorough examination. The problem is that it requires a lot of data. 
(Stein Erik Kruse) 
My case study indicates limited RBM budgets as well as limited investments in 
competence and prioritizing of sufficient time in field during evaluations.  
Coming from the analysis department in a large private-sector company, I was 
surprised to find how tiny the budgets for evaluations and analysis are in the aid 
sector. Customer satisfaction surveys are done every month for mobile phone 
subscribers in Norway – but we cannot afford annual beneficiary surveys for 
those most vulnerable on our globe. This is a general challenge for the aid sector. 
Torild Skard, with experience as researcher, UNICEF director and special 
advisor in the MFA, reflects on the imbalance between the complexity and scale 
of aid compared to evaluation budgets, and finds that the budgets do not reflect 
the costs: 
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The development assistance administration conducts studies, assessments, programs and 
project evaluations to ensure the quality of the operations. But the scale is limited. (...) 
Quality assurance of the aid in total got 139 mill NOK in 2010 – about half a percentage 
of the total aid budget. That does not match the scale and the complexity of the 
development cooperation. (my translation, Skard 2011)
 
The use of indicators might as well be a reflection of realities as well as of 
naturalistic ideology.  
Although Red Cross staff see logframes and in-depth studies as complementary, 
the perception is also that one cannot do both: ‘There is no contradiction between 
logframes and in-depth studies, but it is unjustifiable economically to do both’ 
(Red Cross informant 2). My data indicate that when the organization has to 
choose, primacy is still given to logframes and indicators. 
There are clear indications of conflicting expectations as to results 
documentation and low administration costs (Portela 2012). One of my 
informants pinpoints the paradoxical requirements: 
Norad criticizes the use of funds for personnel in field. At the same time 
they ask for more monitoring and documentation of results. If those 
present in the field are to manage everything, they need our assistance. It 
is naïve to believe that we can just send an order and that they will reply 
back satisfactorily (Red Cross informant 11). 
Then again, we can ask ourselves: why do we want to keep evaluation costs so 
low? Naïve back-donors as well as the NGOs’ own fund-raising departments 
might be the ones to blame. As many donors see low administration as a sign of 
efficiency, fund-raising departments cite low administration costs when 
competing for donations. 
One study emphasized the lack of systematic RBM implementation (Norad 
2011a:xvi–xvii). Such reports might give the impression that NGOs lack the 
willingness to measure results. But I find no indications that willingness is 
lacking – the resources spent on producing indicators, tracking, testing various 
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evaluation methods etc. should prove this. What is lacking are adequate budgets 
and capacity. And when budgets are limited, it is hard to prioritize beneficiary 
surveys, indicator tracking and in-depth, context-based studies.  
6.5.3 InsufficIent priority to real Results Management  
Methodological preferences and budget constraints are two explanations for the 
gap between RBM intention and practice as well as between needs and 
requirements. The third explanation is lack of actual priority to Results 
Management.  
Capacity 
Correct application of RBM requires capacity and knowledge. It is not enough to 
conduct data tracking: data must be turned into useful information. As one 
respondent noted: ‘It requires a lot to track and analyse data’ (Red Cross 
informant 6).  
National society representatives participating in a workshop expressed the need 
for more resources within the field of RBM and PMER. The situation was 
described as: lack of unified plans for PMER, lack of dedicated departments or 
persons, lack of priority at management level, and lack of well-trained staff for 
collecting and analysing data (Red Cross informant 6). 
Considerable personnel resources are already spent on tracking and reporting. At 
the same time, there is still need for more impact reporting and relevant use of 
data, and the NSs have neither enough capacity nor competence here. This is a 
constraint felt by several informants: ‘there is limited understanding in Norad 
and MFA that this requires resources’ (Red Cross informant 11). 
Corruption and financial management 
Although my informants were divided on this point, some felt that the MFA 
gives priority to budget and activity control more than results. There are good 
reasons for focusing on budget control. For many years, corruption has been seen 
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as a main impediment to development (Banik 2010, Moyo 2009). However, 
signals from some back-donors might have influenced Norwegian Red Cross to 
put a greater focus on budget control than on PMER
11
 (Red Cross informant 6). 
This impression might come because the MFA asked only for audit reports (in 
addition to narrative reports), and not indicators as Norad requires. Others 
perceive the MFA as flexible and not concerned solely with how budgets are 
spent. Different positions within the organization might explain some differences 
in perceptions.  
The question is if the priority given to FD Programmes can be understood as a 
consequence of budget-control efforts. In fact, budget control is only one reason 
for FD Programmes. The Norwegian Red Cross supports FD in order to make 
NSs capable of reporting adequately on funding, but also because of a genuine 
wish to strengthen NSs (Red Cross informant 11). As another informant stated: 
Partly our own interest drives the FD programme because we need to 
have stronger control on our money, and report better. (…) [however,] if 
they are to be a trustworthy partner, one that other organization and the 
private sector can support, they have to do this [have financial systems 
and control].’ (Red Cross informant 1) 
Some find financial (mis)management a relevant issue to address (IFRC 
2011a:31), others find it over-focused. The Norad Civil Society Panel concluded 
the following regarding corruption: 
(…)incidents of corruption remain very low compared to total funds outlaid, with only a 
small number of serious cases recorded over a number of years (…) [and] (…) 
corruption is not a large systemic problem involving entire organizations (…) (Norad 
2012b:6).  
                                              
11 PMER=Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting 
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Although perhaps over-focused, corruption is a considerable challenge – and 
trust is a crucial stepping-stone for increased funding. The situation for Burundi 
Red Cross in the early 2000s was lack of partner confidence due to lack of 
transparency in their use of funding. Low transparency, together with weak 
democratic processes, made partners withdraw, staff leave and services collapse 
(IFRC 2011a:16). Reasons like this support the need for anti-corruption 
measures.  
On the other hand, one consequence of the struggle to avoid corruption might 
also be less CB. It was legitimate to fear corruption during the operation at Haiti 
after the earthquake. However, the consequence of not using existing, albeit 
weak, institutions was a lost opportunity to strengthen those same institutions 
(Jonathan M. Katz, interviewed by Ask 2013).  Avoidance of those institutions 
also undermined their future relevance and role in fighting corruption (Ask 
2013).  
The question is not an either/or between Financial Management (and anti-
corruption) and Results Management, but whether the aid sector has found the 
right balance between.  ‘(…) while corruption is invariably an important factor 
explaining policy failure, it is by no means always the dominant factor’ (Banik 
2010:49). 
6.5.4 RBM as a ritual? 
Øyvind Eggen (2011) shows how bureaucrats in Malawi perform a beneficiary 
selection that they clearly know will lead nowhere. Eggen interprets this as an 
aesthetic ritual: ‘everybody’ knows it does not work, but they still do it. Can the 
same be said about RBM and reporting? 
According to one Norad study, 70% respondents from six Norwegian NGOs 
disagree that evaluations tend to be empty rituals (Norad 2013c:47). Still, a 
substantial share (30%) do perceive RBM as an empty ritual – why?  
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Some Red Cross staff also doubt the relevance of the RBM system with overall 
logframes, seeing them as a way of packaging the projects: 
If the new type of Norad application with thematically and overarching 
logframe, contributes to real changes in a certain national society – 
because we package our application in a new way and perform the Results 
Management differently – I am not so sure about that.(…) we create our 
own reality.  (Red Cross informant 9) 
Most agree that, in order to get funding, there needs to be a project plan and 
results over time. To make the plans and the results legible, the organization uses 
procedures and formats that are familiar to it, and its back-donors. The 
development of more thematic logframes in the latest application from 
Norwegian Red Cross to Norad is an example of this. RBM starts by defining 
target and outlining the result chain. This is a part of the RM, and the aim is 
better results.  ‘The reality is, I believe’, argues Desmond McNeill, ‘that staff in 
MFA/Norad will often take decisions based on information that is not captured 
by LFA (but is very relevant): but feel required to present their decision as if it 
was the result of an LFA.’12 (McNeill 2012). 
We may view RBM, logframes and indicators as rituals with meaning, thereby 
confirming ourselves as rational and sensible people.  
In a society where a rational ideology is predominant, decision-making for instance, is a 
sacred ritual which confirms and communicates the current ideology. Organizations 
collect information and perform their analysis because that is what well-run, proper 
organizations and decent decision-makers do. (my translation, March and Simon, in 
Hennestad and Revang 2009:49).  
Although a substantial share see RBM as ritual, this is not the dominant 
perception. Close to 95% of the NGO respondents from the study mentioned 
above disagree that evaluations are mostly useful for external audiences (Norad 
                                              
12 LFA: Logical Framework Approach, or ‘logframe’ 
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2013c:47). This might indicate, once again, that academics have a more negative 
perception of RBM than what the reality is – or, at least, how NGO 
representatives perceive RBM. More empirical research from NGOs, following 
the entire value chain from implementing NSs to back-donors, could shed light 
on this issue. 
6.5.5 Complexity 
When assessing rural development in Norway there is wide acceptance for 
complexity, but when assessing aid projects in developing countries a linear logic 
is required (Red Cross informant 8). It seems paradoxical that complex 
development programmes at home and abroad are met with such different 
expectations and requirements, although Norad acknowledges that ‘complex 
projects need long-term as well as different measuring system’  (Villa Kullid, at 
the Norad Civil Society Panel presentation of the Tracking Impact study). 
David Mosse holds that international development is characterized by narrowing 
of means to quantifiable targets and at the same time widening of means into 
more complex programmes for good governance and strengthening of civil 
society (Mosse 2005:3). Drawing on Mosse, I will claim there is another paradox 
adding to the one above: more complex interventions, such as CB, are at the 
same time met with more simple methodological instruments, such as logframes 
and indicators. 
Why is there limited acceptance of the complexity and difficulties in displaying 
international development results? One factor that probably leads to an 
impression that it is quite easy to achieve development results internationally 
might be how fund-raising campaigns present needs and solutions – with 
extremely simplified messages. Working many years in fund-raising, I have 
experienced that the more clearly and simple the message is framed, the more 
funds we are able to raise. Here two ethical considerations are in conflict: ethics 
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of duty and ethics of consequence (Johannessen et al. 2007:159–160). The first 
focuses on being honest and doing the right thing regardless of the results. The 
second focuses on the consequences of the act and less on how the results are 
achieved. To a large degree fund-raising follows the second ethical orientation –
maximizing the results of a campaign in order to help the most people. The side-
effect of following such a consequentialism ethic is both stereotyping and 
creating the perception that aid is accomplished in a straightforward and simple 
manner. This give an over-simplified impression of how aid works, which in turn 
may lead to higher expectations of results than if the campaigns had presented 
the real, more complex picture. 
6.6 Alternative approach from Norad 
Norad acknowledges many of the challenges in the current RBM regime and asks 
for more impact analysis, results for the poor and accumulated effects:  
There is no consensus today on how to track sustainable result (…) The 
Civil Society Panel’s method is a totally new way of tracking (…) [Today,] 
reporting from the CSOs are too narrow and short-term. (…) We should 
not be afraid to go outside the standard. (Villa Kullid, Norad) 
13
 
A methodological challenge for proving impact identified by Norad, as well as 
the Red Cross and many scholars, is the challenges of aggregation, as previously 
debated. In other cases, the link between output and impact is an attribution 
problem (Norad 2009, Ortiz and Taylor 2009:9). Here some academics and 
consultants call for contribution analysis instead of attribution analysis, which 
Norad supports (Stein Erik Kruse, Mayne 2008, Riddell 2001:208).  
                                              
13 Villa Kullid at the dissemination seminar of the Civil Society Panel. Any incorrect citation is my responsibility as 
tape recorder was not used.  
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Contribution analysis 
Norad established a panel of development researchers who tested contribution 
analysis (Norad 2012b). They started with changes at country level, and searched 
for contributions from lower levels. Quite contrary to Chambers’ claim that ‘(…) 
aid agencies (…) are only familiar with traditional methodologies and are neither 
willing nor able to invest time in changing the approaches of those they fund’ 
(2008:180), Norad here has shown willingness to try out new methods.  
The background for the study by the Civil Society Panel was that evaluations 
overwhelmingly reported on individual projects and short-term results: ‘Much 
less is known about the long-term impact and the wider effects of CSO 
development interventions (...)’ (Norad 2012b:3). 
Although there are certainly areas of improvement, the main conclusion from the 
Panel was that: 
(…) short-term objectives are overwhelmingly achieved (…), Norwegian CSOs and 
their partners are prudent and use available funds efficiently (…) [and] provide support 
to marginal and hard-to-reach areas (Norad 2012b) 
Three interesting conclusions can be derived from this: First, that there are 
positive results. Second, it is possible to show results without basing it on a 
bottom–up approach with indicators as necessary building blocks or empirically, 
verifiable causality chains. Third, there are signals of acceptance from Norad for 
alternative approaches.  
Norad’s signals might reflect an inherent inconsistency in NPM calling for both 
more control and more autonomy at the same time (Christensen et al. 2007:101). 
The experience is more focus on control, more detailed reporting and 
subsequently increased bureaucratization. The RBM system requires verifiable, 
specific facts, and verifiable causality. Norad’s quest for more substantive results 
by asking for ‘wider effects’ and ‘going outside the standard’ may prove a 
necessary corrective to the approach stemming from the NPM influence in recent 
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decades. The question is whether this new approach will fulfil all stakeholders’ 
expectations.  
6.7 Learning and PA  
We have seen that RBM has deficits although the picture is more nuanced than 
the most sceptical academics have claimed. We have also seen that Norad 
acknowledges challenges and is experimenting with new approaches. Let us now 
turn to the alternative approach presented in Chapter 3 – the PA, based on the 
work of Robert Chambers (2008). The aim is to bring forth a methodology that 
empowers and ensures that the voices of the poor and excluded are heard. 
PA involves observation, flexible interviews, intense interaction, joint reflections 
and data processing, and questioning underlying assumptions (Chambers 2008). 
An example of an alternative approach using intense interaction and joint data 
processing is the latest evaluation of the partnership between the Sudanese Red 
Crescent and Norwegian Red Cross, as presented. Chambers argues that the PA, 
with interaction and joint reflection releases energy and creates learning – and 
this we have seen in the example of the Sudan workshop. 
Three of the other evaluations in this case study have also used participatory 
methods, but involved only staff, peers and volunteers – not beneficiaries (Bloom 
and Levinger 2011, IFRC 2011a, Beryl 2011). Chambers presupposes that 
‘participation’ implies bringing forth the voices of those most in need. When 
beneficiaries do not participate themselves, I can partly agree with anthropologist 
Maia Green (2009), who holds that participation is often used rhetorically and 
that all assessments are facilitated by ‘experts’, and thereby filtered and 
customized. It is not feasible to include everyone, but as Chambers takes care to 
point out, any assessment should make sure to avoid biases (2008:35–36). Elite 
bias occurs if only headmen, village leaders or other influential people 
participate. User and present bias occurs if only those using the services and 
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those active in making themselves visible participate. ‘The sick lie in their huts. 
Inactive old people are often out of sight’, and likewise the ‘apathetic, weak and 
miserable’ (Chambers 2008:36). Although challenging in practice, any 
assessment process should ensure that these voices are included, not only those 
of the local elite and the most active (ibid. 35–36). 
However, the team leader of one of the evaluations pointed out how time 
constraints did not allow for a participatory method when it came to involvement 
of all relevant key stakeholders (Bensky 2011:7). Even in projects with activities 
closer to the beneficiaries and without such long and blurred causality chains as 
in CB projects, it is often challenging to record data from beneficiaries, due to 
resource constraints:  
In order to measure effects on health of hand-washing advocacy 
programmes, for instance, how many wash their hands, then you have to 
go in there and count, and there are no resources to do that. (Red Cross 
informant 9) 
Evaluations take time and are expensive (Red Cross informant 9), and 
beneficiaries or those most vulnerable are perhaps the ‘easiest’ to exclude as they 
seldom sit at the decision-making table.  
The rhetoric use of ‘participation’ was one of the criticisms of the approach as 
presented in Chapter 3. The other elements criticized were its apolitical approach 
and power inequalities. Any aid intervention can be accused of being apolitical, 
and especially the Red Cross approach with its neutrality principle. When it 
comes to lack of addressing local power inequalities, I feel that Green is right. 
The evaluations presented in this case study do not problematize the issue of 
local power structures. 
Drawing on Green and Mosse, I suggest that their criticisms have ignored two 
important issues: the practical infeasibility for donors to participate in all 
processes, and the need to aggregate and compare results. 
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One of the rationales behind PA ‘was that decision-makers needed the right 
information at the right time’ (Chambers 2008:67).According to the PA 
principles, decision-makers should listen, learn and to try ‘to get inside their 
skins and see the world as they do’ (Chambers 2008:74). As long as back-donor 
agencies cannot participate in person in all ‘participatory’ processes, reports are 
what they have to rely on. Chambers’ approach therefore does not fully answer 
the back-donors’ need. PA does not answer the need of Red Cross to compare 
and systematize results. 
At the project level, however, we have seen from the Sudan case that the PA 
approach can have positive effects. Despite positive effects, PA appears less 
likely to alter the aid structure with asymmetrical relations between funding and 
receiving actors. Thus I must conclude that a new approach will not alter the 
potential for fundamentally changing what needs to be changed to achieve the 
objectives and potential of CB Programmes.  
In my view, an alternative methodological approach is not sufficient for 
addressing the root cause of the challenges in achieving better results. Simply 
bringing in a new method will not deal with the challenges of asymmetric 
relationships, or poor coordination among funding partners. That will be a main 
issue addressed in Chapter 7. 
6.8 Summary  
We started the discussion of RBM by asking if the apparent lack of results is due 
to inability to document results or to improve results. Now I conclude that 
conventional RBM is not able to fully document the results of CB projects. 
Indicators cannot capture all substantial changes, while aggregated results lose 
important information along the way, and causality is complex and challenging 
to verify empirically.  
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RBM does not fully utilize the potential of contributing to improvements of 
results. This is due mainly to limited learning potential. In part, indicators lead to 
distortion and drawing of resources away from CB, although my case material 
does not fully confirm the initial assumption of distortion. In part, RBM and 
tracking draw resources away from humanitarian activities. Capacity and 
competence of PMER is a further constraint. Many evaluations ensure some 
participation, but beneficiaries are silently absent. RBM has shortcomings, and is 
perceived and practised in a way that does not fully support what staff feel they 
need: learning, trust, context and qualitative documentation of results. 
When a higher share of NGO resources is spent on reporting instead of 
performing humanitarian assistance, more reporting might lead to less 
development assistance, as well as more bureaucracy, and lower – not improved 
– effectiveness. And yet, there are indications that politicians and Norad do not 
really get what they ask for through a greater focus on results. 
However, the picture is nuanced and Red Cross staff can see both pros and cons 
with RBM. It leads to a more coherent system and better quality assurance. Red 
Cross staff-members use logframes as a basis for dialogue between partners. The 
use of evaluations in the Red Cross is not restricted to the conventional 
approaches – although from this case study, and without generalizing, 
conventional approaches seem dominant. 
Lastly, we have noted several obstacles that limit the use of best available 
methods for RM:  methodological legitimacy, budget constraints, lack of 
capacity and limited acknowledgment of the complexity of CB. Although there 
are positive aspects to using PA usage, alternative methodological approaches 
cannot fully address the root challenges.   
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What are the main 
challenges of CB and does 
RBM address those?  
 
7. CAPACITY BUILDING CONTENT 
Some claim that CB promises more than it can deliver, and the results remain 
absent or elusive (Fukuda-Parr 2002, Banik 2010). Moreover, the current RBM 
system does not fully document results, as demonstrated (Riddell 2001:269–270, 
Norad 2012b:5 and 16–17, Norad 2010, Bloom and Levinger 2011:29). In other 
words, CB programmes probably yield better results than what is documented. 
Further, we have seen that the potentials for improving results are not fully 
utilized, as learning is often not prioritized, which means there may well be more 
to be gained from current CB programmes. 
In this chapter, I explore whether the current RBM practice sufficiently address 
the root causes of the challenges to CB as they are perceived by my informants. 
According to Fukuda-Parr et al., ‘capacity has emerged as the one particularly 
elusive goal’ despite all seminars, courses, training, computers, experts, 
consultancies and a new ‘spirit of partnership’ (2002:3). Norad fears the concept 
is a new white elephant (Norad 2013a:9–10). Although more use of the 
Participatory Approach might answer some of the challenges, it is unlikely to be 
enough. We have to dig deeper into the root challenges of CB, like ownership, 
culture, including trust and equality, donors’ priorities, and coordination – issues 
that often remain often outside the scope of project or programme evaluations. 
Before proceeding to these four topics, I will present the transformation of 
Burundi Red Cross and achievements of CB and FD programmes. 
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7.1 BURUNDI Red Cross: transformation14 
The first task the Burundi Red Cross (BRC) started with around 2007 was to 
recruit volunteers, as volunteers are the basis for everything Red Cross does. The 
following quote highlights the challenge BRC had in rebuilding the organization: 
The first thing the potential volunteers asked us was: ‘What will you give 
us?’ The local communities were used to getting food from WFP, plastic 
shelters from UNHCR, and IFRC had been giving per diem. Imagine how 
difficult it was to ask them to volunteer without receiving anything! We 
had to make a promise, so we said –‘We can give you training, but only if 
you show that you have done something in your local community first’. 
And we promised not to ask them for money, only services! 
The results of the re-establishment and re-orientation of BRC have been both 
tangible and numerous: 
They started to cultivate, fetching water for those not able to do it 
themselves, collecting wood, building thatched houses, and they took sick 
people to hospital. To say no to volunteering became a non-option, 
because next time you yourself would benefit. The change we have seen is 
a change of mindset. People were used to receiving only. Now they started 
to realize they had resources!  
Recruiting volunteers, using local resources and building local units have been 
the focus for BRC. A crucial part has been restoring confidence in their own 
resources, to put people in the ‘driving seat’ of their own future, and build on 
elements present in the culture. By fostering new confidence and building on the 
culture, BRC now has a ‘local-first approach’ to challenges:  
                                              
14 Based on internal presentation by Burundi Red Cross, June 2012: Organizational Development, Norwegian Red 
Cross Support to national societies, presentations and discussions, Red Cross, Oslo 
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As an example Burundi experienced a local famine in 2007/2008, but there 
were places that had a good harvest. We said to the local units: ‘Please make 
an appeal locally before you appeal to headquarters.’ So then the harvest 
from those places with a good harvest was collected and redistributed. 
In addition to local mobilized resources, the other most relevant factor for 
explaining the results for BRC is the dialogue with the partners. BRC thanked the 
Norwegian Red Cross for supporting them with seed money in the initial phase 
of this development. After this initial phase: 
...the partners came back and asked to give us support. But, in the first 
meetings with PNS we had to tell them: ‘Even if you bring money, you 
can’t decide what we are going to do’  
This transformation was very context-dependent and built upon local knowledge, 
local values and confidence. It can be questioned whether the intended results of 
CB can be achieved without addressing and working with such fundamental 
building blocks. 
7.2 CB projects: main achievements  
Many NSs dependent upon external funding experience that donors require their 
own accounting and reporting system. This is a draw on resources and is not 
sustainable, as one informant explained: 
German Red Cross, who supported a project, required reporting in their 
own system. They actually paid a person who sat and entered all receipts 
into the accounting system that the German Red Cross required, and then 
they entered all receipts again into Navision15 afterwards. (...) This is 
                                              
15 Navision is an accounting system that is provided through the Financial Development programme supported by the 
Norwegian Red Cross 
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highly unsustainable, and Lesotho Red Cross does not progress. (Red 
Cross informant 5) 
The objective of Financial Development (FD) is avoid such situations. A success 
story in this respect is a National Society in Africa that has profited from an FD 
Programme up to the point where they no longer need the Norwegian Red Cross 
as a partner. Through one accounting system, standardization of partner 
agreements and increased coverage of core costs, they have developed a 
sustainable organizational structure and sustainable activities.  
Now they have (…) well-functioning routines, systems and governance 
mechanisms beyond the financial management, which works so well that 
they no longer need our support. That is a sign they have reach a goal. 
They manage without us.( ..) All the partners now use one single 
accounting system. They have gained confidence from all Red Cross 
partners. They have managed to implement a standard memorandum of 
understanding that all partners have to sign, a partnership agreement, 
where all partners commit themselves to add 10% for coverage of core 
costs. (Red Cross informant 2) 
In sum, results from FD and CB can be described as greater efficiency, self-
confidence, ownership and sustainability. According to my respondents, the 
results are as follows: fewer resources are spent on irrelevant administrative tasks 
and on satisfying different donors’ reporting requirements, and there is increased 
confidence from partners. Further, they mention the development of own 
strategic plans, taking charge of their own development, of awareness being 
raised and thereby increased responsibility for the society beyond own family, 
and greater accountability towards stakeholders in general. These results lead to 
both increased funding in general and increased coverage of core costs in 
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particular. Hence, FD creates more sustainable organizations, FD concerns much 
more than budget control, and acts as a basis for further growth. 16 
7.3 Challenges of Capacity Building  
According to my Red Cross informants, the most challenging issues regarding 
CB are: 
Ownership: 
 The funding partners’ (PNSs) need for control in combination with their financial power 
 Lack of interest in change from the National Society in question 
 Ownership versus local needs 
 Maintaining attention on sustainability in an environment with huge humanitarian 
needs, weak organizations and donors wanting to solve problems  
 Short time-horizons  
 Pushing standard indicators top–down conflicts with a bottom–up CB approach 
 
Culture, trust and equality: 
 The importance of understanding of context, creating trust, equality and building long-
lasting partnership 
 
Priorities:  
 Risk of corruption versus need for decentralization  
 Lack of competence in change management  
 Back-donor priorities  
 Low salaries and lack of human resources 
 
Coordination: 
 Poor coordination among partners 
 
Other issues: 
 CB is not a straight-lined process. If a new Board or Secretary-General is appointed, the 
process of CB might have to start all over again 
 Strengthening the finance division risks creating imbalances within an organization  
 Definitions of the concept in use: ‘Organizational Development’/’Capacity Building’ 
 Over-ambitious donors and back-donors 
 
                                              
16 Summary of examples of impacts mentioned by Red Cross informants 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 11 
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We have already mentioned discussed over-ambitious donors, low salaries, 
definitions of the concept CB (the buzzword challenge) and short time-horizons. 
Now I will look into (1) ownership, (2) culture including trust and equality, (3) 
donor priorities, and (4) coordination. 
7.4 Ownership – four main obstacles 
Critics have argued that there is insufficient attention paid to ownership, existing 
capacities, commitment, and the priorities of the poor themselves (Fukuda-Parr et 
al. 2002:8, Hyden 2006, OECD 2006, Howell 2002, Chambers 1995). The issue 
of ownership dominated the CB discussion with my informants. The basis for CB 
is a strong ownership in the host National Society and motivation to change (Red 
Cross informant 6). There are at least four subtopics to examine here: (1) 
Western standards and who should change? (2) Time pressure versus sustainable 
results, (3) Local knowledge and South–South cooperation and (4) Ownership 
dilemma in extreme situations. 
7.4.1 Western standards – who should change? 
I want to believe that all partners are working on the principle that we 
should be promoting and supporting the self-reliant efforts of local 
communities to take charge of their own development, but in reality the 
situation on the ground is different. In my view, partners need to change 
significantly in their attempts to help NS much more to become self-
sufficient. (Red Cross informant 7)  
The quote above suggests that it is the funding partners that have to make the 
most fundamental changes. Here lies the basic challenge, one which alternative 
results approaches as unlikely to change. Different methodological approaches 
within Results Management, such as PA, can be helpful in steering projects in the 
right direction, but will not be sufficient to change the funding partners (PNSs). 
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The development field has a tendency to prefer top–down approaches, imposing 
‘Western solutions’ on others:   
The main ambition has been to carry out transfer of institutions from the north to the 
south (...) The way these transfers have occurred, however, has typically ignored the 
social and political realities on the ground in Africa (Hyden 2006:10).  
The prevailing development discourse, where CB is a praised strategy, might 
hide how we once again are trying to ‘impose Western ideas and forms of social 
organization on other societies’ (Eggen 2011:2–3). To imply that the ones to be 
changed are the others is nothing new. The concept of ‘poverty’ does the same 
(Banik 2010). It is more comfortable for ‘us’ to talk about poverty than 
inequality, since the latter requires us to examine our own wealth. The top–down, 
Western-based approaches contrast the ‘(...) frequently heard calls for local 
adaption’ (Eggen 2011:61). Such a top–down approach clashes with the need for 
CB to be bottom–up, endogenous, based on local realities etc. The Red Cross 
search for aggregated results through common indicators (see Table 2) serves as 
one example of pushing requirements top–down, conflicting with the bottom–up 
ideal of CB (Red Cross informant 11). The bottom-up approach is essential due 
to that ‘(...) OD is different in all National Societies. You need the commitment 
and ownership from the NS leadership to OD, for change to happen.’ (Norwegian 
Red Cross 2013b).  
 
7.4.2 Time pressure versus sustainable results 
An example from Pakistan shows the dilemma between time pressures and 
building up and building on local knowledge. The Norwegian Red Cross got 
funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affaris (MFA) to work on recovery after 
the catastrophic floods in Pakistan in 2011. The support included establishment 
of a local branch, but funding was provided for only one year. Local branches are 
important in securing rapid responses to floods or earthquakes. Norwegian Red 
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Cross provide support in the form of health clinics or rescue teams within 48 or 
72 hours, but it will always be the local branches that are present during the first 
hours. This particular flood-prone area had no sustainable local branch, and with 
the support from MFA this could be established. Then the question was how 
Norwegian Red Cross could work within that limited period, as the following 
quote makes clear: 
The MFA funding was for one year and that makes ii complicated (…) A 
new branch in Pakistan is to be established and they [one Norwegian 
project coordinator and one Norwegian delegate] are about to write the 
project proposal (…) I stopped them and said there were two overarching 
things we had to do: ‘First, the national society themselves has to employ 
a person. We will pay the salary, but they have to employ a person and 
train him or her if he or she does not have any Red Crescent experience. 
Secondly, we have to find out about the structures of the current branches 
(…)  if we can build on strong branches in Pakistan and make them take a 
role and help the new branch, instead of us sitting here, being Norwegian, 
and knowing everything best’.  (Red Cross informant 1) 
It is likely to take more than one year to get a new branch up and running and 
prepared for the next flood. With time-restricted funding, the risk is that project 
plans etc. will be written by Norwegian Red Cross and implementation managed 
from a distance – with very limited local sustainable Capacity Building as a 
result (Red Cross informant 1). Pressure to demonstrate short-term results may 
hinder long-term results, thus contributing to the impression of the elusiveness of 
CB. 
7.4.3 Local knowledge and peer-to-peer cooperation 
The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) tries to build on local capacities and 
knowledge. Likewise the NRC works to ensure ownership and sustainability. 
Several Red Cross evaluations cover the issue of ownership. The IFRC report 
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highlights the local approach in Burundi as a key success factor, with its bottom–
up approach, use of locally-sustained services and of local accountability (IFRC 
2011a:6–7 and 18). The evaluation addresses the donor–recipient relationship, 
acknowledging that previous practices of the IFRC have been said to ‘contribute 
to a culture of dependency’, and adding that ‘the process should be led by people 
who have knowledge and credibility – not outsiders’ (IFRC 2011a:8 and 33).  
Another study of CB (Bloom and Levinger 2011) points to the importance of 
local engagement in the design and execution of capacity-development initiatives 
and activities that can closely reflect local needs, priorities and resources.  The 
evaluation highlights the negative side of links that go predominantly between 
sponsors and clients and not between peers (ibid.: 9, 25) This study shows that 
building on ‘existing skills, competence, and knowledge’ is one of the strongest 
drivers for CB (ibid.:45) and that cooperation between neighbouring NSs or 
branches should be utilized to a greater extent.  
Learning from others through horizontal networking has proven to be a 
successful way of increasing capacity (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002, Bloom and 
Levinger 2011). And yet, resources for building capacity through networking 
with peers seem restricted. One specific objective of the Financial Development 
Programme has been to ‘establish peer support mechanisms so as to optimize the 
use of available expertise and experience’ (Bensky 2011:40). However, this 
relevant approach was not supported by the necessary means, as ‘financial 
resources for trips to the field were limited’ (ibid.:13), so participants missed the 
opportunity to visit each other, network and learn from each other’s experiences. 
The IFRC study (2011a) shows that simple solutions, like providing bicycles, can 
sometimes solve this: 
The issue of transport at the communal level is problematic: bringing people together 
takes time and costs money. Some external projects have provided bicycles to colline 
units to enable more effective transport. (IFRC 2011a:32) 
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7.4.4 Ownership dilemma in extreme situations 
Often those national societies with the weakest structures are in those 
places with the greatest humanitarian needs.  (Red Cross informant 5) 
Red Cross states that in principle support for Capacity Building will be provided 
only if the NS welcomes the support and the changes needed. CB programmes 
are to be based on the local organization’s own strategies and plans. 
Alternatively, development of such documents is to be supported, and project 
documents developed in a joint process with the funder (Norwegian Red Cross 
2012c:7). However, for countries with the most pressing humanitarian needs, the 
Norwegian Red Cross sees it as their duty to consider support also to 
organizations whose ability, possibility and understanding of own needs not are 
that explicit.  
As noted in Chapter 5, if the aim is to demonstrate results, one should choose 
countries with a certain capacity. The challenges are often greatest for the poorest 
countries, and working with them also means that the prospects for results are far 
lower. The weak institutional capacity of the least developed countries ‘also 
inhibits their ability and confidence to get into the driving seat’ (Fukuda-Parr et 
al. 2002:9). 
The case of Burundi RC illustrates the importance of ownership on the part of the 
receiving organization and being in the driver’s seat (Norwegian Red Cross 
2012c:6). There certainly exist examples of the opposite approach. Belize Red 
Cross experienced that the Norwegian Red Cross took lead, designed a project 
and wrote the project application. This approach led to low commitment and no 
ownership. Other examples where the Norwegian Red Cross has set the premises 
and dictated the host NSs have showed that such an approach leads to resistance 
and hence no results. (Nord-Sør konsulentene 2011:4) 
It is not necessarily the content of CB as such that is a challenge to achieving 
results, but that the principles are not followed all the way: 
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(…) often when there are big challenges in the country, then there are also 
big challenges in the National Society and they should deliver what is 
needed to the weakest part of the inhabitants. Maybe there is an 
emergency situation, maybe there are internal conflicts in the country and 
ICRC needs the National Society to help them access some areas in order 
to do food distribution etc. Then it is easy for a National Society with 
limited resources to let us come in there and build a branch, let us fix the 
situation, deliver what is needed – but that is not sustainable at all! (Red 
Cross informant 1) 
The perceived pressure for short-term results is felt not only in emergency 
situations, but is also present in longer-term three-year agreements with Norad. 
As one informant states: ‘We have to report something after one year’ (Red 
Cross informant 11). A whole year is also perceived as a long time: ‘We believe 
Norad does not have time to sit for a whole year waiting for results’ (Red Cross 
informant 11).  
We have seen that the Red Cross is aware of the challenges – that donor priorities 
are imposed, that time-frames are pushed, that there is a risk that ‘we’ often think 
‘we’ have the best solutions and competence, etc. There are many examples of 
RC staff doing their outmost to alter the asymmetric relationship, and Norad is 
demonstrably supportive. We have seen from the Pakistan example that back-
donors’ push for short-term results is countered by Red Cross staff putting the 
long-term results and CB principles first. We have seen that reports 
recommending more peer-to-peer contact etc. However, there is a need for 
continuous attention to and more research on these issues – the ground floor of 
CB. 
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7.5 Culture, trust and equality: Change of 
organizational culture – and unintended effects 
Organizational culture consists of values, norms and assumptions, and is 
expressed through symbols, habits and language, among other things (Høidal et 
al. 2008:62).  
According to one of the most experienced Red Cross on Organizational 
Development, there should be more attention toward cultural elements. 
Experience has shown that behaviour, attitudes and commitment are essential for 
achieving sustainable results. This informant highlights the importance of 
employees and leaders treating each other with respect, challenging each other, 
and giving effective feedback. Further, cooperation, understanding, willingness 
to accept  positive criticism, is emphasized, as well as support of management 
decisions and changes, ability to speak freely, and a management which is 
communicating both horizontally, vertically and diagonally (Red Cross informant 
7). 
There are two main perspectives on organizations and culture. The first one is 
based on means–end rationality, which assumes that it is possible to use an 
organization as a means towards an end. The premise is that causality is 
rationally calculated. This is the instrumental perspective on how organizations 
work. New Public Management and RBM are based on instrumentality. The 
second perspective is the institutional perspective which focuses more on values 
and norms. Actions are guided by experience and what is regarded as acceptable 
and reasonable (Christensen et al. 2010:14, 23, 25).  
 
Although culture is important, it is debatable whether culture can be changed and 
treated as a means to an end. Means–end rationality resonates with the 
assumptions of ‘Western’ bureaucratic culture. As instrumental perspectives are 
seldom sufficient in rationally-oriented cultures, there should be no reason to 
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believe that instrumental perspectives and analysis should fit even better in 
contexts less based on Weberian bureaucracy and means–end rationality. With an 
instrumental perspective, there is also likely to be a tendency to focus on the 
formal and obvious aspects of an organization, although informal, hidden aspects 
can be equally important and ‘may crucially affect performance’ (OECD 
2006:22).  
The institutional perspective can help us to understand why change takes such a 
long time. My impression is that Red Cross staff often has the institutional 
perspective while the RBM logic follows the instrumental perspective of change. 
The use of indicators is based on this means–end rationality. The performance of 
Red Cross NSs is to be tracked through an indicator set with 120 checkpoints for 
what it is to be a well-functioning national society (IFRC undated). Some see this 
assessment tool as an attempt to dress down the NS (Red Cross informant 7), and 
as unnecessary interference. 
The Red Cross Federation has defined what is ‘Well-functioning National 
Societies’. Evaluations of performance should be done through self-
assessments based on the criteria list: How often do you have Board 
meetings? Decisions should be documented etc. This was not popular! (...) 
It proved difficult to be that honest and transparent. (Red Cross informant 
4) 
The RBM focus on control and tracking NS performance might have the 
unintentional effects of indicating a lack of trust and equality. To reveal and 
document challenging issues might be ‘seen as though one is “dressing down” 
the NS’ (Red Cross informant 7). Without trust between partners, challenging 
issues may be hidden.  Such unintended effects may pull the CB efforts in the 
wrong direction.  The way of shifting or pushing the responsibility for cultural 
change downwards, although unconscious and unintentional, might undermine 
the idea of building on local ownership, local values and trust. ‘Governance 
provide[d] a new tool-kit, an instrument of control, an additional conditionality 
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for the time when the traditional blame-the-victim defense again becomes 
necessary’ (George and Sabelli in Taylor 2004:130). Changing the culture is 
sometimes seen as necessary, but it should build on long-term partnership based 
on trust (Red Cross informant 7). 
7.5.1 Trust and equality  
We often believe we are best (Red Cross informant 4) 
[I]n reviewing Swedish and Norwegian assistance to public financial 
management in Africa (…) success has been achieved by starting with 
core routine processes, and moving on to sensitive issues –management 
development – only when trust has been built up gradually. (Red Cross 
informant 7) 
It might be naïve not to set conditions for cooperation.  
Why we need to implement Financial Development programmes? Some of 
us have the view that to become a main partner country, we have to set 
certain demands – finance systems, financial competence and 
obligations.(…) We are subject to thorough assessments and revisions 
from Norad and ECHO, and our requirements to our partners are far 
from that high today. (Red Cross informant 5) 
The balance between trust and requirements is a delicate one. More attention 
devoted to results might increase the top–down requirements. At the same time, 
the pressure for showing results as well as limited availability of ‘own funds’ can 
lead to a felt need to set strict requirements to the implementing National 
Society. As one informant puts it: ‘It is our money. We have to show results to 
the donor.’ (Red Cross informant 11) 
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7.6 Donor priorities 
Internally, there is a Red Cross debate on whether the purpose of sound financial 
management is to improve service delivery. Some feel that CB support is too 
technical and too heavily directed towards management requirements. This leads 
to projects focusing on management of funds, administration and strategy 
development support, whereas what is needed is a greater focus is needed on 
recruitment, training and retention of volunteers (Nord-Sør konsulentene 2011:3) 
Critics warn that the normative standard is the donors’ organizational form, and 
argue that the ownership rhetoric hides a prolonged Northern dominance (Howell 
2002, Taylor 2004, Bohwasi et al.1998): 
(...) good governance has become what development and modernization were two 
decades ago: a hegemonic discourse that seeks to allow the North to define the South in 
its own image (Taylor 2004:136) 
Moreover, the effect of (unconsciously) wanting to create Southern organizations 
in our own (Northern) image might be that the only partner-organizations are 
those that share donors’, Northern, values and ways of working. Thus, ‘certain 
parts of civil society are included, while various traditional and more informal 
organizations are excluded’ (Norad 2012b:12). 
There is also a clear inclination to emphasize, or even equate good governance with the 
technical qualities of efficient management and the main accountability of client 
governments to funders/creditors and other external agencies. (Taylor 2004:128)  
 
Priorities – streamlined organizations less relevant for change? 
As shown earlier, Red Cross staff display two motives for FD Programmes: first 
and foremost strengthening and growth of the NSs for improved impact for those 
in need, but also improved financial control. Regardless of this discussion, Norad 
has expressed concerns regarding the side-effects of the content of CB 
Programmes: 
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There is a control aspect built into the Capacity Building all the way. That 
is one of the reasons that some of the most important change-makers 
within civil society get very little support. These organizations – tenant 
farmers, women associations, labour unions – often with a weak 
membership democracy and not that good at modern organizational 
management as we value – these organizations, when they start to move, 
things are really happening. The NGOs can do a lot, but a real impact on 
society is lacking. (Ivar Evensmo) 
If the inclination towards control has the consequence that the potentially most 
influential change-makers do not get support, then the result is less societal 
impact. One risk is ending up with organizations that are streamlined and 
proficient at result-reporting, but with little or no relevance or grassroots 
connections: 
(…)you won’t get a union with members being beaten, you won’t get them 
to write long reports. They do not have time for that. It is only those 
without something important to do that has time for such tasks. (Ivar 
Evensmo) 
This issue of donor priorities is seldom mentioned in evaluations and results 
reports. 
Lack of interest or resources? 
A key success factor concerns who initiates the development programmes. 
Motivation may suffer if the programme is imposed from outside. Despite the 
Red Cross’ focus on that key criterion of success, there are still situations where 
(…)the national societies do not always understand the importance [of the 
Financial Development programme] (...) For some of the national 
societies in the Southern Africa region, I believe there is minimal interest 
in change. (Red Cross informant 2) 
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Internally, some contest this perspective. Lack of ownership is often more linked 
to lack of resources than lack of willingness, according to one informant: 
Of course, they are willing, but they have so limited personnel. In 
addition, funding is often restricted to projects. (Red Cross informant 1) 
In addition to the challenge of personnel resources and funding comes the 
question of competence and priority within a given Red Cross National Society.  
Often organizations are good at documenting and analysing, but not on change 
management or implementation. 
Normally, it is not the analytical competence to assess that is missing in change 
projects, but the ability to diagnose the need for change and the ability to implement the 
changes. (my translation, Hennestad and Revang 2009:50) 
 
For Red Cross it seems that both parts need more attention. Change management 
is definitely needed: 
Management and change management is a profession. Few of us are born 
with that competence – to make the organization move in one direction, to 
make changes happen, and so that those changes serve a purpose that 
makes things better. (Red Cross informant 1) 
In addition to competence deficit, those responsible for CB are often placed in a 
subordinate position. ‘They have an Organizational Development advisor, or 
something like that, placed in a subordinate position in the organization’ (Red 
Cross informant 1). That signals low priority.  
 
7.7 Coordination  
Coordination is important: that PNSs do not come and push their own 
systems. That’s obvious and banal, but happens anyway (…) There is a 
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shocking waste of resources in this [lack of] coordination. (Red Cross 
informant 5) 
Arguably, the priorities of an organization and the management of projects are 
less fragmented when they are achieved through a participatory, bottom–up 
approach. Today we see the same NSs being drawn in many directions with 
fragmented goals. It might not always be in the interest of the funding partner to 
follow the conclusions of a Participatory Approach. There is a tendency to pick 
and choose, or emphasize certain elements, or wrap activities into a policy model 
with legitimacy in domestic policy circles (Mosse 2005). I hold that it is naïve to 
believe that new and better assessment methods will lead to less fragmented 
priorities. The challenge is not one of methodology, but the worldview of the 
donor countries, their policy priorities and the asymmetrical donor-recipient 
relations. As the informant quoted above also explained, the recipient NSs often 
do not say no if they are offered funding. 
Moreover, recipient NSs do not necessarily base all their priorities and funding 
applications on PA, including communities and intended beneficiaries. They also 
pick and choose. As one informant notes, NSs are not passive receivers, but 
tactically adjusts their proposals and applications to what they know the funding 
partner prefers (Red Cross informant 8).  
Fragmentation – The project model is not fully in use 
One of the main challenges that RBM and the four evaluation reports address 
only to a limited degree is fragmented management (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002:5).  
Some of my respondents were concerned about the unwillingness of various 
donors to coordinate, or let the implementing NS lead the processes. Underneath 
this ‘unwillingness’, I feel, there is a structural challenge in the way that 
programmes and projects are managed.  
121 
 
Interventions are organized as projects or programmes17(IFRC 2011b), but there 
seems to be a lack of coherent management and systematic use of a management 
model. I hold that the project management model is not fully applied. A project 
manager leads a project and should report to a steering group (Jessen 2001:237). 
The role of a steering group is to: 
- make sure that the objectives of the project or programme are coherent and 
relevant 
- make sure the project has the necessary mandate and resources 
- ensure efficient and adequate reporting routines, so that project management 
does not have to use scarce resources on ‘time consuming discussions regarding 
who should have what type of information at what time, in what format etc.’ (my 
translation, Jessen 2001:246) 
- inform internal and external stakeholders  
- take necessary decisions regarding larger changes in the project 
- support the project manager and take necessary action towards  stakeholders 
(based on Gustavsson and Hallin 2012 and Jessen 2001:246–247) 
 
The steering group should consist of ‘representatives of various stakeholders’ 
(Gustavsson and Hallin 2012:42). For a NGO project, these are likely to be 
representatives from funding partners as well as representatives from the end-
users or the beneficiaries’ community. 
Especially for weak NSs, the problem is that there seldom exists one coordinated 
steering group for projects related to or involving CB components. Weak NSs 
have not been able to develop their own strategy plan with adequate activities 
which they invite PNSs to support (Red Cross informant 11). Then they have to 
base their activities on the priorities of PNSs and back-donors. The result is that 
project managers often have to report to many and disparate stakeholders with 
differing requirements, expectations, project-plan formats and reporting formats. 
                                              
17 Programmes often have more strategic or long-term goals than projects, and a programme might cover 
several projects (Jessen 2001:30–31) 
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All the partners have different requirements regarding format and how the 
logframe shall look. Then the Belgians arrive and want this system. Then 
the French come with that system. Then we arrive, but we are flexible and 
tell them to use what they already use. Then the Dutch come … Burundi 
Red Cross has 8–9 partners and 5–6 logframes. All of them set up 
differently. (Red Cross informant 2) It is so crazy. For them it is so much 
work that could have been spent on other tasks. (Red Cross informant 10) 
(…) This is the overall consequence of how we as a movement are unable 
to coordinate. All the costs are pushed downwards towards those partners 
which need the most to really use their time/resources on really working 
on the programme (Red Cross informant 2). 
 
The situation described in this dialogue is also the main reason why Norwegian 
Red Cross supports weak NSs with Capacity Building. The objective is for these 
NSs to develop their own strategies. Stronger NSs will be able to take the lead 
(Red Cross informant 11). 
Without a coherent management like a steering group, project management must 
spread their resources on fulfilling the different objectives of different 
stakeholders and use disproportionate amounts of resources on reporting. This 
obstructs results. As this is the situation in many weak countries, the lack of 
coordination can be a highly relevant explanation for lack of results. Then it is 
not enough to evaluate the results of the single projects. As shown in Chapter 5, 
projects generally do achieve their objectives. And yet, overall impact seems to 
be lacking. More research is needed on if and how aid structure and lack of 
coordination influences long-term results.  
Long chain – Many layers 
In a classical project model, the project leader relates to the steering group. In the 
Red Cross, there is a long chain of actors between the project leader and the 
back-donors: 
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Local branch -> National Society -> project coordinator in Norwegian RC -> 
management of Norwegian Red Cross -> Norad, MFA or another back donor  
One of the project coordinators based in Oslo expressed confusion and 
uncertainty whether she could meet the expectations regarding her own role as 
regards project governance and Results Management system: 
The challenge for us is that it is not us that are managing the projects. (…) 
Actually we are placed a bit on the side. Thereby the system does not feel 
relevant (...) I have to make sure the reports are delivered, that we start by 
writing good planning documents. (…) Often we have mechanisms (…) 
standard format, but it goes very wrong when I have to answer them.  I’m 
not the one who has the answer or makes the decisions. It is their 
programme. (…)There is one level too many compared to the intentions. 
(Red Cross informant 10) 
In addition to many levels between a project leader and the back-donors, 
representatives from back-donors are spread in different funding countries. 
Fragmented management makes it very difficult to steer towards specific, 
achievable and relevant goals – three of the SMART criteria. Delivering results is 
most often seen as the responsibility of the implementing party. This creates a 
paradox. 
The Norwegian Red Cross reports on coordination and cooperation on a regular 
basis to Norad and MFA, but this is mainly related to specific projects or 
programmes, and not the overall aid structure. In addition, some perceive the 
issues of ownership, coordination, priorities and equality within the Red Cross 
movement not to be something that back-donors should be bothered with. As one 
informant stated: ‘We see these as internal problems’ (Red Cross informant 11). 
Although ownership and coordination are part of RBM to some extent, these are 
still two of the factors that impede better impact of CB. In my view, neither 
better RBM nor more PA will be sufficient to change this.  
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7.8 Final remarks, chapter 7 
The main challenges to achieving CB, as seen by Red Cross experts, are 
ownership, culture, priorities and coordination. These challenges might not be 
more easily overcome through alternative results approaches. It might be relevant 
to examine the suggested need to change the funding partners and to change the 
structure of how projects are governed at steering-group level. Rather than new 
methods of assessing results, governance that is more coherent might contribute 
to better results. Further empirical research is needed to conclude whether 
changes in priorities, aid structure or improvements in project governance, at the 
donor side of the aid channel, can contribute to improved results and less 
‘elusiveness’ in CB results.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to investigate, based on a case study of the Norwegian Red 
Cross, why Capacity Building (CB) seems to remain an elusive goal despite the 
massive efforts of Results Based Management (RBM). The overall conclusion is 
that the impression of poor results or elusiveness is not always correct, and that 
the current RBM system appears to be better than its reputation. Although much 
of the criticism of RBM may be valid, it should be noted that the positive aspects 
are overlooked in most of the literature. Still, there is definitely room for 
improvements in results management as well as in the aid structure –influencing 
the possibilities of achieving better results for those in most need. 
One of the main issues of this thesis has been the conflict between a bottom–up 
approach, CB, and a partly top–down approach, RBM. In this concluding 
chapter, I will take a bottom–up approach and start with the last sub-question:  
1) What are the main challenges of CB, and does RBM address those?  
2) Does RBM document actual results of CB and contribute to improved 
results through learning?   
3) Do unrealistic ambitions and goals set Capacity Building up for failure? 
8.1 Challenging aspects influencing CB  
Some of the achievements of CB, and the Financial Development Programme in 
particular, are: i) more efficient administration, ii) increased trust and iii) 
implementing NSs taking lead in strategy development and planning. The main 
challenges for achieving more and better results are lack of ownership and lack 
of coordination between funding partners. Without generalizing, I have 
suggested, on the basis of this case study, that the project model approach has 
been only partially implemented in the aid sector. Without more coordinated 
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governance, improved results are likely to be obstructed. More research is needed 
to see how coordination and ownership influence long-term results. RBM and PA 
approaches partly cover the challenging issues of ownership and coordination, 
but, in my view, no methodological approach will be sufficient to tackle the root 
causes of the challenges: donor priorities, time pressure, resources for peer-to-
peer cooperation, willingness to coordinate and compromise among funding 
partners and so forth. It is also worth noting that donor priorities do not 
necessarily yield the intended results. An interesting paradox is revealed between 
building streamlined organizations and supporting those organizations which are 
perceived as being most relevant for making real changes. 
8.2 Methodology choices partly obstruct learning and 
documentation of actual results 
I have questioned the perspective that ‘The widely reported underperformance of 
aid in earlier years would not occur in the future as RBM methods would ensure 
high levels of performance’ (Hulme 2007:18), as well as challenged the one-
sidedly negative criticisms from researchers. RBM can contribute to improved 
results through more systematic approach and quality assurance. Armed with 
researchers’ criticisms of RBM, I was struck by the positive attitude towards 
RBM among my respondents, and also by the variety of approaches that the Red 
Cross uses to evaluate projects, ensure learning and document results. However, 
this case study has also shown that RBM is ill-suited for documenting results of 
CB. It also confirmed that RBM can be counterproductive because of its 
extensive use of resources, limited attention to learning, and being a drain on 
energy. Worth noting, however, is that my initial assumption of extensive 
distortion has not been confirmed: I found that both the Norwegian Red Cross 
and Norad do indeed give priority to CB projects.  
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This study has identified a gap between RBM intentions and practice, as well as a 
gap between needs and requirements. Indicator tracking and procedural reporting 
have gained dominance at the expense of reflection and learning. I have indicated 
four main explanatory factors for this: methodological preferences, budget 
constraints, limited capacity and limited acceptance for the complexity of CB.  
Drawing on methodological theory, I have suggested that the prevalence of 
conventional methods, and especially indicators, is because the natural-science 
tradition has higher legitimacy than constructivist methods involving narratives 
and reflections (see Knutsen and Moses 2007). Budget limitation is a practical 
hindrance just as relevant as ideology. Although indicators are never meant to 
give the full picture of any project, it seems unrealistic and unjustifiable to 
conduct data tracking and in-depth studies for all programmes. Despite the 
intentions of New Public Management to move from a focus on control to a 
focus on results, the dominant practice still focuses on control and donor 
accountability.  
That said, methodological choices and budget constraints are not the only reason 
why the conventional approach still dominates. Two other explanations are 
limited understanding of the need for RBM (or PMER) capacity, and limited 
acceptance of the complexity entailed in building capacity. This study has 
indicated that the linear thinking of RBM is ill-suited for capturing the 
complexity of CB. 
There is something very appealing about the Participatory Approach (see 
Chambers 2008) and PA ideas are in line with the CB concept (bottom–up, 
participation, ownership etc.). As shown by the workshop example, PA can 
create learning and energy, and thereby the possibility of contributing to 
improved results. On the other hand, it seems questionable whether PA can 
respond to back-donor demands for documentation, and whether it has the 
potential to address the root challenges of the CB concept. 
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8.3 Unrealistic ambitions set CB up for failure 
Both Norwegian official development policy and the Norwegian Red Cross set 
high ambitions. My findings suggest that the capacity of the aid sector does not 
match these ambitions. The objectives of Norwegian development policy are set 
at a societal level, while the objectives of NGO projects are set at the institutional 
level. This leads to a gap in levels, wherein overall ambitions and project scopes 
do not match. In fact, many aid projects, including Capacity Building, do achieve 
their immediate goals (see Riddell 2001:269–270, Norad 2012b:5 and 16–17, 
Norad 2010, Bloom and Levinger 2011:29). However, this is not always visible 
in the societal and long-term impacts. The apparent lack of results might explain 
the diminishing confidence in aid (SSB 2013) and the quest for more efficient 
aid. One explanatory factor behind the perceived lack of results is lack of 
capacity, including the challenge of low salaries and high turnover.  
Indeed, the ambitions set at project level are also high. This is driven both by 
pursuit for funding and for an intense desire to facilitate changes. The number of 
goals and requirements from various initiatives and the number of donors act as a 
third factor that can lead to unrealistic ambitions.  
8.4 Paradoxes, multifaceted and interlinked challenges 
Throughout this thesis, I have presented paradoxes and dilemmas in RBM and 
CB. One dilemma inherent in NPM, between control and autonomy, is still 
relevant as one explanation for weak results or documentation thereof. The thesis 
has also shown other dilemmas and paradoxes: i)support to weak NSs versus 
results requirements, ii)requirements of reporting and low administration costs 
versus weak capacity to track and report, iii)acceptance of complexity home 
versus abroad, iv)more complex interventions meets ‘simpler’ methodological 
instruments, v)distance between who is setting overall goals and who are 
responsible for implementing, vi)need for quick interventions in extreme 
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situations versus long-term results, vii)short-term results versus sustainability, 
viii)building streamlined organizations versus need for ‘real’ change makers. 
Mention has also been made of the aversion to risk-taking as well as the dilemma 
between prioritizing the least developed countries and being able to demonstrate 
short-term results. 
The thesis has also presented various factors that can help to explain why CB 
seems to remain an elusive goal despite massive efforts of RBM. I have 
discussed whether the weak results are only an impression, or if they are real. 
This case study suggests that the answers lie in both categories: some are 
explained by actual weak results and some are only impression-based. Figure 5 
summarizes the explanatory factors split in those two categories for each of the 
three sub-questions. 
For example is the impression of weak results caused by (too) high ambitions and 
contextualised results lost in aggregation. Actual weak results are e.g. capacity 
constraints, limited priority of learning in the RBM practice and lack of local 
ownership. See more examples in figure 5. My point is that there is no single 
explanation for the neither actual nor apparent weak results. The challenges in 
both demonstrating and improving results are multi-faceted. 
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The three sub-questions under discussion are also interlinked. High ambitions 
lead to high expectations. If they are not met, this is likely to lead to calls for 
more effectiveness and more Results Based Management. These requirements 
become translated into a certain RBM practice which in the next step also will 
influence CB projects. Both setting objectives and RBM practice will influence 
CB results. Further research is needed to analyse how goals and RBM can 
contribute to improved CB results in the future.  
Figure 5: Summary of explanatory factors 
131 
 
Bibliography 
Ask, Alf Ole (2013, 21 July): Mener verden skapte en katastrofe i Haiti. [Aftenposten 
online] . Available at: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Mener-verden-
skapte-en-katastrofe-i-Haiti-7257107.html  
Banik, Dan (ed.) (2006): Poverty, Politics and Development: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget 
Banik, Dan (2010): Poverty and Elusive Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget  
Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George (2005): Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press. Available at: 
http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/case-studies-and-theory-development-social-
sciences (accessed 19 November 2013) 
Bensky, Roberta (2011): Financial Development Review  [unpublished internal Red 
Cross evaluation] 
Bistandsaktuelt (2010): Vi må tåle å bli politisert, in Bistandsaktuelt, 22 October 2010. 
Available at: http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter-og-reportasjer/arkiv-
nyheter-og-reportasjer/vi-m%C3%A5-t%C3%A5le-%C3%A5-bli-politisert 
(accessed 16 November 2013) 
Bloom, Evan and Beryl Levinger (2011): Fulfilling the Promise: How National 
Societies Achieve Sustainable Organizational Development – A Multi-Country 
Study. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Evaluations/Evaluations2011/Global/GlobalODStudy1
1.pdf (accessed 13 January 2012) 
Bohwasi, Phillip, Grete Brochman, Ivar Evensmo, Jacqueline Lambert-Madore, Arjuna 
Parakrama and Ted Paterson (North–South Institute, Canada) (1998): Evaluation 
Report 4.98. Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Non-
Governmental Organisations. Development through institutions? Sub-study 4.  
Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page
?key=109664 (accessed 17 June 2011) 
Booth, Wayne, Gregory G. Colomb and Joseph M. Williams (2008): The Craft of 
Research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
Chambers, Robert  (2008): Revolutions in Development Inquiry. London: Earthscan 
132 
 
Chambers, Robert (1995): ‘Poverty and livelihoods: whose reality counts?’ Available 
at: http://eau.sagepub.com/content/7/1/173.full.pdf (accessed 23 March 2011) 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2010): ‘Complexity and hybrid public 
administration – theoretical and empirical challenges’, Public Organization 
Review 11 (4): 407–423 
Christensen, Tom, Morten Egeberg, Helge O. Larsen, Per Lægreid and Paul G. Roness 
(2007): Forvaltning og politikk. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 
Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kjell Arne Røvik (2010): 
Organisasjonsteori for offentlig sektor, Vol. 2. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget  
Coghlan, David and Teresa Brannick (2001): Doing Action Research in Your Own 
Organization. London: SAGE 
Danida (2005): Evaluation. Capacity Development, Outcome Evaluation, Field-testing 
of the Methodology . Available at: 
http://startinternational.org/library/archive/files/danida-cd-evaluation-
144_eab5be065b.pdf  (accessed 18 November 2011) 
Ebrahim, Alnoor and V. Kasturi Rangan (2010): The Limits of Nonprofit Impact: A 
Contingency Framework for Measuring Social Performance. Working paper . 
Available at: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6439.html  (accessed 23 March 2011)  
Eggen, Øyvind (2011): Dissonance in Development: Foreign Aid and State Formation 
in Malawi.  Dr.Phil.Dissertation, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås. 
Available at: 
http://www.nupi.no/content/download/246707/874469/version/1/file/Dissonance
+in+Development.pdf  
Eggen, Øyvind (2008). ‘Virker bistand? Ulike bidrag til de siste års bistandsdebatt’, 
Internasjonal Politikk 66 (1): 209–222.  
Farah, Nagat, Malcolm McKinlay, and Trine Moa (2012): ‘Straight talk about 
partnership – a synthesis of voices discussing cooperation, exit, branch 
development and sustainability and the relationship between the Sudanese Red 
Crescent and the Norwegian Red Cross’ [unpublished internal document]  
Fukuda-Parr, S., C. Lopes and K. Malik (2002): Capacity for Development – New 
Solutions to Old Problems. London: Earthscan. 
Green, Maia (2009): ‘Doing development and writing culture. – Exploring knowledge 
practices in international development and anthropology’, Anthropological 
133 
 
Theory  9 (4): 395–417. Available at: http://intl-
ant.sagepub.com/content/9/4/395.full.pdf+html (accessed 8 July 2012)  
Gustavsson, Tina Karrbom and Anette Hallin (2012): Project Management. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget 
Hennestad, Bjørn W. and Øivind Revang (2009): Endrings-ledelse og ledelses-
endring.2nd edition. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 
Howell, Jude (2002): ‘In their own image: donor assistance to civil society’, Lusotopie, 
1: 117–131. ISSN 1257-0273 . Available at: 
http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/howell.pdf (accessed 1 December 
2011)  
Hulme, David (2007): ‘The Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human 
Development Meets Results-Based Management in an Imperfect World’. Brooks 
World Poverty Institute Working Paper No. 16: 1–26. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1246696## (accessed 17 
February 2012) 
Hyden, Gøran (2006): African Politics in Comparative Perspective. New York: 
Cambridge University Press 
Høidal, Eduardo, Kim Fjelde Reiersen and Floyd Rudmin (2008):  Hvilken 
organisasjonskultur korrelerer med og predikerer ytelse i hæren?  Available at: 
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/pt/artikler/2008.2.hoidal.pdf  (accessed 16 August 
2013 
IFRC (2008): ‘Programme Update. Capacity Building Fund - Appeal MAA00011’. 
Available at: http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual08/MAA0001108pu1.pdf 
IFRC (2010a): strategy2020 – SAVING LIVES, CHANGING MINDS. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/general/strategy-2020.pdf (accessed 5 
July 2012) 
IFRC (2010b): Federation-Wide Reporting System (FWRS) Overview. – Draft, 24 June 
2010. IFRC. 
IFRC (2011a): Pilot project: Building sustainable local capacity in the branches of the 
Burundi Red Cross Society – Evaluation Report, IFRC. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Evaluations/Evaluations2011/Africa/978-92-9139-180-
6%20Burundi-evaluation-report.pdf 
134 
 
IFRC (2011b): Project/programme monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guide. Geneva: 
IFRC 
IFRC (undated): Building the capacities of National Societies. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/capacity-building/ (accessed 30 October 
2013) 
Jessen, Svein Arne (2001): Mer effektivt prosjektarbeid i offentlig og privat virksomhet, 
2nd edition. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 
Johannessen, Kai Ingolf, Olav Molven and Sidsel Roalkvam (2007): Godt, rett, 
rettferdig – etikk for sykepleiere. Oslo: Akribe 
Khogali, Hisham and Derej Zewdu (2009): Impact and Cost Benefit Analysis – A Case 
Study of Disaster Risk Reduction Programming In Red Sea State Sudan 
Klingebil, Stefan (2011): ‘Result-based aid: Limitation of new approaches’,  Deutsches 
Institut for Entwicklungspolitik, briefing paper 17. German Development 
Institute. 
Knutsen, Torbjørn and Jonathan Moses (2007): Ways of Knowing: Competing 
Methodologies in Social and Political Research. London: Palgrave Macmillan  
Kruse, Stein-Erik, Erik Magnus Sæther, David Michael Fergus and Arne Disch / Centre 
for Partnership in Development (DiS) with Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) 
(1998): Evaluation report 5.98. Institutional Development in Norwegian 
Bilateral Assistance. Development through institutions? Synthesis Report. Oslo: 
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Kuramoto, Juana and Francisco Sagasti (2002): ‘Integrating local and global 
knowledge, technology and production systems: challenges for technical 
cooperation’, in Fukuda-Parr et al. pp. 203–228 
Mayne, John (2008): ‘Contribution analysis: An  approach to exploring cause and 
effect’ ILAC Brief 16. Netherlands. Available at: http://www.cgiar-
ilac.org/files/ILAC_Brief16_Contribution_Analysis_0.pdf (accessed 8 July 
2012) 
McNeill, Desmond (1999) ‘On interdisciplinary research: with particular reference to 
the field of environment and development’, Higher Education Quarterly 53 (4): 
312–332 
135 
 
McNeill, Desmond (2012). desmond.mcneill@sum.uio.no, 2012. LFA. [email] Reply to 
Tone Faugli (tone.faugli@redcross.no). Sent 27
 
January 2012, 17:05 [cited on 27 
January 2012]  
Mikkelsen, Britha (2005): Methods for Development Work and Research : A New Guide 
for Practitioners. Second edition. London: SAGE 
Ministry of Finance (2012): http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/the-
ministry/Underliggende-etater/the-customs-and-excise-
authorities.html?id=270408 (accessed 18 November 2013) 
Mkandawire, Thandika (2002): ‘Incentives, governance and capacity development in 
Africa’, in Fukuda-Parr et al.,Capacity for Development.  London: Earthscan. 
pp. 147–150 
Mosse, David (2005) 'Global governance and the ethnography of international aid,' in: 
D. Mosse and D. Lewis (eds), The Aid Effect. Giving and Governing in 
International Development. London: Pluto Press, pp. 1–36. Available at: 
http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/global-governance-and-ethno-of-intl-
aid-august-2006.pdf (accessed 8 July 2012)  
Moyo, Dambisa (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There is Another 
Way for Africa. London: Penguin Books 
Natsios, Andrew  (2010): The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development. 
Center for Global Development, essay. Available at: 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424271 (accessed 16 
September 2011) 
Norad (2008): Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation : A 
practical guide.  Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(Norad) 
Norad (2009): Principles for Norad’s Support to Civil Society in the South . Available 
at: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-
publications/publications/publication?key=128394 (accessed 5 August 2012) 
Norad (2010): Resultatrapport 2010 – Kapasitetsutvikling: Bygging av levedyktige 
samfunn . Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page
?key=207940 (accessed 29 March 2011)  
136 
 
Norad (2011a): Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East 
Africa – Report 1/11 – Evaluation . Available at: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-
and-publications/publications/publication?key=333388 
Norad (2011b): Årsrapport 2011: Evaluering av norsk utviklingssamarbeid. Oslo: 
Direktoratet for utviklingssamarbeid  
Norad (2012a): Vi trenger mer kunnskap om virkningen av norsk bistand. Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/no/evaluering/nyhetsarkiv/vi-trenger-mer-kunnskap-om-
virkningen-av-norsk-bistand (published 4 June 2012, accessed 28 October 2013) 
Norad (2012b):  TRACKING IMPACT - An exploratory study of the wider effects of 
Norwegian civil society support to countries in the South. Oslo: Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) 
Norad (2013a): Evalueringsavdelingens årsrapport 2012: Evaluering av norsk 
utviklingssamarbeid. Oslo: Norad, evaluation department 
Norad (2013b): Sammendrag_Studie av bruk av evalueringer i norsk 
bistandsforvaltning.pdf  Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/no/evaluering/publikasjoner/publikasjon?key=402245 
(accessed 5 November 2013) 
Norad (2013c): A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society 
Organisations.pdf  Available at: 
http://www.norad.no/no/evaluering/publikasjoner/publikasjon?key=402245 
(accessed 5 November 2013) 
Norad (2013d): ‘Norsk bistand i tall’.  Available at: http://www.norad.no/no/om-
bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall (accessed 27 November 2013) 
Nord/Sør konsulentene (2011): ‘Organisassjonsutvikling i nasjonalforeningene. Rapport 
fra gruppediskusjoner i Utenlandsavdelingen Norges Røde Kors.’ [unpublished 
internal document, Norwegian Red Cross]  
Norgaard, R. and Sharachchandra L.(2005): ‘Practicing interdisciplinarity’, BioScience 
55 (11): 967–975. 
NOU 2008: 14: Samstemt for utvikling? Hvordan en helhetlig norsk politikk kan bidra 
til utvikling i fattige land. Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/nou-er/2008/nou-2008-
14.html?id=525832 (accessed 9 October 2012) 
137 
 
Norwegian Red Cross (2009):  ‘Strategy for International Activities 2009–2014 The 
Norwegian Red Cross’ . Available at :  
http://lokal.rodekors.no/upload/Hovedkontor/International%20strategy%202009
-2014%20english.pdf  
Norwegian Red Cross (2009): ‘Progress report for Southern Africa regional 
programmes. Norad ref: GLO-08/418-24/ NorCross ref. RAF09140’ 
[unpublished internal document] 
Norwegian Red Cross (2012a): ‘The Norwegian Red Cross’ periodic result report to 
Norad for 2009–2011’ Agreement number GLO-08/418. [unpublished internal 
document] 
Norwegian Red Cross (2012b): Programme/project plan, Malagasy Red Cross,– 
Thematic area: Organisational development. Date: 30 July 2012. [unpublished 
internal document] 
Norwegian Red Cross (2012c): ‘Eierskap, endringsledelse, bærekraft. Sterke og 
velfungerende nasjonalforeninger. En forutsetning for å møte behovene til de 
mest utsatte og sårbare. Hovedprinsipper for Røde Kors’ støtte til 
nasjonalforeningers organisasjonsutvikling.’ [unpublished internal document] 
Norwegian Red Cross (2013a): Indicator tracking table. [unpublished internal 
document] 
Norwegian Red Cross (2013b): ‘NorCross OD Approach – Focus Group Discussion’ 
[unpublished internal document] 
OECD (2006): The Challenge of Capacity Development – WORKING TOWARDS 
GOOD PRACTICE . Available at :  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf (accessed 1 December 2011) 
OECD (undated, a): ‘Evaluation of development programmes. DAC Criteria for 
Evaluating Development Assistance’.  Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassista
nce.htm (accessed 6 November 2013) 
OECD (undated, b): ‘Aid effectiveness. Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for 
Action’ . Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.
htm (accessed 6 November 2013) 
Office of the Auditor General of Norway/Riksrevisjonen (2011, January 13): 
‘Mangelfull resultatorientering i norsk langsiktig bistand’. Available at: 
138 
 
http://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Presserom/Pressemeldinger/Sider/bistand.aspx 
(accessed 10 July 2012) 
Ortiz, Alfredo and Peter Taylor (2009): Learning purposefully in capacity development. 
Available at: 
http://www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Cap_Dev_Rethinking/pdf/Le
arning_purposefully.pdf (accessed 23th September 2011) 
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (2011): ‘Synthesis report of the 
evaluation of Dutch support to capacity development. - Facilitating 
resourcefulness’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/ghana/48678426.pdf (accessed 23 September 
2011) 
Portela, Gilbia (2012): Legitimacy and Risk – Perceptions of Organizational Risk in a 
Norwegian Non-governmental Organization. Masters thesis, Centre for 
Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. 
Rattsø, Jørn, with Ruth Haug, Stein Erik Kruse, Sidsel Saugestad, Per Selle, Anne 
Sletmo og Atle Sommerfeldt (2006): ‘Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i 
utviklingssamarbeidet.’ Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/pla/2006/0004/ddd/pdfv/283962-
rattso.pdf (accessed 16 September 2011) 
Red Cross (undated, untitled). Table with 91 criteria defining six sets of Core Capacities 
with the column headlines; ‘Criteria for excellence’, ‘Attribute’ and ‘Current 
situation’. Unpublished internal document. Provided by one respondent.  
Reeler, Doug (2007): A Three-fold Theory of Social Change and Implications for 
Practice, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. Community Development 
Resource Association. Available at: 
http://www.cdra.org.za/articles/A%20Theory%20of%20Social%20Change%20b
y%20Doug%20Reeler.pdf (accessed 16 September 2011) 
Riddell, Roger C. (2001): Does Foreign Aid Really Work? New York: Oxford 
University Press 
Silverman, David (2001): Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, 
Text and Interaction. Wolverhampton: Cromwell Press 
Skard, Torild (2011, 26 January): ‘Bistand i blinde’. Available at: 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/alle_meninger/cat1003/subcat1010/thre
ad122081/ (accessed 28 January 2011)  
139 
 
Solli, Audun (2011): ’From good governance to development? A critical perspective on 
the case of Norway's oil for development. Forum for Development Studies 38 
(1): 1–21. 
SSB (2013): Holdninger til og kunnskap om norsk u-hjelp, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.ssb.no/uhjelphold/ (Published 5 November 2013, accessed 21 
November 2013) 
Taylor, Ian (2004): ‘Hegemony, neoliberal ‘good governance and the International 
Monetary Fund: a Gramscian perspective’, in Desmond McNeill and Morten 
Bøås (eds), Global institutions and Development: Framing the World?  London: 
Routledge, pp. 124–136 
Thagaard, Tove ( 2003): Systematikk og innlevelse. En innføring i kvalitativ metode. 
Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.  
United Nations Economic and Social Council (2006): ‘Definition of basic concepts and 
terminologies in governance and public administration’. Available at: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf 
(accessed 27 November 2013) 
Vike, Halvard ( 2004): Velferd uten grenser. Den norske velferdsstaten ved veiskillet. 
Oslo: Akribe 
Vähämäki, Janet, Joakim Molander and Martin Schmidt (2011): Results based 
management in development cooperation. Available at: 
http://www.seachangecop.org/sites/default/files/documents/2011%2011%20RB
M%20in%20development%20cooperaton.pdf  (accessed 29 July 2013) 
Welle-Strand, Anne (2008, 22 December): Strykkarakter til norad-rapport. Available at: 
http://www.bi.no/forskning/Nyheter/Nyheter-2008/Strykkarakter-til-Norad-
rapport/ (accessed 10 July 2013) 
White Paper no 13 (2008–2009): ’Klima, konflikt og kapital – Norsk utviklingspolitikk 
i et endret handlingsrom ’. Available at:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2152610/PDFS/STM200820090013000DDDP
DFS.pdf (accessed 25 March 2011) 
White Paper no 11 (2011–2012): Global health in foreign and development policy. 
Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/ud/dokument/proposisjonar-og-
meldingar/stortingsmeldingar/2011-2012/meld-st-11-2011-
2012/3.html?id=681870 (accessed 7 August 2012) 
140 
 
White Paper no 14 (2010–2011): ‘Towards a greener development’. Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/ud/dokument/proposisjonar. Availableog-
meldingar/stortingsmeldingar/2010-2011/meld-st-14-2010-2011-
2/3/6.html?id=655164 (accessed 7 August 2012) 
White, Howard (2009): ‘Theory-Based Impact Evaluation : principles and practice.’ 
Journal of Development Effectiveness 1(3): 271–284. 
 
141 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
Simonsen, Anette: Consultant, Course provider and Head of Results Management  
Evensmo Ivar: Senior Advisor, Civil Society Department, Norad 
Kruse, Stein Erik: Consultant and Partner at Nordic Consulting Group 
Eggen, Øyvind: Senior Researcher at NUPI (now Policy Director, Evaluation 
Department, Norad) 
 
Red Cross staff: 
 Country representative Lebanon (previously programme coordinator for Sudan) 
 Deputy Head of Programme Division International Department (previously 
programme coordinator for the Americas) 
 Head of Finance Division (previously short-term mission in Zimbabwe) 
 Head of Organizational Development Burundi  
 Head of Resources International Department  
 PMER advisor (Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting) 
 Programme coordinator for East Africa 
 Programme coordinator for Sudan  (previously programme coordinator for Lesotho, 
Haiti, regional representative for East Africa and others) 
 Programme coordinator for Tsunami programs (now SOS Children Villages) 
 Regional representative Southern Africa (previously programme coordinator for 
Lesotho, West Africa, and Senior Advisor Disaster Risk Reduction East Africa) 
 Regional representative for Southern Africa and Financial Development Advisor  
 Senior advisor Organizational Development (previously programme coordinator for 
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Appendix 2: Evaluations, policy documents and 
result reports 
The following evaluations, policy documents and result reports have been used as 
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Bensky, Roberta (2011): Financial Development Review   
Bloom, Evan and Beryl Levinger (2011): Fulfilling the Promise: How National 
Societies Achieve Sustainable Organizational Development – A Multi-
Country Study. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Evaluations/Evaluations2011/Global/GlobalODStu
dy11.pdf  
Farah, Nagat, Malcolm McKinlay, and Trine Moa (2012): ‘Straight talk about 
partnership – a synthesis of voices discussing cooperation, exit, branch 
development and sustainability and the relationship between the Sudanese 
Red Crescent and the Norwegian Red Cross’ 
IFRC (2011a): Pilot project: Building sustainable local capacity in the branches of 
the Burundi Red Cross Society – Evaluation Report, IFRC. Available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Evaluations/Evaluations2011/Africa/978-92-9139-
180-6%20Burundi-evaluation-report.pdf  
Khogali, Hisham and Derej Zewdu (2009): Impact and Cost Benefit Analysis – A 
Case Study of Disaster Risk Reduction Programming In Red Sea State Sudan 
Nord–Sør konsulentene (2011): Report from group discussions on Organizational 
Development  
Norwegian Red Cross (2009): ‘Progress report for Southern Africa regional 
programmes. Norad ref: GLO-08/418-24/ NorCross ref. RAF09140’  
Norwegian Red Cross (2012a): ‘The Norwegian Red Cross’ periodic result report to 
Norad for 2009–2011’ Agreement number GLO-08/418 
Norwegian Red Cross (2012c): ‘Eierskap, endringsledelse, bærekraft. Sterke og 
velfungerende nasjonalforeninger. En forutsetning for å møte behovene til de 
mest utsatte og sårbare. Hovedprinsipper for Røde Kors’ støtte til 
nasjonalforeningers organisasjonsutvikling.’  
143 
 
Appendix 3: Seminars and internal meetings 
April 2011: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East 
Africa, presentation of study by Tärnstrøm at Norad, Oslo 
December 2011: ‘On the road home’ seminar: On monitoring, evaluation and impact 
assessment, Oslo – Introduction by Howard White, director, International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluations (3ie) 
November 2011: Presentation of PMER framework and practical guidelines, Red Cross, 
Oslo 
November 2011: Dissemination of Financial Development Review, Red Cross, Oslo 
December 2011: Norad Conference 2011: Development assistance and conflict. Norad 
Annual Report presented, Oslo 
March 2012: What are the effects of Norwegian assistance? Presentation of report by 
civil society panel, Norad, Oslo 
June 2012: Organizational Development, Norwegian Red Cross Support to National 
Societies, presentations and discussions, Red Cross, Oslo 
April 2013: Study of the evaluation work of Norwegian civil society organizations, 
Norad, Oslo 
 
 
 
 
